tricontinental

END OF A WAR CRIMINAL IN

BESTOWED TO THE TRICONTINENTAL
ORGANIZATION
"The pierced man" 3.00 x 1.50 Roberto Matta

FORERUNNERS AND FIGHTERS FALLEN
IN THE TRICONTINENTAL STRUGGLE

Sandino, Nicaragua; Lumumba, Congo; Van Troi, Viet-Nam; Ben Barka, Morocco; Turcios Lima, Guatemala; Guido Gil, Dominican Republic; Domingo Ramos, so-called Portuguese Guinea. Major Ernesto Che Guevara in his Message to the Tricontinental Organization: **Our soldiers must be thus; a people without hatred cannot vanquish a brutal enemy.**

EDITORIAL

Two years have passed since the holding of the First Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America. This period has been one of struggle between the revolutionary forces and those of reaction, headed by U S imperialism, that with characteristic aggressiveness and alienation, continues its systematic policy of plunder and exploitation the world over.

That first Conference gathered revolutionaries from the three continents who outlined a strategy: the joint struggle, unavoidable as the only genuine path by which to eliminate the exploitative regime of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. The Conference determined that "imperialism will never voluntarily relinquish its policy of exploitation, oppression, pillage, aggression and intervention."

Its aggressiveness has increased in these last two years. Four hundred and eighty thousand U S troops are today stationed in Viet-Nam as against 180,000 in 1965, plus 46,000 South Korean troops, a Thai regiment, one from Australia and units from New Zealand and the Philippines. More than a million tons of bombs have been dropped on Viet-Nam; bombing raids continue over liberated zones of Laos; and even Cambodian territory has been the target of bombardments. Sixty thousand U S troops still remain in occupied South Korea; more than a million U S troops are stationed abroad in comparison to 835,000 in 1965.

One hundred and thirty-two active U S installations throughout the world (200 U.S. military bases in Japan are considered one installation) have been enlarged. A radar and radio base has been constructed at Northeast Cape in Australia; another base at Sierra Macarena, Colombia. The Chilean Government authorized construction of a base on Christmas Island and there are plans for another at the Malvinas Islands, Argentina. Bases are being constructed or enlarged at Sattader, Ichan Kaen, Takhiliu, Korat, Udorn, U-Tapao and Lop-Buri in Thailand. A special highway called "friendship highway" —as the Nazis in years past called similar thoroughfares— was constructed to link these bases with the rest of the country.

International reaction, trained by the USA, has launched a violent offensive against the African continent, instigating coups d'état against progressive governments, as was the case in Ghana, or by placing in power regimes responding to its interests, as happened in the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Nigeria, Lesotho, Togo and Sierra Leone. In Latin America we have seen this in Argentina, and U S policy of "democratization" has legalized dictatorships in Brazil, Ecuador and Santo Domingo.

U S soldiers and officers pop up all over the world as advisors under various pseudonyms: Green Berets, technicians, "peace corpsmen," whichever best serves U S policy of penetration and subjugation.

In Indonesia, hundreds of thousands of citizens have been assassinated; in Greece, pseudo-democratic legality was crushed, and they resorted to the coup d'état; the world was shaken by Israeli aggression against the Arab states in which the power of U S. and British installations was brought to play.

With each new crime against the peoples, the revolutionary movement grows, its hatred increases, and with each passing day the crisis of the decaying structure of exploitation and misery becomes more acute.

The most shocking example of U S aggression is seen in Viet-Nam. And it is there that we also see the most eloquent response of the peoples. In Viet-Nam, an armed people, in the name of humanity, is waging the most heroic war of modern times. In these last two years, U S losses have reached 270,000. In South Viet-Nam the patriots have destroyed 4,216 planes and 2,600 have been downed in North Viet-Nam while 6,480 military vehicles have been put out of action. The liberation movements of Laos, the Philippines, Malaya, Kalimantan, Thailand and Indonesia are growing, while in Guinea (called Portuguese), Angola, Mozambique, the Congo (L), Palestine, Zimbabwe, Southwest Africa and South Africa, the people have already taken up arms. And in the USA's own backyard, in Venezuela, Colombia, Nicaragua and Guatemala, the guerrilla movement is developing.

Strikes, demonstrations, protests, the seizing of land, are all expressions of the need to fight felt by the masses in different countries in the face of exploitation and misery.

And on three continents, the imperialists are paying their blood-quota at the hands of peoples who are fighting. The national liberation movement gives form to the indispensible solidarity that must count on the help of the already liberated countries. Scorn and hatred for imperialism are also growing among diverse sectors of mankind. Within the United States itself contradictions are growing more acute. Opposition to the war in Viet-Nam and the struggle of the Black people is growing in close relation with the liberation movements acquiring greater proportions, and it is actually aimed at its real objective: destruction of the imperialist system as a whole.

The OLAS Conference, inevitably bound to the worldwide struggle, had special significance for the peoples of Latin America, and showed the imperialists that today the liberation movements are joining forces and that people themselves are ready to contest the so-called U S authority.

And while "peace reigns" throughout the world, misery and hunger take their toll; genocide in Viet-Nam claims new victims with each passing hour; and federal, colonial, imperial or "national" troops commit daily slaughter throughout the three continents: Asia, Africa and Latin America. This assassination may be physical, cultural or economic, but it is directed against the natural way of life. The Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL has maintained the principles on which it was founded. The struggle of our peoples continues following the examples of Lumumba, Sandino, Van Troi and Ben Barka, and all those who have fallen in the course of these two years of struggle against imperialism: Guido Gil of the Dominican Republic; Major Domingo Ramos of so-called Portuguese Guinea; Major Turcios Lima of Guatemala; and others. Major Ernesto Che Guevara, genuine interpreter of the purest internationalism, who shed his blood on Bolivian soil, stated in his message to the Tricontinental Organization: "The peoples of the three continents focus their attention on Viet-Nam and learn their lesson. Since the imperialists blackmail humanity by threatening it with war, the wise reaction is not to fear war. The general tactics of the people must be to attack hard and unremittingly on all fronts where the confrontation is taking place."
There is only one way to eliminate misery, hunger and win power: paying the price necessary in a war without quarter. Just one way: the Vietnamese way.

TRICONTINENTAL

TO THE READER

Tricontinental marks its first 6 months with the third issue of its magazine which contains several articles written especially for the occasion. These include one on the war in Viet-Nam as a focal point of world attention. Jean-Paul Sartre, with his customary straightforward manner, contributed an analysis of the sessions of the Russell Tribunal and its legality, delving into the ethical and political values that weigh on contemporary man (page 6).

Roberto Matta, 56 years old Chilean painter and architect, contributed a mural to the Tricontinental organization, synthesizing U S impotence in the face of the peoples' decision to fight. This mural is depicted on the cover of this issue. *The Pierced Man* —the title of the work —complements the Vietnamese document appearing in the section "Notes for History," setting forth the strategy underlying inevitable Yankee defeat (page 76). "The Pierced Man" is a reaffirmation of US defeats from Thay Ninh to Dak To.

TRICONTINENTAL

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If the war in Viet-Nam exposes the nature of imperialism, Japanese philosopher Yanagida exposes its more subtle side: US cultural penetration in his country (page 140). In the section "New Expression", the Secretary General of the Guinean Government, in an exclusive contribution to *Tricontinental*, writes on the cultural transformation taking place in his country, recently freed from colonial domination (page 124).

In the section "Experiences and Facts" (page 28), we publish three articles submitted for immediate publication: from Brazilian specialist

Josué de Castro, who evaluates from an internal point of view the roots of his country's economic crisis; from Uruguayan journalist Carlos Núñez, intimate observer of the Régis Debray trial, an arbitrary miscarriage of Bolivian "justice;" and an article on the guerrilla attack on the Madina Garrison, stronghold of Portuguese colonialism in the heart of Guinea Bissau. "Meridian Liberation" carries a report and interview with commandos of the Al Fatah organization in Palestine (page 65). For the first time a journalist has spoken with and photographed these commando groups that chose the path of armed struggle as the means by which to reclaim national sovereignty.



And the section "Books of Today" (page 168) contains another first. *Tricontinental* is publishing one of the chapters of an 8-volume series entitled *Contemporary Africa* by French specialist Jacques Vignes, soon to be published in Europe.

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FROM NUREMBERG TO STOCKHOLM

by Jean-Paul Sartre

Reflections on the Russell Tribunal and its Legitimacy.

Jean-Paul Sartre, 62, as Executive President of the Russell Tribunal, passed judgment from the city of Roskilde in Denmark on the United States policy of imperialism in Viet-Nam. At the opening of the first session which was held in Stockholm, Sartre gave a detailed analysis of the juridical status of the Tribunal for those who, from the beginning, had tried to proclaim its "illegality." "It is certain," he said, "that we are nothing more than jurors without the right to condemn or to absolve anyone. There will be no public proceedings nor will there follow any official accusation, properly speaking... But there are judges: they are the peoples, and above all, the people of the United States. We are working for them."

Tricontinental offers its readers this exclusive article by the French philosopher and writer who here records his ideas on this Nuremberg of tomorrow, reflections inseparable from the much discussed relationship between ethics and politics.

The "Russell Tribunal" has been considered **illegal** by the governments of the West. And by refusing it the right to hold sessions in France, General de Gaulle has summed up the general opinion of the "powers" in these words: "All justice is the sole competence of the State." And yet, this Tribunal — created on the initiative of one man, a famous philosopher it is true, but still an ordinary citizen with no public offices — after its session in Stockholm and its initial conclusions, has no further need of proving its **legitimacy.** It is this seeming contradiction that I would like to discuss with you.

On May 10, 1967, at the end of our first session, we read the conclusions of the Tribunal before the press. "1. Has the government of the United States committed acts of aggression against Viet-Nam in terms of international law? **Yes,** unanimously. 2. Have purely civilian objectives been deliberately and systematically

bombed on a large scale? **Yes, unanimously.**" And when everything had been said, when the audience including prominent press correspondents, applauded these conclusions with a standing ovation of twenty minutes, we understood that **something** had taken place or, if one prefers, that during those past ten days in which we had unceasingly heard and questioned investigators and witnesses, scrutinized and criticized documents, examined material proof, attended projections of photographs and films taken by our investigating commissions during their mission, an irreversible trial had taken place, independent of us, which had led us all, jury and public, to this point of no return, to those answers—made **by no one** to questions put **by no one** — and that suddenly made themselves evident there, as a true determination of historical objectivity.

What had happened finally? Simply, that the result of our undertaking, little by little escaping us, had turned on itself and legitimized it **a posteriori** and that, while it appointed us objectively as jurors, it freed that jury from its apprehensions, from its internal relations, as yet too subjective, defining them as a meeting of **any men whatever,** who could be replaced equally well, without delay, by **any other men whatever,** and who were summing up with the simple human power of saying yes or no, with knowledge of the cause.

Indeed, when we met at the request of Lord Bertrand Russell we hardly knew each other or not at all. Those first days in Stockholm, when we had to decide on a legal procedure, this mutual ignorance — the names, the works were well-known by all, of course, but not the human beings themselves — deeply separated us. For we came from everywhere: from the Philippines, from Cuba, from Turkey, from Pakistan, from Japan, from Western Europe and even from the United States; the Cuban delegate **did not represent** her government, for it had been agreed that we would represent no one; at least, this heroine of the Revolution, although in perfect agreement with the Revolution which was slowly and surely transforming her country, had absolutely not been sent nor chosen by Fidel. But she loved Fidel and had confidence in Fidel; her judgment, whatever it would be, would not compromise her country. But we knew that, even in these Nordic regions, so far removed from the Caribbean, it would be that of the Cuban masses which stand behind Castro; in short that —although a strictly private one — it would have a collective dimension. On the other hand, the delegates from the Philippines, from Japan, from Europe, from the United States, etc., had come, sometimes at their own risk and peril, against the wish of their governments. Until their decision to sit at the Tribunal and answer the questions asked, they were deter-

mined by the contradictions of their societies whose infrastructure remained capitalist and was consequently characterized by exploitation and oppression. It is true that they had chosen to fall in beside the masses, but each one of them had done it in his own way and, even when belonging to a political group — which moreover had neither the will nor the power to mandate them — the only thing that could be said about them is, that their appreciation of the debates would be partly conditioned, perhaps by the principles, the fundamental objectives and the mental habits of that particular group and that, at the beginning, they could not hope to express the opinion in totality of the working classes in their countries.

At the same time, although in an abstract sense these countries resemble each other in their fundamental structures, they differ greatly in their history and in the concrete nature of their economy; in other words, they really differ in regard to their relations to production, in their human conflicts, the institutions and the internal and external problems faced by them. And so, each one of us was doubly separated from the others: the political group one came from or with which one had the greatest affinity, necessarily only represented a part of the working masses and did so **in its own way:** the urgencies, the possibilities, the particular quality of the economic development, the resulting correlation of forces and the particular aspect of the class struggle, in short the historical evolution which produced us in our uniqueness as social individuals; all this including the language barrier contributed in throwing each one of them back into a sort of national subjectivity — not to mention the personal subjectivity — and making each one a stranger to the others. How, for example, could Dave Dellinger, from the United States, p a c i f i s t and nonviolent, be compared with Hernández, the poet from the Philippines, in prison for years for having carried out armed warfare against the establishment of American neocolonialism in the Philippines? How could he be compared, in his own country, with that other juror, Carmichael (he could not come to Stockholm, but sent a representative), declared partisan of violence as a reply of the Black population to the permanent violence of the white racialists? It is curious that what separated us most at the start — and still separated us the night preceding the final vote — were the superstructures and, particularly, one of them: the legal institution. Each country had different rules. Therefore, we had to establish our own. Which were we to choose? To quote one example only, the United States demand of their juries that they pronounce themselves unanimously. In France, a majority is enough.

On this last point, we debated for a long time. For some, the vote

should be unanimous; for others, a greater number, a majority was enough. Some wanted the members of the minority to be able to state their names and even publicly motivate their votes. I mention this discussion, which sometimes took a lively turn, because it could only mean one thing: **we mistrusted each other.** Certainly not as **persons:** lasting bonds of friendship were laid in Stockholm between these people who had never met each other before. And then, we respected each other, because we knew each other's past. No one doubted that when the moment came, each one would decide "in his soul and conscience." But, products of different countries and continents, none of us could foresee all the steps which would lead his neighbor to a final decision. And, without knowing even what his own judgment would be, each wished to guarantee himself and guarantee those who had confided in him, against an unexpected decision which he would be unable to ratify. It has been said in the Western press that there were "hawks" and "doves" among us: this is not true if it means that for some of us things had been prepared beforehand. But it is true that the jurors suspected the others, each in their turn, after a gesture or a misinterpreted word, of being "hard" or "soft" and that each one wanted to keep the liberty and spontaneity of the votes.

Among us, we never touched the core of the problem; we never discussed, in closed session, or in private conversations, the guilt of the United States or the overwhelming testimony we had just heard: this reserve was not the effect of a collective decision but rather a sort of fear and timidity. Our discussions, often immediately afterwards, were exclusively about our legal status. And yet, the Tribunal lived intensely: in the course of those long days, that which haunted us incessantly, that which slowly took from under our eyes and then obsessed us, was that which we never mentioned, that irrefutable and terrible assembly of proof, slowly, patiently gathered, which did not depend on any of us and which ended by creating of itself alone, by itself alone, an autonomous, hideous, unbearable thing: the war of aggression conducted by the government and the armed forces of the United States against Viet-Nam. Little by little the false façade, hastily built-up by President Johnson and his collaborators in order to deceive their own people, fell to pieces: the falsifications of history were blinding. One could see the miserable legal apparatus, painfully set up to prove that the American policy did not contradict the United Nations Charter, collapsing. On the other hand, there appeared in the full light of day, the cynical recourse to brutal force, the terrorist raids unquestionably aimed at the civilian population, the use of modern weapons, ineffectual against soldiers and military

objectives, carefully brought to perfection to cut down peasants working in the fields, the ferocious attacks of the planes against the schools, the hospitals and lazarets, the places of worship. We were still divided by our subjective discussions, while the objective reality, not taking into account our individual divisions, social or national, was uniting us without our knowledge.

The last night, we had hardly made any progress on the formal and legal plane: majority or unanimity; how were the texts to be edited which would be submitted to a vote; etc.? It seemed impossible to arrive at an understanding. And then, the chairman that night had an idea. He asked, sounding us out: "With the reserve of finding an editorial form which satisfies everyone, we could vote to know who have the intention of answering 'yes' to the questions that we have been asked." And then we voted and it was at that moment that we received somewhat of a shock; what could be called a surprise: we were unanimous in declaring the U S Government guilty of the two war crimes it had been charged with. I say it was a surprise: the trouble is we doubted the others and ourselves, shut in as we were in that infernal circle of subjectivity; emotion was so powerful, it brought tears to the eyes of some of the jurors. But, at that same moment, this unanimity freed us from subjectivity and revealed to us the truth of that long period of development. While we thought ourselves divided, each one was silently reacting like the rest of us; on receiving the depositions, expositions, the documents, our way of thinking had been one and the same: our collective unity — so rigorous one could almost consider it an identity — was not within ourselves, nor in the small court where the closed sessions were being held; it had formed itself outside us, in the big court of the Tribunal, through that which the investigators and the witnesses had so patiently reconstructed and which was none other than the sense itself of this filthy war and of the criminal policy of the United States Government. In the face of this war laid bare, of the cynical recourse to a force carelessly disguised by arguments ad usum internam, these famous differences which had worried us so much — national histories, cultures, horizons, politics, problems pertaining to each of our countries — had not held for one moment. The evidence of this, first a glimmer, then little by little, an understanding, was such that it had made interchangeable men of us. Fifteen men, each of whom could replace any other, and which could be replaced by fifteen other persons chosen no matter where or how.

It only had to be seen: we had come here and we had seen. No, and yet our offer was not limited to that. Not exactly. It had been necessary to answer two questions of legal tenor. Our indignation in

the face of photos of ravaged hospitals or of victims — among them a child whose thighs had been gnawed by napalm — had been identical in each one of us and its violence had been felt by all alike.

But this ethical jolt did not count in this matter: we could not free ourselves of it, day or night, but that was not what was asked of us. Actually, there were international laws which exactly defined certain acts as war crimes, and we had to decide if the activities of the American Government and its armed forces were or were not in this category. These laws have been in existence since 1945: they had been applied for the first time at Nuremberg and nothing challenged their validity; far from it, they had been transcribed, in a positive form, in the Charter of the United Nations. It was therefore a question of an objective determination; the nature and the meaning of the war in Viet-Nam was also shown to us in its blinding objectivity. And what we discovered on that unexpected moment of the unanimous vote was, that the application of one of these determinations to the other, of the legal qualification to the political and military operations of the U S A had been made **through us** but, as I might say, without us. I mean to say that the facts demanded their qualification with such rigor that not one of us had to hold counsel with himself and our common answer was not a subjective decision from any of us: it manifested itself in the eyes of each juror as the establishment of a truth. **These** acts and **these** laws existed: and **these** acts fell under **these** laws. As if the relation between the statute of Nuremberg which defined war crimes and the acts of the Americans in Viet-Nam had existed **before** the creation of our Tribunal and independently of it, and as if the sole role of the jurors consisted in being the **mediators** between the law and the incriminating activity.

In order for the virtual application of one to the other to become a reality, it would be enough to summon in any place whatever, any persons whatever to take cognizance of this and of that. The conclusion would be made **through them** but without their aid, we might say: it was already done, it was enough for them to take notice of it and declare it. It was then that we understood the true nature of our Tribunal: Lord Russell had indeed taken the initiative of constituting it and each one of us, in answer to his summons, had accepted the responsibility, finally, of declaring himself juror. But what Bertrand Russell had been the first to suspect was that it was not a question of setting up a Tribunal, but of giving an organ to a function which needed it most urgently and defined it beforehand. These acts **were** condemned; it was precisely the function of international legislation to bring in a verdict against them; it was the men qualified to speak which

were lacking. Through Lord Russell, **the function created its organ.** When unanimity at last deprived us of our excessively loquacious subjectivities, when we became **no matter who,** we felt all at once that the Tribunal had won its legitimacy. Some time afterwards, in a meeting, I was able to answer someone who asked me: "Why did **you** decide to constitute this Tribunal and become its juror?" "Very simply **because you** did not." Objectively, a question as well as an answer had been entered; it was only necessary for living men to come and lend it their power stripped of affirmation. And as this power alone was needed, we escaped once and for all the reproach of partiality we heard so often **before** our first session and much less frequently **afterwards.**

It is true that we all or nearly all (some jurors who were not Marxists used a different terminology) thought that imperialism should be fought and that it is an enterprise aimed, as Che Guevara said, "against all humanity." But our political convictions were of small consequence. There are some profoundly sinister aspects of monopoly capitalism which nevertheless are not crimes in the legal sense of the term. American investments in French enterprises are harmful to France; they endanger its independence and threaten the working class with an artificial unemployment whose origin may at any moment be a decision taken in New York and not a labor problem as a result of a real crisis on a national scale. It is necessary to fight against their increase: the working classes can find allies for this point of view in certain spheres of national bourgeoisie, the hand of the government can be forced and it can be compelled, in the name of the full sovereignty it claims, to curb this influx of foreign capital. But, although the consequences of this current are indeed inhuman, there is no question of defining it legally as a crime. In the first place because it concerns rather a process than a **praxis;** in the second place, because a law does not exist in bourgeois France that can be applied.

In the case of the war in Viet-Nam, there are acts, there are responsible agents, there are laws pertaining to these acts: our political position is not more important than our ethical indignation; it is a question of giving legal judgment. The injustice of the Viet-Nam war is not doubted by anyone today in Europe, even by those governments which are accomplices to it under the economic pressure of the United States; we were only supposed to decide if international law condemned it and to what type of sanction those responsible were exposing themselves. For this reason, I maintain that it was not in any way necessary, in order to pass judgment in Stockholm as we did, to belong to the clan of those who actively

struggle against imperialism; it was enough to come, to listen and to look. Of course a declared supporter of the Atlantic Alliance would undoubtedly and diplomatically have hesitated to condemn Johnson and his accomplices. But in his heart, he would secretly have agreed with us. On the other hand, it was not enough to have an opinion already right at the start to condemn this war, politically and morally.

I will mention my case; as far I was concerned, it seemed to me, that in general terms, I would probably answer yes to the first question. But I had good, although legally speaking, insufficient reasons for it; I thought quite simply — and I still think so — that a war conducted by a country many thousands of miles from its coasts, by means of an expeditionary force and planes whose bases are on foreign ground, cannot be called defensive. Arriving in Stockholm, I understood my ignorance; in order to decide, it was necessary to know and discuss the complete history of Viet-Nam since 1945 as well as American politics in Southeast Asia as of that same date. On the other hand, regarding the second question, I had no exact opinion; I knew that hundreds of civilians were dying every day, victims of American bombings. That was enough to make me hate this war. But the fact is that American propaganda, being what it is in Europe with the bourgeois press so unanimously its accomplice, I attributed these massacres to criminal indifference rather than to deliberate willfulness. If I had maintained this spirit, I would have had to answer no to the second count of indictment. My opinion, in this case, undoubtedly came from this timidity, from this fearful effort, not to believe the worst, which is characteristic of the petite bourgeoisie, my class origin.

In order to make me change my opinion, nothing less than the unbearable light which suddenly disengaged itself from the reported facts was necessary, and especially, the reports of experts regarding the fragmentation bomb. Everything arranged itself implacably under my very eyes; everything denounced the criminal intentions. My fears and that lazy spirit of conciliation common to the middle classes, were swept away. There was Hell; a prefabricated Hell. It had to be said: I could judge. I know many of our friends have questioned the usefulness of our Tribunal. The United States war of aggression against Viet-Nam, they say, is strictly a consequence of United States Asian policy, very well summed up in the "Truman Doctrine" of which the permanent "Yankee" interventionism in Latin America is the expression of the profound structures of this society based on monopoly capitalism, unceasingly compelled to export its products and its capital. That is the fact; it must be denounced, analyzed, its unacceptable consequences must be shown and

fought in the field of facts, by opposing to it, for example, in all the countries that have signed the Atlantic Pact, the largest possible popular union which will exercise pressure on their respective governments so that these, when the time comes, will be compelled to shatter the Western bloc, leaving the Alliance and NATO. In what way are jurists necessary? What do we care, after all, about an international legislation which has been sponsored, mostly, by governments that in spite of the façade set up by the bourgeois democracies, are not representative of their people? You say that legally, this war is a crime? Even so. What do we care if chance wills that some of its aspects are contradictory to the stipulations that have taken place at the summit? Phylloxera is not criminal, still, it is fought because it is harmful. We consider it reason enough to fight it, that this American operation is harmful to the human species and brings us to the brink of a world conflict. Doesn't your Tribunal, with its useless minutiae, have its origin, really, in a petit-bourgeois legalism?

I write these objections so fluently, because I had made them myself when Lord Russell kindly asked me to sit with the jurors. Nevertheless, I accepted; that means the objections did not convince me. Today, they convince me even less. And I shall try to explain the reason why. In the first place our work, naturally, does not intend to substitute itself for any actual form of struggle against imperialism and United States aggression against Viet-Nam. I would even go so far as to say that it does not intend to join that struggle, being different but with the same type of effectiveness. Later on I will show what end we have in mind or rather, is intended through us. But first of all, considering it superficially, it seems to me that unless there is no other justification, that reproach should be accepted and we should assume our "legality." If the petit bourgeois is a legalist, why not after all, try to win him to the union of the masses against imperialism, letting him know that he has legal assurances? But it is not only this. And we shall advance more if we pause a little at this remark that political propaganda has never been understood by the masses (except — and even then — in the case of extreme urgency, the idea of the dangers that are directly threatening them) if it does not begin by disclosing the ethical dimension of the activities it invites them to oppose.

For us, the Algerian war was first of all, for millions of Frenchmen protesting against it, the filthy war. Today, the photographs we can see on the posters denouncing United States policy in Viet-Nam, are of course the facts presented to us. But these facts are the ones most apt to provoke in us a moral condemnation: a mother, after an air raid, holding her dead child in her arms. Elsewhere, it is very young skeletal Vietnamese, mov-

ing on crutches, sad victims of the famine imposed by the aggressor. It is at this elementary and deep level, all at the same time, that public opinion is roused. The masses have a simple and revolutionary moral, which before any political education, demands that the relations among men be humane, condemning exploitation and oppression as radically bad **actions**, even before the organizations come to life that combat the **processes** giving rise to these actions. This moral **is right;** whichever it is, no matter where the contemplated operation comes **from**, it has an ethical dimension because the **praxis**, although conditioned by former circumstances, itself engenders ethics in the measure it questions them, surpassing them in a quest not yet in view. **Praxis** is a fact and it is more than a fact: human in the measure that it tears itself away from given situations to make history. By the same token it offers itself to the judgment of the masses which will appreciate it from the depths of their misery, their remote end being that of enforcing our alienation or drawing nearer the liberation of man. In our time, it is said, moral is politics. Nothing is more true but this would not be possible if, more profoundy, politics were not moral — at least for the working classes. In other words, an ethic exists and the masses are its guardian; the governments, no matter which, have to answer to them for their actions.

In this conflict in Southeast Asia, it is evident that the incredible heroism of the Vietnamese and their fierce determination to regain their sovereignty is, in the eyes of the other peoples, an omen of the advent of free man. We are still far from this advent but the **value** of the Vietnamese independence in our eyes precedes that which is, at the same time, symbol, admonition and, in these somber and confused times, a step which brings us nearer. The victory of Viet-Nam will be proof that man is possible. Nothing more is necessary to prove that the American enterprise, on the contrary, is essentially the object of a radical condemnation. If it should succeed, it would prove that man is a dream and that nothing else matters in the world but profit and its servants. This ethical dimension of the popular movements is of paramount importance. Far from being a super-structural aspect of it, it constitutes its original force and cohesion. It remains that it demand, in order to be rigorous, the power to reveal itself by exact conceptions and precise judgments.

Quite often, in a meeting, I have heard a speaker consider American policy "criminal." Judging from the grumbling which receives him, one feels that he has touched to the quick. But the audience was left unsatisfied: it vaguely felt that this epithet, originally accepted with a kind of joy, was losing strength in the measure it revealed its lack of precision. So many things are "crimi-

nal" that have so little resemblance; yesterday a doctor said to me: "If your doctor doesn't forbid you to smoke, he's a criminal." What relation could be established between this practitioner, who is a bit too indulgent, and General Westmoreland? Words are used, they lose power: "criminal," yes; but, at the meeting the participants demand something more than a vague ethical inference transforming itself in their minds, through lack of rigor, in a subjective discomfort. What they want is that the judgment passed incidentally by the speaker, take on and keep the character of an **objective determination.** This is precisely, I told myself, before answering Lord Russell, what this Tribunal **should be for.** Are the masses horrified by the war waged by the Americans against this small heroic and poor people, they want to know if it is a crime, they wish to learn which universal laws condemn it? Well, these laws exist; taking them into consideration we will examine the facts and supply the answers. Legalism is petit bourgeois when legislation is petit bourgeois. But the fact is, precisely, that international laws, in spite of their origin, serve popular interests. It is this that I will briefly explain here.

Before the Second World War, among the nations, it was the law of the jungle. In 1918, it had been mildly insisted that William II should be put on trial. But when Holland refused extradition, that had been enough: the allies thought no more about it. And anyway, where were the laws which would have permitted sentence to be passed? Not one existed. The aggression was in no way condemned. Later on, the Briand-Kellogg pact appeared as a development, but as no organ had been foreseen for its application, this accord remained a dead issue.

There was nothing surprising in this: the colonizing nations that had built up their wealth on aggression, the massacre of the civilian population and the organized plunder of the colonized countries, would not have allowed their actions to be judged by universal criteria. Hitler came and had the insolence of making the Europeans undergo, in Europe, the same treatment that the latter allotted, in their colonies, to those they called "natives." The horrified allies decided as of 1942 to create a body of law which would permit them to condemn the Nazis. And so, suddenly, international law, still limited to the regulation of the war, was called on **to prohibit it.** The statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal is historic inasmuch as the **jus ad bellum** becomes **jus contra bellum:** aggression is declared a war crime. This crime is punishable and, in Nuremberg, it was punished by judges. So exactly was legislation conceived to sanction Hitler's crimes, that the allies did not perceive that, by the same token, they were condemning their own wars of aggression and conquest.

massacres of civilians, summary executions, ill-treatment of prisoners, torture, genocide: this was then called a **crime.** Justly so, but these explosive stipulations, after having permitted Goering to appear in the defendant's seat, ran the risk of bringing Salazar there afterwards for his policy in Angola, or a French or English minister. The fix in which they found themselves led the allied governments to create avant-garde legislation which, rightly employed, served the interests of the oppressed. At the Nuremberg Trial, only the officers and high officials sent by their countries had the right to sit. But for once unwittingly, they did not represent the state apparatus in the hands of the ruling classes: **in the name of the masses** they not only tried the Nazis but permanently and everywhere all the men with any resemblance to them. In relation to the supreme international crime, aggression, Attorney General Jackson, speaking for the United States, said the following rash words: "Although this law is being applied for the first time against the German aggressors, it could not exclude other applications — if one wishes to see it serve all useful ends — and it should condemn any aggression committed no matter by which nation, including those conducting the trial here."

It is understandable that after having judged the last guilty German, the Nuremberg Tribunal vanished into thin air and nobody heard anything more about it. The German aggression had stood trial all right; but to avoid sentence being passed on any of "the nations conducting the trial," the only means was suppressing the only organ which had been qualified to judge. The Tribunal is dead, killed by those who created it: this means it could only survive — unless it became a docile and slightly ridiculous toy in the hands of the big powers — as a **revolutionary Tribunal** elected by the masses and judging the Heads of State on the complaint of the peoples. Nevertheless, no matter what happens, one cannot act as if it had never existed, nor as if the people were not discussing it, when a small and poor country is attacked by a rich and powerful nation: however, it condemned **that** for being a supreme war crime. We desperately need such an organ, which has appeared and has established itself permanently; and its universality has irrevocably defined rights and duties, leaving a void which must be filled. A ghost, this tribunal became the organ of the masses or rather their need. It is this which they claim when, during a meeting, in front of a poster, they feel that dull dissatisfaction I was speaking about. It is through it they demand that their ethical indignations be made universal and objective. For ethics, in this case, finds its result and full realization in **jurisdiction. Jus contra bellum** expresses the popular will, the nationalism and

internationalism of the working classes. What they demand, without always being clearly conscious of it, is that it manifest itself as **their** law, the absolute rule which permits the objective condemnation of the American aggressors. If the governments have given the legality of Nuremberg a vacation, it is because they serve the interests of the ruling classes and because the latter, strictly speaking, condemn the wars waged by others but reserve for themselves the right, when they judge it useful, to push **their** country into **their** war.

The Russell Tribunal was created because it was required. Not that, knowing the reason for it, it was in any way expected nor, above all in the form it has taken. It was born — as it had to be — of the need felt by the peoples for a universal legislation, ratified by all governments but remaining lifeless because it could not live without being revolutionary — applied, after investigation, rigorously to the precise actions of the American Government in the Viet-Nam conflict. It was born because the peoples wanted the precise concepts to be employed — that of aggression, for example — because teams of jurists had made an effort to define without ambiguity in order to clarify these somber and bloody happenings. Nobody mandated it. Who then would have done it? Not the governments, more or less accomplices, preferring silence above all. Nor the masses themselves, divided into compartments by their frontiers, having a presentiment of the universality which is denied them. But, far from substituting an instituted power, it issued from this void and this appeal. For if, as we have seen, the international laws **demand** their application to the policy of the Johnson Government, it is, in reality, owing to popular demand. At the end of our session in Stockholm, we received an initial legitimation: in the measure itself in which, owing to our unanimity, we became any person and interchangeable, in the measure in which any person could replace us; we understood that we had become the true representatives of the masses, that is to say, that we had employed pure right of judgment which belong inalienably to each and every one of the people and is the foundation of every sentence. We — members of the masses — have judged **for the masses** and undoubtedly, **before** they gave their consent.

But our judgment does not possess its truth yet; it must now be presented to the peoples, with its motives and its whereases. If they ratify it, it will become **theirs** and obtain all its objectivity from them. We will then know that our legitimation is whole and that the masses, granting us their accord, disclose a more profound demand: the creation of a real tribunal against war criminals. A tribunal emanating from them and giving their ethical claims a legal dimension. A revolutionary tribunal.

starting points

ETHICS AND SOCIALISM

by José Carlos Mariátegui

"Revolution is, unfortunately, not made with fastings. Revolutionaries from all parts of the world must choose between being the victims of violence or using it. If one does not wish to see one's spirit and one's intelligence serving brute force, one must forcibly resolve to put brute force under the subservience of intelligence and the spirit." The author of this passage, written more than forty years ago, was José Carlos Mariátegui, founder of the Peruvian Communist Party, a physically feeble man of unstable health who combined a powerful, cold and lucid intelligence with an exquisite artistic sensitiveness and an incorruptible revolutionary morale. His short life, ended before he was thirty-five, elapsed between long periods of hospitalization and poverty. Jail and the continuous humiliations he suffered, did not deter him from accomplishing his life's work, which, given the circumstances he had to cope with, does not cease to stimulate today more and more amazement, as well as the increased attention and admiration of revolutionaries the world over. Suffering from the time he was seven years old from an incipient physical disability which denied him a normal childhood, and when called upon, helping his mother out by working as proofreader in a publishing house, his career as a revolutionary writer began when an army man cowardly attacked him for the ideas he expressed in a newspaper article.

The sum total of Mariátegui's work constitutes an ideological struggle against reformism, first and foremost. His work *Defense of Marxism* is imbued with this spirit, and the very founding of the Peruvian Communist Party denounces "domesticated socialism": "The ideology we adopt," states Mariátegui in his thesis of affiliation with the Third Internationale, "is that of militant revolutionary Marxism-Leninism, a doctrine which we wholly and unreservedly adhere to in its philosophical, political and socio-economic aspects. The methods we uphold are those of orthodox revolutionary socialism. We not only rebuke in all their forms the methods and tendencies of the Second Internationale, but oppose them actively." In this document he did no more than ratify before the world what he had previously made known in a magazine: "The political sector with which I can never come to terms is the other one: that of mediocre reformism, of domesticated socialism, of pharisaical democracy. Moreover, if the revolution demands violence, authority, discipline, I am all for violence, authority, discipline. I accept them in block form, with all their horrors, without any cowardly reserves."

Between 1919 and 1923 Mariátegui made a tour of Europe. It was in Italy where his thought ripened and became richer. In addition to his admiration for the theorist of violence, the revolutionary trade-unionist George Sorel, there was his passion for Gobetti, Labriola, and he found in Croce a friend with whom he could enter into controversy. Mariátegui was an eyewitness to the great social upheavals which foreshadowed the triumph of Nazism and the reformist preachings of class collaborationism. On his return to Peru, in a work on the world crisis and on the role that the Peruvian proletariat ought to play in it, he wrote: "..The proletarian forces are divided in two great groupings: reformists and revolutionaries.

"There is the faction of those who want to bring about socialism by collaborating politically with the bourgeoisie; and the faction of those who want to bring about socialism by conquering for the proletariat in its entirety political power." To this global crisis, Mariátegui answered in a vein both aggressive and critical: "I am of the same opinion as those who believe that humanity is going through a revolutionary period. And I am convinced of the imminent decline of all the social-democratic theses, of all the reformist theses and of all the evolutionist theses." In another article, he denounced the impotence of reformism to avoid war: "The thought of Lasallean social-democracy guided the Second Internationale; that is why it proved itself impotent before war. Its leaders and sectional corps had become accustomed to a reformist and democratic attitude and resistance to war demanded a revolutionary attitude."

Defense of Marxism (a work from which we publish here one of its most interesting chapters) constitutes a rebuttal of *Beyond Marxism* by the Belgian revisionist Henri de Man, and of other social-democratic theorists, such as Vandervelde, a rebuttal which arises from revolutionary tenets and from practical positions. Mariátegui, who is brought to task in a controversy over principles, is equally removed from all sectarian and dogmatic standpoints, because he understood that Marxism was never "a set of principles embodying rigid consequences, similar in all historical climes and all social latitudes." "We must strip ourselves radically of all the old dogmatisms," he wrote, "of all the discredited prejudices and archaic superstitions." It is the correct interpretation of Marxist theory that makes him state directly: "Marx is not present in spirit in all his so-called disciples and heirs. Those who have carried on his ideas are not the pedantic German professors of the Marxist theory of value and surplus value, incapable themselves of making any contribution to the doctrine, devoted only to fixing limitations and labels to it; it has rather been the revolutionaries, slandered as heretics..." A deplorable article by Mirochevsky, published in *Dialéctica,* in which Mariátegui is grossly characterized as a petty bourgeois populist, was later impugned by the articles on Mariátegui of Semionov and Shulgovski, both of whom see the great Peruvian Marxist in a totally different light. But even today there are people interested in misrepresenting his political thoughts and actions to the point of belittling his significance from the Liberation Army spokesman he is to that of a sort of moralizing Salvation Army sermonizer. With each passing day, though, this task grows more difficult.

In this chapter, "Ethics and Socialism," transcribed from his work *Defense of Marxism,* Mariátegui comes to grips with revolutionary ethics, with the ethics of socialism. For the great Peruvian, Marxist revolutionary ethics "does not emerge mechanically from economic interests; it is

formed in the class struggle, carried on in a heroic frame of mind, with passionate willpower." And further on, he adds: "The worker who is indifferent to the class struggle, who derives satisfaction from his material well-being and, generally speaking, from his lot in life, will be able to attain a mediocre bourgeois moral standard, but will never be able to raise himself to the level of socialist ethics."

Some of Mariátegui's works remain unpublished, but those that have been published suffice to make of him one of the most noteworthy Marxists of our time.

The charges that have been brought to bear against Marxism for its attributed unethicality, for its materialistic motives, for the sarcasm with which Marx and Engels deal with bourgeois ethics in their pages, are not new. Neo-revisionist critique does not say, as regards this matter, one single thing which socialist utopians and all the run of the mill pharisaical socialists have not said beforehand. But Marx's reinstatement, from the standpoint of ethics, has also been effected by Benedetto Croce —being one of the most fully recognized representatives of idealist philosophy, his judgments will seem to all concerned to carry more weight than any Jesuitic regret over the petty bourgeois mentality. In one of his first essays on historical materialism, confusing the thesis of the lack of ethics inherent in Marxism, Croce wrote the following:

"This current has been principally determined by the necessity in which Marx and Engels found themselves, before the various strains of socialist utopians, of stating that the so-called social question is not a moral question (i. e., according to how it should be interpreted, this question will not be solved by preachings or by moral means), as well as by their severe criticism of class hypocrisy and ideology. It has also been nurtured, as far as I can see, by the Hegelian origin of the thoughts of Marx and Engels for it is known that in Hegelian philosophy ethics loses the rigidity which Kant gave it and which Herbart was later to lend support to. And, finally, the term "materialism" does not surrender in this connection a shred of efficacy, seeing that the mere term brings immediately to mind the full implications of what is meant by "interest" and "pleasure." But it is evident that the ideality and absoluteness of ethics, in the philosophical sense of such words, are necessary assumptions of socialism. Isn't the interest that drives us to create the concept of surplus value a moral or social interest, or whatever term might be used for defining it? In the sphere of pure economic science can one speak of the theory of surplus value? Doesn't the proletariat sell its productive capacity for what it's worth, given its situation in present day society? And, without this moral assumption, how can the tone of violent indignation and bitter sarcasm, along with

Marx's political actions, contained in every page of **Das Kapital**, be accounted for?" (**Materialismo Storico ed Economia Marxistica**).

I have previously had occasion to set forth this passage from Croce, which led me, in turn, to quote some phrases by Unamuno, in his work entitled **The Agony of Christianity (La agonía del cristianismo)** and which consequently made me the recipient of a letter by Unamuno himself, who wrote me therein that Marx was more truly a prophet than a professor.

On more than one occasion Croce has quoted verbatim the passage referred to above. One of his critical conclusions on this subject is precisely "the negation of the intrinsic amorality or of the anti-ethicality of Marxism." And, in this same text, he wonders why no one "has thought of calling Marx, in the way of extending him a further honor, the Machiavelli of the proletariat," a fact which can be thoroughly and amply explained in the light of the conceptions he formulates in his defense of the author of **The Prince**, who was no less persecuted by regrets of which posterity made him the victim. On the subject of Machiavelli, Croce has written that he "discloses the necessity and autonomy of politics, which is beyond moral good and evil, and the laws which it would be of no consequence at all to rebel against, which are immune to every sort of exorcism and which cannot be made to take leave of the world with the aid of holy water."

In Croce's opinion Machiavelli gives evidence of being of "a divided mind and spirit on politics, of the autonomy of which he has become aware, and he now thinks of it as a corrupting influence for compelling him to sully his hands in dealing with basely ignorant people, and now as a sublime art with which to found and uphold that great institution, the State" (**Elementi di politica**). The similarity between these two cases has been clearly pointed out by Croce in the following terms:

"A case, in some respects analogous to that around which the discussions on Marxian ethics have centered, is the one having to do with the traditional critique on the ethics of Machiavelli; a critique which was brought to fruition by De Sanctis (in the chapter concerning Machiavelli in his **Storia della litteratura**), but a critique which nevertheless recurs quite systematically, and in a work by Professor Villari, one reads that Machiavelli's great imperfection is to be found in the fact that he did not propound the moral question. And I have often asked myself if Machiavelli was bound by contract or in any way obliged to deal with every sort of question, including those in which he took no interest and on which he had nothing to say. It would be tantamount to reproof of those who study chemistry for not delving into the metaphysical principles of matter."

The ethical function of socialism —in regard to which the hurried and summary extravaganzas of Marxists such as Lafargue, no

doubt make for error— should be sought out, not in highfalutin decalogues nor in philosophical speculations, which in no way constitute a necessity in the formulation of Marxian theory, but in creating a morale for the producers by the same process of the anti-capitalist struggle.

"Vainly," Kautsky has said "have the English workers been made the object of moral preachings, of a loftier conception of life, of feelings underlying nobler deeds. The ethics of the proletariat derives from its revolutionary aspirations; from them will it be endowed with more strength and elevation of purpose. That which has saved the proletariat from debasement is the idea of revolution."

Sorel adds that for Kautsky ethics is always subordinated to the idea of the sublime, and though he disagrees with many official Marxists, who carried to extremes their paradoxes and jokes on the moralists, he nonetheless, concurs in that "Marxists had particular reasons for showing lack of confidence on all that which touched upon ethics; the propagandists of social reforms, the utopians and the democrats had so repeatedly and misleadingly recurred to the concept of Justice that no one could be denied the right of looking upon all dissertations to this effect as a rhetorical exercise or as a sophistry, destined to lead astray those who were involved in the labor movement."

One can ascribe to the influence of Sorel's thought Edward Berth's apologia on this ethical function of socialism.

"Daniel Halevy," states Berth, "seems to believe that the exaltation of the **producer** is bound to harm the **man**; he attributes to me a completely American enthusiasm for an industrial civilization. But it will not be thus; **the life of the free spirit** is as dear to me as it is to him, and I am far from believing that in the world there is nothing else save production. It is always, in the end, the old charge levelled against the Marxists, who are held responsible for being both morally and metaphysically, **materialists.** Nothing could be more false; historical materialism does not impede in any way whatsoever the highest developement of what Hegel calls **the free or absolute spirit;** quite the contrary, it is its preliminary condition. And our hope is, precisely, that in a society which rests on an ample economic base, made up by a federation of shops where free workers would be inspired by a spirited enthusiasm for production, art, religion and philosophy would in turn be given a prodigious impulse and the frantic and ardent rhythm resulting from it would simply skyrocket."

Luc Dartin's sagacity, sharpened by a finely wrought characteristically French irony, throws light on this religious-like ascendancy pervading Marxism, a phenomenon which conforms to principles inherent in the constitution of the first socialist country in the world. Historically it had already been proven by the socialist struggles

of the West, that the sublime, such as the proletariat conceives of it, is not an intellectual utopia nor a propagandistic hypothesis.

When Henri de Man, demanding from socialism an ethical content, tries to demonstrate that class interest can not of itself become a sufficiently potent motor of the new order, he does not in any way go "beyond Marxism," nor does he make amends for things which have not already been pointed out by revolutionary criticism. His revisionism attacks revisionistic trade-unionism, in the practice of which class interest is content with the satisfaction of limited material aspirations. An ethics of producers, as is conceived by Sorel and Kautsky, does not emerge mechanically from economic interest, it is formed in the class struggle, engaged in with heroic disposition, with passionate will power. It is absurd to look for the ethical sentiments of socialism in those trade-unions which have fallen under the influence of the bourgeoisie — in which a domesticated bureaucracy has become enervated in its class consciousness — or in the parliamentary groups, spiritually assimilated by the class enemy, regardless of the fact of their combative stand before it as witnessed by their speeches and motions. Henri de Man expresses something which is perfectly superfluous and beside the point when he states: "The class interest doesn't explain everything. It does not create ethical motives." These avowals may impress a certain breed of nineteenth century intellectuals, whom, glaringly ignoring Marxist thought, glaringly ignoring the history of the class struggle, facilely imagine, as does Henri de Man, that they can surmount the limits of the Marxian school of thought. The ethics of socialism is formed in the class struggle. If the proletariat is to comply in its moral progress with its historical mission it becomes necessary for it to acquire beforehand a consciousness of its class interests; but in itself, class interest does not suffice. Long before Henri de Man, the Marxists have understood and felt this perfectly. Therein, precisely, arise their stalwart criticisms against lubberly reformism. "Without revolutionary theory, there is no revolutionary action," Lenin used to repeat, referring to the yellow-streaked tendency to forget historical finality in order to pay attention only to hourly circumstances.

The struggle for socialism instills in workers which take part in it extreme energy and absolute conviction along with an asceticism that forcibly cancels and makes utterly ridiculous any charge levelled against them having to do with their materialistic creed, and formulated on behalf of a theorizing and philosophical ethics. Luc Durtain, after visiting a Soviet school, asked whether he couldn't find in Russia a lay school, to such an extent did he regard of a religious tenor Marxist education. The materialist, if it be one who practices and is religiously devoted

to his convictions, can only be distinguished from the idealist by a convention of language (Unamuno, touching upon another aspect of the opposition between idealism and materialism, states that "since what is matter to us is no more than an idea, materialism is idealism").

The worker who is indifferent to the class struggle, who derives satisfaction from his material well-being and generally speaking, from his lot in life, will be able to attain a mediocre bourgeois moral standard, but will never be able to raise himself to the level of socialist ethics. And it is preposterous to think that Marx ever advocated, or ever wanted to separate the worker from his source of livelihood, or ever wanted to deprive him of all that which binds him to his work, so that the class struggle might take hold of him more firmly, more completely. This conjecture is only conceivable in those who abide by far-fetched Marxist speculations, as Lafargue, the apologist of the right, as the individual to idleness was wont to do.

The mill, the factory, act on the worker's mind and soul. The union, the class struggle, continue and complete the worker's educational process.

"The factory," Gobetti points out, "offers the precise vision of the coexistence of the social interests: the solidarity of labor. The individual grows accustomed to feeling himself part of the productive process, an indispensable as well as an insufficient part. Here we have the most perfect school of pride and humility. I will never forget the first impression the workers gave me, when I undertook a visit to the Fiat furnaces, one of the few English-like modern capitalistic enterprises in Italy. I felt in those workers a self-possessed attitude, an unassuming assertiveness, a contempt for every manner of dilettantism. Whomever lives in a factory possesses the dignity of work, the willingness for making sacrifices and the habit of resisting fatigue. A way of life severely founded on a sense of tolerance and interdependence which induces punctuality, strictness and perseverance in the worker. These virtues of capitalism are offset by an almost bleak asceticism; whereas, on the other hand, selfrestrained suffering nourishes, when exasperation sets in, the courage to fight and the instinct for taking a defensive stand politically. English adultness, the capacity for believing in precise ideologies, of undergoing perils in order to make them prevail, the unbending will power of carrying forward with dignity the political struggle, are born of this apprenticeship, the significant implications of which are ushering in the greatest revolution since the rise of Christianity."

In this severe environment of persistency, of effort, of tenacity, the energies of European socialism have been forged, which, even in those countries where parliamentary reformism holds a big sway over the masses, offer Latin

Americans an admirable example of continuity and duration. In different Latin American countries the socialist parties and the trade-union members have suffered a hundred defeats. However, each new year the elections, protest movements, any rally whatever, either of an ordinary or extraordinary character, will always find these masses greater in number and more obstinate. Renan recognized that which was mystical and religious in such a social creed. Quite justifiably Labriola praised German socialism:

"This truly new and imposing case of social pedagogy, i.e., that in such great numbers of workers and middle class sectors a new conscience should take shape, in which equally coincide a guiding perception of the economic circumstance — a stimulant conducive to stepping up the struggle — and socialist propaganda, understood as the goal and arriving point."

If socialism should not be achieved as a social order, this formidable edifying and educational accomplishment would prove more than enough to justify it in history. The previously quoted passage from de Man admits this postulation when he states, though with a different intention, that "the essential thing in socialism is the struggle in its behalf," a phrase which is very much reminiscent of those in which Bernstein advised the socialists to busy themselves primarily with the movement and not with the movement's results, by which, according to Sorel, the revisionist leader expressed a much more philosophical meaning than what he himself might have suspected.

De Man does not ignore the pedagogical and spiritual function of the trade-union, though his own experience was inherently and mediocrely social-democratic.

"The trade-union organizations," he observes, "contribute in a much greater measure than the majority of the workers suppose, and almost all of the employers, to binding together more vigorously the ties between the workers and their regular chores. They obtain this result almost without their knowing it, by trying to keep up qualification and efficiency and by developing industrial education, by organizing the right the workers have to union inspection and applying democratic norms to shop discipline by the system of delegates and sections, etc. In so doing, the union renders the worker a service a great deal less problematical, considering him a citizen of a future city, rather than seeking the remedy in the disappearance of all the psychological relations between the worker and the environment of the shop."

But the Belgian neo-revisionist, notwithstanding his idealistic protestations, discovers the advantage and merit of all this in the increasing attachment of the worker to his material well-being and in the measure in which the latter factor makes a Philistine of him. Paradoxes of petit-bourgeois idealism!

REGIS DEBRAY: "GUILTY OF BEING A REVOLUTIONARY"

by Carlos Núñez

Impressions of a witness, at Camiri, to one of the most sordid and shameful of spectacles.

Only the brazenness of a regime like Barrientos



"t them not find justification for a political sentence, an ideological sentence..."



A court-martial with a publicity-seeking slogan: also against Chile?

Régis Debray was declared guilty by the War Council that judged him in Camiri and was condemned to thirty years in prison. What was he guilty of? Régis himself told me in his small dark cell in the Fourth Division's Military Club: **"guilty of being a revolutionary."** However, not even this quality, affirmed and extolled by Debray at every moment with clear-sightedness and integrity, can justify the military court's sentence, because only an immoral regime such as that of René Barrientos could publicly pretend that the composition, actions and conclusions of the Camiri War Council have any relationship, however remote, with the word justice, even when defined within the sophisticated coordinates usually surrounding the term in the "Christian democracies of the West."

The basic contradiction of this supposedly criminal but brazenly political trial, was defined by Debray early last October. It was not by chance that this definition was given during one of the many episodes of the campaign mounted by the Bolivian regime to try to bring public discredit on the young French intellectual. Using a so-called "interview with university students" as a pretext, Debray was invited to take part in an open debate (in the presence of students, professors and reporters in the patio of the Mili-

tary Club where he is being held prisoner) with Ernesto López Canedo, a law student (?) from the University of Cochabamba, who is an activist in the so-called Popular Christian Movement and nephew of "President" Barrientos. In fact, this debate was an intellectual trap by which López Canedo tried —unsuccessfully— to demonstrate the so-called "irrelevance" between the ideas and the actions of the author of **Revolution in the Revolution?**

The President's obliging nephew, a declared follower of the "revolution in liberty" —a formula which, significantly, is being heard more frequently in the public statements of the Bolivian regime's officials — assumed a role far too large for him, as the rightist press admitted later. What was intended to be an inquisition of Debray, his ideas and actions, boomeranged on its instigators. Because of the essential lameness of his own attempt and the steadfastness and ideological clarity of the man he tried to indict, the officious accuser became the accused. It was not, however, wrong to speak of a disassociation between words and acts. Debray himself established this clearly during the debate: **"What I ask here is that I be judged for what I have done, that I be judged for the ideology I uphold, that this ideology be judged, but let no one come to justify a political condemnation, an ideological condemnation, with false facts or accusations, and this is what is actually happening in the trial."**

From the very moment of the arrest of the French journalist and philosopher on April 20, from the moment that all the details of his arrest and subsequent interrogation were made known, when the nature of his activities in Bolivia were revealed, from the moment of the installation of the War Council that was to judge him, this contradiction was plainly visible to any honest observer, even to someone who did not profess Debray's ideology. Anyone who watched the development of the low comedy staged in Camiri by Bolivia's "gorillas," busily mouthing the word justice, will always retain the impression that he was witnessing one of the most sordid and undignified shows put on in Latin America by the uniformed oligarchies and their imperialist bosses.

THE CORRUPTION OF A REGIME

No less than thirty specific articles contained in the Bolivian Constitution (which is established therein as: **"the supreme law, the nation's juridical order; officials, judges and authorities will apply it with preference over laws and the latter with preference over any other resolutions"**) have been violated in spirit and letter during the course of Debray's trial. These violations include his arrest itself, his being held incommunicado for more than two months, the physical and mental tortures

inflicted on him, even the convocation of the War Council that condemned him, and clearly without authority. The supreme law of the Bolivian State would uphold even the accused Régis Debray if he claimed damages from the authors of these violations. The Ministry of Justice once again trampled on the Constitution in failing to initiate proceedings in the name of the accused. A precise and exhaustive account of these irregularities is given in the document written by Ralph Schoenman, representative of the Bertrand Russell Foundation. During the Camiri trial he attempted to read it publicly in one of the sessions, for which he was expelled from the courtroom and later from Bolivia.

Schoenman's testimony constitutes an irrevocable indictment of those responsible for the trial and reveals with clarity and detail the degree to which the colonels of the War Council — and the armed branch of the regime they represent — have made a travesty of those very laws they claim to uphold and enforce in the trial against Debray. The representative of the Bertrand Russell Foundation does not limit himself to the strictly legal aspects of the trial, but with impeccable logic draws from his exhaustive legal analysis an X-ray revealing the extent of the Bolivian military regime's corruption. Says Schoenman: **"The military and this government have destroyed the Constitution and therefore the foundation of their right to govern Bolivia. Nothing less than this government's legality and right to continue in power are being judged in the trial of Régis Debray. It is the Bolivian Government that is on the stand for its gross violation of the Constitution and, consequently, of the rights of every Bolivian citizen. It is not by chance that the illegal detention, torture and persecution of Régis Debray are included among these violations. The Debray case symbolizes the moral poverty and illegality of this pseudo-government. Historically it finds its parallel in the Dreyfus case, the Sacco and Vanzetti trial, the Rosenberg trial and, indeed, the trial of Fidel Castro. All these cases represent the degeneracy of regimes which by their tyrannical and repressive acts condemned themselves before history and civilization."**

No one expected the military to become too perturbed by these appeals to the Constitution, since their own installation in power was possible only by trampling on the same Constitution. The irregularities of the Camiri trial, however, go much further: it is not only a question of a violation of the law, which has never been a detaining factor for the "gorillas" but also of an attempt against human dignity, against the most basic freedoms, against intelligence, and even the most pedestrian common sense. The Bolivian military have never even taken the trouble to dictate new laws to their liking which would annul the old ones, or to mold the exist-

ing laws to their own convenience, tasks for which certainly they would not have lacked lawyers or experts. Instead, they chose an apparently simpler road, one more in keeping with the mental mechanisms of international "gorilla-ism": they changed the facts, distorted them, invented them. It would be difficult to make them understand that theirs is a vain task: the facts remain — much to their sorrow — unalterable, clear, alive and finish by turning against the misguided apprentice witch-hunters.

THE HAND OF THE CIA

It was Mr. Fogler, "cultural attache" of the U S Embassy in La Paz, who organized "Operation Camiri" for the CIA. Through a Cuban counterrevolutionary known as "González" he ordered and supervised the torture of Debray and the first interrogations to which he was submitted, doing this with complete impunity because of the public's ignorance of the arrest of the French intellectual and the later story of Debray's death. In spite of having employed agents who were specially recruited from abroad and officials from Section II of the Bolivian Army, the CIA could not break Debray. However, from Ciro Roberto Bustos they obtained twelve drawings of the guerrilla fighters operating in the southeast, and it did not cost them too much trouble to orchestrate adequately the declarations of the other four accused men, all of them Bolivian. Of these, three were deserters from the guerrilla force (whom Major Ernesto Guevara himself decided to "release" to make known his presence on Bolivian soil, before the guerrilla focus began its march to the north, abandoning the zone of Ñancahuazú); the fourth man was presented by the military as suspected of having collaborated with the guerrillas, the same man who was also suspected by the guerrillas of having collaborated with the Army.

Later, Mr. Fogler returned to La Paz. Bolivian officials were left in charge of the minor operations: to organize the **claque** that would act in the courtroom and in the public demonstrations in the small southeastern town, known as the "petroleum capital" of Bolivia; to control the less docile reporters; to organize incidents to demoralize and publicly disparage the prisoners, especially Régis Debray; to harass his parents and friends; to prevent the movements of his suspected friends and sympathizers. Later, other CIA agents arrived disguised as foreign correspondents to infiltrate the group of real journalists. The rest of "Operation Camiri" was directed from La Paz... and from Washington. The world press tied to imperialist interests soon began a campaign to discredit Debray, publishing the lie that he had "**betrayed half of the Latin American left.**" This smear campaign, waged subtly during all the trial months, ended in the calumnious imputa-

tion made by Newsweek towards the end of the trial, that Guevara's assassination had been made possible by the declarations of Debray, who was the only one to have interviewed him during more than two years of Che's revolutionary activity on the continent. The Bolivian press, meanwhile, devoted itself to baser tasks: for a long time it waged an uninterrupted campaign accusing Debray of having failed to practice what he preached in his theoretical works, from the moment that the French journalist declared that he had not participated in the guerrilla forces as a combatant. The public debate with López Canedo was just a part of this campaign, which obviously tried to cash in on the feeling of chauvinism latent in a part of the subjugated Bolivian population.

In practice, "Operation Camiri" obtained doubtful results, to say the least. On the second day of the military trial, a group of about twenty women gathered near the barbed wire fence around the block where the improvised courthouse was located. They carried signs reading **"We want the heads of Debray and Bustos!"** and chorused the refrains shouted by an official wearing a sports shirt and dark glasses. It was a good spectacle for U S photographers and cameramen, but it did not last long. In response to a mobile loud-speaker unit, the group, transformed into a miserable demonstration, marched to the town's main plaza.

"There were only a few people, fewer than when Barrientos spoke," a foreign correspondent recalled later. The claque in the courtroom started performing when the tribunal gave the floor to Debray, eight hours before the end of the public trial. Shouts of "Murderer!" and "Shoot him!" prevented the French intellectual from speaking and the War Council achieved the desired objective: Debray's defense was heard behind closed doors — the public had no knowledge of it. Up till then, the simplest way to do this had been to expel the correspondents who described the trial with a modicum of objectivity. A France-Press reporter was thrown out of Camiri for writing that the armored truck transporting the prisoners between the courthouse and their respective prisons was a gift to the Bolivian Government received under "Point Four" of U. S. foreign aid. Of course, this was absolutely true.

However, this machination did not defeat Debray. His dialogue with Barrientos' nephew is a clear example of the integrity and lucidity that the young revolutionary intellectual maintained at all moments, in spite of the base arguments used against him. Two days after the death of Che and still suffering from the impact of the news, Debray wrote the members of the military court an open letter in which he revealed that he had asked Major Guevara's permission to take part in the guerrilla forces as a combatant, and re-

quested the court to treat him as equally responsible for the guerrillas' actions. Immediately, the press and the military publicized the letter as a "confession," but the truth was otherwise. Debray's declaration was an eminently political and essentially moral one. In generous measure it pays incomparable homage to the memory of the fallen guerrilla leader, without taking into account what personal consequences might stem from it for Debray. For the purposes of the trial, however, the truth was that Régis Debray did not participate in the guerrilla force as a combatant.

THE MISSION OF THE FOUR COLONELS

Why this precise explanation? There is no need for it for a revolutionary: Debray's solidarity with the guerrillas has been and is clear and unalterable. His mission of disseminating information about the guerrillas and their goals to the world is (as Guevara himself stated on denying Debray's request to become a combatant) as important as that of fighting. In his open letter to the War Council, Debray himself establishes that the one is exclusive of the other only in regard to time. If he left the guerrillas, the young revolutionary said, it was not because it is a privilege of the intellectual not to carry his ideas to their ultimate conclusion, but because the mission entrusted to him made his participation as a combatant impossible at that moment of the struggle.

But the Bolivian "gorillas" brought Régis Debray before a military court **"for the crimes of murder, robbery and the infliction of grave wounds during the ambush of Ñancahuazú on March 23 and in Iripiti on April 1 of this year, where young officers (officers, students, soldiers) of our National Army were victimized** — the list continues — **and relieved of their arms, equipment, clothing and goods, being mocked about the booty... at the same time robbing armaments and provisions from the Bolivian State."** Thus reads the initial indictment of the military prosecutor, Colonel Remberto Iriarte (an ambitious and avid officer of public importance whom Mr. Fogler thought was "the right man for the job"). This is perhaps the only moderately precise accusation known publicly. It should be noted however that the crimes of **"rebellion"** and **"armed assault"** do not figure in the indictment, the same crimes that the prosecutor and some members of the War Council later cited in the course of the public sessions. To prove Régis Debray guilty of these crimes (which certainly he is not) the prosecutor had to demonstrate that:

a) Debray was a combatant in the guerrilla forces;
b) in this role he took part in the armed encounters of Ñancahuazú and Iripiti;
c) during these battles he killed or gravely wounded members of the Bolivian Army, that he stole their arms, equipment,

clothing and goods, and further "armaments and provisions from the Bolivian State."

None of these facts could be authentically proved by the prosecution. Proof, even circumstantial proof, does not exist to back up any of the three accusations. The absence of proof is certainly not due to indolence on the part of the prosecutor. In the course of the trial, Colonel Iriarte resorted to absolutely every means at his disposal, whether or not they fitted the case.

A resumé of these includes:

—the presentation of testimony as doubtful as that of the guerrilla deserters and as prejudiced as that of some of the army officers, evidence that would have been rejected (for its origin and formulation) by any justly integrated court, and which in any case did not contribute proof against the accused.

—The repeated citation of sentences from the book **Revolution in the Revolution?** taken out of context and read as if they referred to specific events of guerrilla activity in Bolivia, which was, to say the least, manifestly absurd;

— the reading of Debray's manuscripts ("confiscated" by the prosecutor). These were written during his first weeks in prison and are eminently literary and narrative in character. The prosecution went to the extreme of trying to interpret obviously metaphoric sentences in a literal sense, as for instance the reference "to dynamite Chartres Cathedral."

—the strange thesis that Debray had entered Bolivia secretly, in spite of his having all his documents in order, because he had supposedly been in contact, by means of previously arranged codes, with couriers who would lead him to the guerrilla group. This thesis borders on the ridiculous when the prosecutor contrasts the "legitimate clandestine action" of Ciro Bustos (who entered the country under a false name and passport) with the "cunning clandestine action" of Debray.

Before a court functioning according to elementary juridical norms, Prosecutor Iriarte would have been covered with ridicule (which he was anyway, even before the War Council) and Régis Debray would have been declared innocent on the third day of the trial. However, the tribunal of Camiri was composed of four Bolivian colonels with a mission to perform. In the first place, they had to ease the work of the prosecutor and to obstruct that of the defense (which was, at any rate, limited to strictly juridical resources), as well as to guarantee a sentence dictated beforehand. When Efraín Guachalla, president of the War Council, read the sentence condemning Debray to 30 years in prison, the mission of the four colonels had been fully carried out: to conduct a trial that violated the Bolivian Constitution, a trial null in origin, arbitrary in procedure, ridiculous in development, false in conclusion, in-

cluding a sentence that was not based in the least on the accusations and their rebuttal, a sentence which obeyed only political interests which of course were not made known in the trial.

THE TRUE CRIMINALS

But Prosecutor Iriarte's object was not precisely to prove the "guilt" of Régis Debray: in fact, such a formality was totally superfluous from the moment that the four colonels had agreed to put their signature under the sentence no matter what proof might be presented. It would be a mere platitude to say that from the start the Camiri trial was a political and not a criminal process — not because the imprisonment and the expected condemnation of Debray had political motivations, but essentially because this was an attempt to judge, over and above Debray, an obviously political fact: the Bolivian guerrillas.

With less show of nonsense and publicity, the Bolivian "gorillas" could have obtained from a civilian court — on the basis of conjecture — the sentence of Debray for the crime of "rebellion." But, according to the most acceptable jurisprudence, that is a political crime, and the "gorilla regime" of Palacio Quemado did not have the slightest interest in examining concepts of that nature in broad daylight. Debray himself emphasized this fact by saying: **"Mine is a retroactive trial. Through me they are trying to judge the guerrillas."** The entire judicial façade was mounted around that central objective. The regime of René Barrientos, adequately advised by the friends of Mr. Fogler, interpreted the term "bandits" (that all regimes in the world have applied to guerrillas fighting for national liberation) in its broadest sense, condemning their actions as common crimes. To attempt this maneuver before a civil court was risky, even under the Bolivian military regime, if that regime wanted to conserve a "democratic" appearance. A political allegation, admissible before a civil court as a way of rejecting the classification of the crimes, with the freedom of speech that this implied for a theoretician of Debray's capabilities, and the freedom of information that the "democratic" norms had to protect, was more than the decadent government of Barrientos could risk. With the pretext that a military tribunal was able to judge crimes affecting "military personnel or places" the War Council of Camiri carried out its objective, that is, it made the attempt.

On this point too, Colonel Iriarte did his best to comply with Mr. Fogler. He went through veritable verbal juggling acts to prove that Bolivian soldiers and officers in Ñancahuazú and Iripiti had been killed or wounded "in the back." When he met with contradictory testimony (a doctor categorically rejected the previously prepared version of a rehearsed officer), Iriarte brought in a soldier who showed the

Court a wound in his back and stated that he had received it in one of these encounters. Iriarte then showed the weapons captured from the guerrillas which were identified by Colonel Reque Teran, commander of the Fourth Division, a so-called expert. He showed color films taken in Nancahuazú and went into long speeches that tried to link the tactical-military concepts of "ambush" with the criminal concepts of "premeditation" and "malice aforethought." But Iriarte forgot one thing: that the description of the concept of murder implies the definition of a motive.

Why did the so-called bandits of the southeast kill Bolivian Army soldiers and risk their lives in combat with them? Did they operate costly weapons, spend money on the ranches and pay for all that they received from the peasants only to steal "armaments and provisions from the Bolivian State"? Were they a group of psychopaths bent on ruining the career of Bolivian colonels by the tortuous method of decimating their armies? Where were the bandits? Obviously, only in the terror-stricken imagination of the Bolivian military clique. The patriots forming the National Liberation Army of Bolivia were guerrilla fighters, and conducted themselves as such.

Neither Colonel Iriarte nor Mr. Fogler seemed to have thought of such petty details. If the definition of murder presupposes the defenselessness of the victim and presupposes premeditation and malice aforethought on the part of the aggressor, the Camiri War Council should not judge Debray but René Barrientos and Alfredo Ovando, who premeditatedly and maliciously murdered hundreds of miners in May and September of 1965 and repeated their crime during the tragic night of San Juan in 1967. If ambush is a crime, why don't they judge and condemn the "heroic patrol" that ambushed and totally annihilated a group of eleven guerrillas as they were crossing a river single-file with their rifles held high in Vado del Yeso? If armed insurrection against a government should be considered a crime, the Camiri War Council would have all its time occupied during the next months by bringing to trial René Barrientos, Alfredo Ovando and many other officers from the Bolivian Army (among them the same colonels who sentenced Debray) who were involved in the military coup of November 1964. These, and not the others, are the true criminals.

However, the cynicism of these bedfellows of imperialism is not detained even by these infamous details. What they were after was to set two precedents: to judge the Bolivian guerrillas as common criminals — which in the long run would not obstruct the road to liberation of the Latin American peoples; and to establish that the military could judge civilians on the slightest pretext — which will surely be useful for

the repressive tasks against the Bolivian guerrillas.

FOREIGN AGGRESSION

A more important objective of the Barrientos regime was added to the ones already mentioned in this vast propaganda campaign. The deterioration of the military government was undisguisable and increasing when the guerrillas appeared on the scene. The prospect of an insurrection for national liberation only aggravated existing political tensions to the point where they became unbearable for the regime. From the start, even personal conflicts and rivalries within the armed forces made use of the appearance of an insurrectional focus to win psychological and political advantages in the game of ambitions, thus obstructing considerably the efficacy of their repressive actions. The Pentagon had to help restore order to this "dog fight": the scarcely disguised rift between Barrientos and Ovando suddenly became a sugary idyll, and the respective teams suddenly called for a respite. The centainty of more U S aid smoothed out the inevitable initial rough edges of reconciliation. But the growing popular discontent and the game played by the opposition parties made the government a permanently unstable one.

It was then that "Operation Cuba" began. Based on "Documents" which were simultaneously presented to the OAS and to foreign correspondents in La Paz, the Barrientos regime accused the Guerrilla Movement of being the spearhead of a so-called foreign aggression. The objective was plain to see: to capitalize on an almost instinctive sense of nationalism. The successive plunders and abuses that Bolivia has suffered throughout its history at the hands of its neighbors on the continent, largely as a result of its role as pawn in the imperialist rivalries, awakened in a large number of Bolivians a chauvinistic sensitivity, which could be stimulated with relative ease. It was symptomatic that the theme of the guerrillas appeared in one way or another related to the theme of access to the sea which —founded on a legitimate basis— the military government has taken good care to keep alive as an aid to national cohesion. Upon his return from Europe, with the guerrilla movement scarcely beginning, Commander in Chief Alfredo Ovando connected both elements in a speech given from Palacio Quemado. The courtroom where the Camiri War Council sat in judgment displayed under the Bolivian coat of arms a huge sign with the slogan that the Barrientos regime had distributed throughout the country: "The sea is ours by right; to recover access to it is our duty."

It is doubtful, however, whether Barrientos has achieved an effective base of support for the regime by using such elements. When the Camiri trial began, the country's teachers were on strike

(a trade union of considerable strength in Bolivia since the 1952 revolution); discontent was growing among different sectors of the working class. The opposition parties, for their part, inquired at length in Parliament of the Minister of Government about the guerrillas. The news about the Army's successful counterinsurgency operations seemed to galvanize the trade union organizations into action, which was taken advantage of by the regime by their dealing a blow against the opposition.

On learning of the death of Ernesto Guevara and the subsequent announcement by the army of the "liquidation" of the guerrillas, the government organized a parliamentary tribute to the armed forces (only for eliminating a gang of bandits?) and thus cut short the inquiry. Two weeks later, the Ministry of Government carried out mass detentions of the trade union leaders, accusing them of having served as liaisons for the guerrillas and of preparing for an outbreak of urban insurrection. The repressive forces used a psychological advantage, but they contributed in awakening the popular reaction that had been momentarily stunned. The regime began to take false steps again and the supposed liquidation of the guerrillas will be able to throw the internal struggle into gear anew, lessened but not eradicated. When the guerrillas counterattack, the excuse of "foreign aggression" will no longer serve.

Last October 1, Régis Debray, speaking to a group of students from La Paz, declared: **"It is difficult to say what will happen now. Possibly, after the death of Che, the guerrillas will take a pause, but the fight will continue. I interpret this pause more as a breathing spell. Che himself foresaw it. When I interviewed him he said: 'There is only one Fidel, for he is something different, something unique. But there are many Che's.' And I believe this. They will continue to appear; still others will come; perhaps even tomorrow more Che's will appear. We need a certain intellectual unrest and passion, something youthful. The death of Che is a permanent banner in an uncontainable struggle. It will become the banner for many to carry. Che's importance lies not only in his ideas, but in the way he put them into practice, the way he lived them, up to the ultimate consequences. This was the quality of Che that made him all purity, all dedication to an idea. I would not say fanatic because he always had a scientific discipline for conceiving these ideas. It is his purity, his determination and passion for these ideas."**

For these ideas, for his purity, determination and passion, Régis Debray was condemned to thirty years in jail.

In the depths of their fears, the Bolivian militarists already know that neither the death of Che Guevara nor the imprisonment of Régis Debray will go unavenged.



Régis Debray: Renunciation of everything, even life itself



THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC PHENOMENON

by Josué de Castro

No one is better authorized to write about Brazil's economic situation than Josué de Castro. *The Geography of Hunger* and *The Geopolitics of Hunger* are works of paramount importance opposing bourgeoisie theorizing on the "population explosion." Josué de Castro, 59, a Brazilian and a public speaker, was formerly president of FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). De Castro filled the posts of leader of the Brazilian mission to the Conference on Disarmament and to the International Organizations Meeting in Geneva at the time of the military coup d'état in Brazil in April, 1964. He was also a distinguished representative of FAO. A few days after the coup he was dismissed by the military leaders. At the moment he presides over the International Center for Development.

The author published this article in Paris in December in a pamphlet of limited circulation and *Tricontinental* was granted first reproduction rights for its distribution.

The fact that a country like Brazil — the fifth in the world in surface area and the eighth in population — having passed through a phase of accelerated economic development from 1930 to 1959, should have suddenly fallen into a period of recession, or at least of economic stagnation, if duly analyzed, may contribute to a better understanding of the delicate process of economic emancipation of those countries, especially in Latin America, on the road to development. Now, more than ever, it is necessary to understand thoroughly the complex mechanism which hinders economic expansion in zones

having dependent economies. In fact, the countries of the Third World are passing at this moment through their greatest historical crisis, while they see how the economic gap which separates them from the rich and industrialized countries is ever widening.

The Brazilian example, with its political and social implications, has a continental or rather a worldwide scope: it offers a valuable lesson to all who are engaged in the development of economically backward areas.

For more than four hundred years — from the discovery of the country by the Portuguese in 1500 to the great world crisis of 1929 — Brazil has lived under an economy of a classical colonial type: an extensive exploitation of raw materials destined for export to the great metropolitan centers. The Portuguese conquerors were satisfied at the beginning with the extraction of certain natural products such as wood, but a few years later there appeared in the northeast region of the country a better organized system of exploitation: the extensive use of land for the cultivation of sugar cane. For more than a century, the Portuguese maintained a monopoly of that tropical product. The establishment of a Brazilian economy based on sugar provoked the appearance in that region of a feudal type of agrarian system the remnants of which persist today and dominate the economic life of the country.

The great increase of latifundia and the further development of this monoculture which has so seriously checked the social and economic evolution of the country, are due to the type of colonization established by the Portuguese.

The golden age of sugar lasted until the second half of the XVII century, at which time production in the West Indies broke the Brazilian monopoly.. Then a new economic cycle made its appearance in the country: that of gold, which was found in abundance in the center of the southern region. Brazil became then the main source of that metal which was to give great impetus to European capitalism and accelerated the industrial revolution, particularly in England.

At the end of the XVII century the production of gold steeply diminished. The national economy was then diverted towards coffee production. This development took place in the southern provinces of Brazil, which would today correspond to the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.

The coffee cycle, which undoubtedly played a significant role in the Brazilian economy, passed through very difficult periods of crisis. The first one took place in 1888. It was bound directly to the abolition of slavery and consequently to the disappearance of the cheap labor which, along with an abundance of fertile land, assured a low cost production. After the disappearance of the

slaves they tried to give new impetus to the coffee economy by favoring the immigration of European farm labourers who came to work in the plantations. It was only then that an economy of capitalist type was seen to develop on a basis of agricultural salaries for, up to that time, they had lived under an agrarian feudalism; the rural population of the sugar productive regions had remained isolated from the metal cycle, having practically no purchasing power. It was in 1888, with the abolition of slavery, that there appeared this economic gulf, incessantly deeper, which was to separate the South of the country from the North as though they were two different worlds, one at the side of the other, but not integrated in the same economic system.

The financial position of the government — and therefore its stability — dependent on foreign commerce, was practically reduced to the export of coffee alone. (1) It did not take long for the coffee planters to replace the "sugar barons." The North entered into a decline while the South monopolized the country's centers of decision.

The application of a protectionist policy at the expense of every other economic activity, permitted a very rapid increase in coffee production. This product made a great advance over the few other products exported by Brazil. But the over production of coffee, linked to a fall in world markets, only worsened the position of the Brazilian economy which was soon going to suffer a serious balance of payments crisis, of such proportions that the country was obliged to reduce imports from the beginning of the XX century. Numerous attempts were then made to find new outlets in the world market which could reestablish the economic balance of the country which had always rested on export trade.

The discovery of the vulcanizing process and the appearance of the automobile industry provoked an important demand for rubber, an exclusive product of the Amazon region. The tonnage of latex extracted from the Amazon forest increased very rapidly until it represented, at the beginning of the century, 28% of all Brazil's exports. (1) But this was of short duration and the exportation of rubber only offered temporary relief to the country's economy. An economy, moreover, of a purely extractive nature, incapable of meeting the world demand and need for rubber. Also it did not take long for Brazil to lose that market to the benefit of the countries of Southeast Asia which organized a systematic production of rubber through a rational cultivation of the **Hevea Brasiliensis,** a species,

(1) Celso Furtado. **Development and Underdevelopment,** Rio de Janeiro, 1961.

(1) Firmo Dutra, **Borracha in Brazil,** Brazil, 1939-1940. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1940.

as its name indicates, originating in Brazil.

They turned then towards other products in order to amplify the scope of Brazilian exports: cacao, maté and cotton. The amount of these exports, however, has never equalled that of coffee. Besides, the increase did not correspond to that of the population. The exportation of these products was only a palliative and the country has been forced to maintain, under the force of circumstances, the kingdom of coffee, in spite of the uncertainty it represents.

The second serious coffee crisis made its appearance as a result of the great world depression of 1929. It radically changed the economy of the country, which progressively relinquished its classical pattern as a dependent economy to turn itself inward to an internal market. Starting in 1929 the measures adopted until then to defend the coffee economy proved to be inoperative in the face of the brutal decline of this product in the world market, and of national over-production. Successive devaluations of the currency were ineffective. The government had then to take measures as Draconian as audacious: it guaranteed a compensating price for the entire coffee crop at the risk of having to burn or throw into the sea a great part of this produce. It is estimated that 80 million sacks of coffee were burnt between 1929 and 1939. The state also tried to limit production.

Such a group of external and internal circumstances provoked important economic distortions, accelerating the tendency towards inflation. But it had the advantage of guaranteeing and even raising the employment level in the interior of the country.

Within the coffee region, the presence of a labour market paid in cash constituted a remarkable interior market, giving birth to a national industry, producing, at the beginning, only commodities (fabrics and food products). The devaluation of currency and the disposal of funds formerly invested in the coffee sector favored the expansion of a rising national industry which, in its second stage, passed to the production of equipment. Brazil then took the way of industrialization which might have facilitated its economic emancipation. Based on 100 as the index of industrial production during the period 1925-1929, this quota has risen to 160 during the 1935-1939 period. (1) That was, according to Celso Furtado, the end of this "colonial ideology which considered the interests of the country as being those of commercial exports." (2)

The fact that this colonial structure was abandoned thanks to the diversification of the eco-

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(1) **Survey of the Brazilian Economy,** Brazilian Embassy, Washington, 1959.

(2) Celso Furtado, **Development and Underdevelopment,** Rio, 1961.

nomy, constituted for the country an important factor working towards a national consciousness, creating the ideology of development, and favoring the displacement of the centers of political decision. There emerged a new Brazil, facing horizons filled with promise but unfortunately resting upon a feudal and colonial infrastructure whose purpose was to serve an economy of primary products destined to be exported. In spite of these considerable obstacles — archaic agrarian structure, lack of transportation and power — the industrialization went on its way somewhat chaotically but encouragingly. Between 1947 and 1961 the annual growth rate of the gross national product was about 6%. The development of industry continued at a steady rhythm of 12.7% annually while that of agriculture barely reached 4.8%, an index that can hardly be considered precarious considering the country's low level of nourishment and an annual population growth rate of 3%.

This inequality of progress between agriculture and industry weighed all too heavily, as we will see later, on the process of national development. Other serious distortions would be felt during the course of this phase of accelerated development, but it was unfortunately both disorderly and too specialized, deprived of directives capable of unifying them or of integrating them within a national economic system. It is true that in 1949 the government had established a plan of development, the so-called Salte Plan. This was, however, far from what might be considered a plan of organic and universal development. It only concerned four well-defined sectors of activity: sanitation, feeding, transport and energy. Besides, it only covered the public sector, leaving the private sector to the hazards of circumstance. It was only in 1956 that the first plan of universal development was seen to emerge in the country — the Program of Stages — which embraced thirty objectives (or stages) which were to be attained during the course of the five years from 1956 to 1960. Unfortunately serious mistakes were made in that plan, conceived somewhat empirically and under the stress of certain political pressures. I will mention a typical example: during the distribution of the requested credits, barely 3.2% of the total were invested in the food production sector, while 43% and 29% respectively, were devoted to power and transportation. (1) These figures show how little importance was accorded to the food production problem in addition to the real neglect of the agricultural activities in a country where inquiries reveal an alarming food situation with the presence of vast zones where

(1) Joao Paulo de Almeida Magalhaes, A Brazilian Experience in Planning, in **Development and Conjuncture**, March, 1966.

hunger and undernourishment rule.

The lack of unity facing the objectives to be attained, similarly became a considerable obstacle to the process of development: the progressive sector which, identifying itself with the Brazilian reality, hoped for a true, autonomous and balanced development, openly fought the conservative fraction. The latter represented the agrarian oligarchy, which, very often in association with foreign capital, was against the changes of structure and the basic reforms which might have altered the established colonial system. With the increase of the participation of the masses in the political and economic life of the country, one could witness a hardening of the conservative minority still holding the majority in power while making the rural proletariat elect most of the representatives to Parliament. It was during the course of this phase that the fight between the urban proletariat, up to then isolated from public life, and the domineering political minorities was emphasized, their antagonisms becoming systematized.

All these social barriers, these serious structural obstacles, coupled with a certain incomprehension of events on the part of the leaders of the country, contributed to check the rhythm of development and to accelerate the tendency towards inflation made evident by a general increase in prices. Although one might consider the phenomenon of inflation in Brazil as an historical constant (1), it is nevertheless certain that the first great wave of inflation was caused by the protectionist policy for coffee, inaugurated after the crisis of 1929. From then on the "inflationary spiral" influenced by factors as numerous as they were complex, has continuously worsened. Without pretending to discover the truth of national debate on the causes of inflation, one is, all the same, obliged to admit that this inflation has served as an instrument for an economic development that was not followed by structural changes essential to such a development. But, having attained the limits of hyperinflation, it did not take long for this phenomenon to constitute a factor of social agitation and restlessness which demanded immediate measures. The cost of living suffered a rise of 64% in 1962 and of 81% the following year. There follows another conclusion: it is not the development which has provoked the inflation, as Celso Furtado has noted, but the absence of an authentic policy of development. A policy of development was required that did not sacrifice even the bread to the steel, that is to say, agriculture almost exclusively at the expense of industry, that did not concentrate every effort on one region only — the Central South — while abandoning the rest of the coun-

(1) Jairo Simoes, Inflation in Brazil: the Politics of Stabilization, from the magazine **Civilisaçao Brasileira**, May, 1966.

try, and which would transform the existing feudal infrastructure, wholly incapable of supporting a rapid and constant agricultural development. Nothing of that has been done!

As was noticed in the course of the last years of the Program of Stages a clear weakening of the rhythm of development which dropped from 1961 on, in an alarming fashion: 7.5 in 1961, 5.5 in 1962 and 2.6 in 1963. Considering a figure of 3% for the population growth rate, the year 1963 was marked by a net regression in the national economic development. During the course of the critical years, 1961 to 1963, the public powers, in efforts to confront a crisis which proved to be menacing, tried to rapidly promote the basic reforms essential to the mastery of the inflation and to once again develop the economy. But the resistance was very strong, especially where the agrarian reform was concerned, the most pressing of all, destined to break the land monopoly. It was impossible to promote the real development of a country where 8% of the owners possessed 75% of the total lands, where more than half of the agrarian properties surpassed 500 hectares and in which, of 12 million peasants, 10 million owned no land. Therefore we conclude that the main obstacle to the economic development of Brazil rests on its agrarian structure: only the disappearance of feudalism will permit it to attain a satisfactory level of development. It will not be necessary to investigate further the reason for the country using no more than 10% of the tillable lands. This is one of the weakest indices of agricultural productivity in the world and does not include food or agricultural raw materials in sufficient quantities to satisfy the needs of its industrial reserve.

The economic situation was therefore a constant source of popular discontent; despite successive readjustments, the salaries could not follow the alarming rise in the cost of living. The domineering minority was afraid of reforms that, while allowing other social levels to participate in political life, would rob them of their power. This fear caused the rightist elements to regroup and, with the support of certain chiefs of the armed forces, carry out the coup d'etat of April 1, 1964, designed to reestablish economic stability. They presented a program of "Economic Action by the Government" (P A E G) for the period 1964-65 whose objectives were as follows:

a) To accelerate the rhythm of economic development of the country, interrupted during the period 1962-63;

b) To progressively master the inflationary process during the years 1964 and 1965 in order to obtain a reasonable stabilization of prices from 1966 on;

c) To attenuate the economic crisis between sectors and between regions thus diminishing

the tensions due to social inequalities by an improvement of the living standard;

d) To assure the employment, by a policy of investment, of the important labor force continuously fluent on the labor market;

e) To correct the balance of payments whose tendency to an uncontrollable deficit threatens the continuity of the process of economic development while periodically diminishing the import capacity. (1)

The principal objectives of the new plan are, consequently: the rapid promotion of development and, simultaneously, retarding the process of inflation. Within a first stage, it was aimed to regain as quickly as possible an economic growth rate of 6%; while on the other hand to reduce the inflation to 25% in 1965, then to 10% in 1966. This new plan did not differ much in its objectives from the plan elaborated by the former, overthrown government, the so-called **Triennial Plan of Economic and Social Development for 1963-1965.** The main difference between these two plans consists in the choice of means to be employed to obtain their objectives: while the Goulart Administration expected to carry out profound structural reforms destined to liberate the productive forces of the national economy, the plan of the Castelo Branco Administration rested essentially on the monetary policy, without practically altering the basic structure. The results of this monetary plan have proved until now to be very deceiving: not only has inflation not been reduced within the foreseen limits but the economic recovery was insufficient. The country is still in a state of economic stagnation. We quote several figures to support this statement: the rate of growth of real production which was 1.6% in 1963 changed to 3.1% in 1964, then to 4.7% in 1965. (The figure for coffee production which, for climatic reasons, has greatly increased lately from 23 million sacks in 1963 to 33 million sacks in 1965, is included). If a correlation is established between the real produce and the increase in population, the following figures are obtained for per capita growth: in 1963 less than 1.6%; 1964, 0%; 1965, 1.5%. If the rise in the cost of living was already around 81% in 1963, in 1964 it reached 87% and was stabilized in 1965 at 45%. This increase amounted already to 14% during the course of the first quarter of 1966, while the plan foresaw only 10% for the whole year. The difference between the values verified and the provisions of the plan is rather significant. Not only has inflation not been controlled, despite the high social cost the Brazilian people is paying for this attempt at stabilization, but the economic development has not recovered its pre-1961 level.

(1) **Program of Economic Action of the Government 1945-1965;** Ministry of Planning and Economic Coordination, 1964, Brazil.

In the struggle against inflation the present government has resorted to two extremely depressing economic mechanisms: the brutal fall in real wages and the excessive restriction of credit. The decline in wages is the fruit of a governmental practice which consists in adjusting them on the basis of the forecasts of its plan of struggle against inflation. Let us examine what the Brazilian economist Días Leite asserts: "The difference between the reality and the forecasts of this plan is such that one cannot attribute it to any uncertainties inherent in economic forecasts. Besides, the government gives two weights and two measures to the indices of inflation forecast as 25% for 1965 and 10% for 1966. In order to defend its anti-inflation program it declares that these figures should not be taken as being precise. But in the application of the wages policy it does not hesitate to make its readjustments taking these two figures as a basis, and it is always so, for on January 13, the Monetary Council decided to fix at 10% the inflation residue for 1966. The indices themselves become guiding instruments, whose direct consequences on the whole national economy provoke distortions in the social structure of the country." (1) For not having respected, as had been foreseen, the purchasing power of wages, this policy had considerable repercussions on the living conditions of the laboring classes. The fall in the purchasing power of wage earners was to bring about a general paralysis of the Brazilian economy.

The calculations made by the Commission of the Plan of Development itself show that between 1964 and 1965 purchasing power had diminished by 8% for those receiving the minimum salary, by 15% for bank employees, by 7% for textile workers and by 15% in the public services. There followed a sharp decrease in sales throughout the country. In the textile sector this fall was of 40% in Paraná State, 33% in Guanabara,, 28% in Sao Paulo and 18% in the state of Río de Janeiro. The U S. magazine **Time**, in a report by its local correspondent, confirms that the figures for Christmas sales in 1966 were the lowest ever registered in Brazil. (2) If one adds to this recession of the market, the restrictions on credit imposed as a stabilizing measure, it easily explains the great number of bankruptcies occurring during the course of this period of crisis through which the country is passing. In a document prepared by the technicians of the National Confederation of Industries, it appears that, during the period of 1963 to 1965, while the real production increased by

(1) Antonio Días Leite, "The Program of Economic Action of the Government before the National Reality" in **Brazilian Economic Letter**, No. 5, year II, May 1966.

(2) **Time**, December 16, 1966, U.S.A.

90%, the industrial growth was 134%; the disposal of credits, at 40.5%, hardly increased. On the other hand, the diverse facilities offered to foreign capital to attract it have rendered even more critical the position of national industry which is forced, because of that fact, to compete with foreign companies, disposing, by means of internal credit, of more reasonable financial facilities. It should be noticed, however, that the foreign capital has not flown in the proportions anticipated by the government to support the economy. The foreign aid is evidenced more in the form of merchandise or services than in the form of foreign currency. (1) That is also a negative aspect to the prospects for success of the present economic plan. Stagnation rules. The small and middle industries disappear, absorbed by the great foreign companies which grow in this manner without having to contribute new capital in foreign currency.

In the light of this comprehensive analysis — which does not again discuss the details of the present Brazilian conjuncture — there remains no doubt that the measures taken by the present government from 1964 have not succeeded in lifting the country from its economic marasmus and the social tension resulting therefrom. Inflation still plays havoc, although in a less sustained rhythm, and the economy is paralyzed. That was moreover, a foreseeable situation for all those who are not ignorant of the fact that inflation is a product of underdevelopment, and of the alarming dependency of the Brazilian economy.

Inflation is not a phenomenon of conjuncture but it is an integral part of the structure of an underdeveloped country, subjected to the monopolizing conditions of its market.

The attempts at stabilization will always meet failure and they will continually retard the development of Brazil as long as the country maintains its colonial or semifeudal structure. And this in spite of the intrusion into the thick feudal strata of several incrustations of a capitalistic type which are no less than centers of industrial activity — centers which are little by little monopolized by foreigners. And it is the American magazine **Time** which asserts in the above mentioned article: "The danger of the Brazilian 'denationalization' is not purely imaginary." It is indeed a very sad reality.

The economic and social crisis which Brazil is presently experiencing, after having been prepared, more than any other tropical country in the world, to abandon its underdeveloped economy for the benefit of an autonomous and balanced development, is a significant example whose lesson may be of great use for the Third World now in search of its economic emancipation.

(1) Antonio Días Leite, **Roads of Development**, Brazil, 1966.

GUINEA BISSAU GUERRILLA JUNGLE

by Gabriel Molina

Major Domingo Ramos, standing firm and defiant, shouted war-cries and called for victory as he directed the fire of his guerrilla group located some six hundred meters from the Portuguese garrison at Madina Boe.

Six feet tall and husky despite the deficient diet, his strong muscles stood out all over his body. With a thick beard, black like his skin, Domingo Ramos was the picture of a revolutionary leader. Member of the Political Bureau of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde and Political Commissioner for the eastern region of PAIGC, thirty-one years old at the time of the attack, he was known as one of the most politically-aware men among the guerrilla fighters of Portuguese Guinea. In addition to being commissioner, he was military and political head of the region and personally directed its operations.

His shouts were drowned by a mortar shell exploding nearby. Fragments from the shell embedded themselves in Ramos' stomach and one of his arms.

Suddenly the guerrilla fire almost stopped. Major Domingo Ramos lay mortally wounded on African soil. Beside him, Anfale, his faithful companion and equally valiant combatant, lay dead, his head crushed.

"They have killed the Major!" someone shouted.

For a few seconds a succession of images passed through Domingo's mind. Bissau and the people flitted by. The uprisings in the city. The alternative to killing fellow Guineans in the name of the Portuguese flag and uniform that he had been obliged to don and defend. The decision to desert. The first guerrillas. Amilcar. Comprehension. Patriotism. The jungle. H u n g e r and fatigue shared. The command. The guerrillas.

Guerrilla fighters never die, he said. But his life was slowly ebbing away through a hole in his liver.

Major Domingo and Major Nino, carrying out instructions of the Political Bureau, planned the attack on the Madina Boe Garrison with the objective of

causing the Portuguese enemy the greatest number of casualties possible and forcing him to abandon the east zone of Portuguese Guinea which was being liberated by the guerrillas. This garrison and the one at Beli were all that remained of Portuguese colonialism in the area. At the beginning of November 1966, they began to plan the operation, which was carried out a few days later.

Some observers were sent to obtain the necessary information for developing the strategic and tactical plan of attack. The mission accomplished, Majors Domingo and Nino gathered the troops together after eating their frugal daily meal of rice.

Domingo Ramos, in battle dress once olive-green before perspiration and the scorching heat of the African sun had changed the color, again explained what they were fighting for. Liberty or death. Not to slacken the fighting until the end. "In this operation we may die," he said with premonition. "But in the face of our country's call, the life of the revolutionary is the least important thing. It is the deed that is important. Your decision to continue the struggle until victory or death. I ask you to remember this watchword always."

Domingo had no need to remember his words as he lay mortally wounded. The enemy, noting the lull in the guerrilla operation, realized that something had happened. The order to increase the volume and rhythm of the defensive fire was given by the captain of the Madina Boe Garrison, while reinforcements were requested by radio. Mortar broadsides and sprays of 50 calibre machine gun fire swept the zone separating them by only six hundred meters.

Major Domingo reacted and asked all those gathered round him not to abandon the struggle. In spite of the pain, he added it was essential to continue the attack and destroy the Portuguese position. Battle cries and gunfire sounded once again while Domingo's transfer to the rear was organized despite the protests of the heroic commander. The Portuguese tried to take the offensive.

The combat had started in the afternoon and already the darkness of the West African night had fallen. The Portuguese counteroffensive was contained and a siege that lasted several days began. The decision was made to take Domingo back to the guerrilla base because of his serious condition. The journey on foot was difficult. It lay along paths rarely frequented by the Portuguese in the middle of the Guinean jungle. The major's comrades carried him on their shoulders.

PLAIN AND AIRPLANES

The Madina Garrison in the Boe region, defended by some 250 Portuguese soldiers, was situated in a small plain. At 600 meters distance on a slight elevation less than 100 meters high and 500 me-

ters long, it was the central point of the attack. The rest of the territory was surrounded and occupied by the guerrilla fighters during the four days before the attack.

The reinforcements, requested by the captain of the garrison, tried to cross a nearby river with armoured cars and boats with the close support of Portuguese aircraft, both propeller driven Fiats and supersonic F-84's. The planes concentrated their fire in the vicinity of the river to help the advance. But the PAIGC combatants did not retreat. They continued to destroy the boats and obstruct the armoured cars, stopping them and causing several casualties. Only one guerrilla was wounded by fire from the aircraft.

The Portuguese had come from the Quebo Garrison and the armoured vehicles were in the front line. They used their cannon to hammer the position of the ambush prepared by the guerrillas on the opposite bank of the river. In spite of their technical advantages and military training, the **tugas**, as the guerrillas call the Portuguese, were stopped. The fact is that an army without combat morale loses all combativeness — not through cowardice but because it has no reason to fight — when it meets strong resistance to its attacks or when it is taken by surprise.

On this occasion, the Portuguese reinforcements divided their forces and tried to go through the jungle in another area instead of using the paths. But the alternative was foreseen and this enemy advance was also repelled by ambush. The blockade of Madina continued, but more loosely after the arrival of the planes which began to scatter napalm in an attempt to paralyze the offensive action. When the blockade was raised these same planes returned to their base carrying approximately thirty bodies. The losses were not greater only because the **tugas** made use of underground shelters built below the seven or eight surface structures to protect themselves. The African forces of the Portuguese army, principally from the Fula and Mandinga tribes, were obliged to fight aboveground and many of them were among the casualties.

During the combat, the Portuguese planes, besides aiding the advance of the reinforcements and harassing the guerrilla fighters — preventing them from closing in on the barracks — parachuted ammunition, arms and food to the besieged men, thus neutralizing the operation.

The Portuguese used every type of bomb in their air offensives, especially those with high explosive power and napalm. Usually in these attacks the aircraft indiscriminately sweep the area, especially the villages or **tabankas**. Periodically, the Portuguese first carry out reconnaissance missions and then launch air attacks. The **tabankas** with their

civilian population are their favorite target since the guerrillas, constantly hidden, are difficult to locate and the effectiveness of these missions is practically nil, although carried out over flat, open areas typical of the majority of the territory of so-called Portuguese Guinea.
Nevertheless, the blockade of the Madina Boe Garrison had to be raised because of the great increase in intensity of the air offensive.
This is no contradiction of the fact that the air attacks caused only minor losses among the guerrilla fighters protected by the forests. But in Africa, air attacks are used as a psychological weapon against the guerrillas, and as an instrument of destruction and death against the civilian population. In the first place, it has the effect of a catalyst on man's fear mechanisms; it has been employed with relative success in those regions of the Third World which have a very low general and cultural development. This measure is particularly effective in the African animistic societies, on account of its new and confusing form and qualities and because of the probable interpretations given it by believers in atavism.
An indisputable example is the experience of the Congo. It is clear that this is not the main reason for the present slowness to develop the revolutionary war in the Congo. But within the framework of circumstances that have operated there, where the principal one is probably the strategic and economic value of Patrice Lumumba's country, atavism maintains a disconcerting role. If the lack of military technique in the evasion of aggressive air attacks is added to this problem, the bombs begin to play as important a role in guerrilla warfare as in classical warfare. However, it must not be thought, without analyzing these extremes, that the effects of the use of aircraft in the war are nonetheless terrible. It is simply that they could be avoided like armored cars when fear of them is overcome. On the African continent it is not easy to overcome this problem as was done some time ago, for example, in Viet-Nam.
It should be noted that the OSPAAAL delegation which toured different sections of both liberated and disputed territory in Portuguese Guinea saw what had been villages razed by Portuguese bombs of US fabrication.

VIOLENCE AGAINST VIOLENCE

The Portuguese army seeks to terrorize the rural population so as to undermine the guerrillas who have been harassing them for some time now; but already the guerrillas have learnt to evade the classic type of combat where modern weapons can be used. Heavy losses therefore are not common. But, like a boomerang, terror engenders the conviction that it is necessary to react to

violence. The farmers comprise not only the fundamental nucleus of the guerrilla ranks; they also help in the very important factor of supplies, contributing as much in the feeding of the guerrilla fighters with rice extracted from the **bolanhas**, and other crops that they cultivate, as in the armed defense of their **tabankas** or carrying out the difficult, suffocating, tiring movement of matériel on foot through the jungle despite the demons that walk, the demons that crawl and the demons that speak and shoot.

On March last, this correspondent and the OSPAAAL delegation, lived with the guerrilla fighters of the PAIGC and with the farmers, with the improvised teachers and the cadres from the city and country, with the children and the youth of "Portuguese" Guinea. We walked tens of kilometers with them. We passed through scores of **tabankas**. We witnessed hundreds of manifestations of sympathy and silent protest and the horror of the effects of napalm on men, women and children in the field hospitals hidden deep in the thick jungle, sultry despite the passing of the dry season. We will never forget the dying farmer, burnt by napalm, who looked at us without seeing us, suffering his last hours, with the doctor powerless to do anything more. Nor the little girl, her foot converted into a deformed stump by the bombs made in USA.

They are the ones who suffer. But they are also the ones who fight. The first planes have been brought down by the anti-aircraft fire of the guerrilla fighters and the construction of shelters and fortifications has been initiated in the **tabankas**.

It is certain that the PAIGC has to make greater advances in order to snatch control from the tugas of the large villages and towns, waterways, and of some tribes tied to the despotic designs of their chiefs. Those feudal lords stick to their privileges as do all who live by injustice!

The Fula and Mandinga tribes still submit in the main to the domination of their ancient chiefs and for this reason make up the majority in the ranks of the Portuguese army. Conscription is forced upon them. But when they begin to realize what this means they can always resort to desertion. The greatest factor favouring recruitment or its maintenance is poverty. These mercenary soldiers, like their Portuguese masters, ease their poverty a little, although frequently it is in their huts that the colonialists place their mortars and other weapons, to sow doubts among the guerrillas and confuse them about the location of their targets. These "natives" are not allowed to use the underground shelters installed in the garrisons and they have to carry the greatest part of the load in their defence. These submissive circumstances are mainly due to the feudal chiefs, who are the well-paid agents of the colonialists. The Fula and Mandinga

chiefs have the right, born of ignorance, to impose forced labor, steal cattle, abuse women and transfer property and possessions. The feudal chiefs know that the guerrillas are opposed to their privileges and fight against them ceaselessly. Considered traitors, these feudal chiefs will be dealt with by revolutionary justice at the appropriate time. The PAIGC's policy toward the masses who have still not understood the meaning of the struggle is one of a permanent call to join the revolutionary movement. For this reason every guerrilla fighter must be a politically conscious combatant. In every unit of the PAIGC's guerrilla army a political commissioner holds joint command with the military chief.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

When analyzing the concrete results of the attack on the Madina Boe Garrison, it is necessary to see them within the general framework of strategic and tactical principles.

Last June, when we spoke in Conakry with the leader of the struggle in Portuguese Guinea, Amilcar Cabral, we asked him at what stage he considered the guerrilla struggle he directs, with reference to the concepts of Major Ernesto Che Guevara. Cabral declared that insofar as Guevara's ideas could be applied to an analysis in depth of the struggle in Portuguese Guinea, the war in his country was in the mobile stage. He said: "For this reason we are reorganizing our forces, creating very powerful regular army units in such a way that we can attack the Portuguese units, give greater mobility to our own forces, and diminish the relative importance of guerrilla positions already held in order to advance against enemy positions. Right now, an essential part of our struggle is the systematic attack on reinforced outposts, on the Portuguese forts. This indicates that we are now engaged in the stage of mobile warfare.

"We hope that we will not be long in progressing with this mobile stage so we can begin, at the same time and as conditions develop, our general offensive to end Portuguese domination of our country."

Strategically, the capture of the garrison in the Madina Boe operations had not been visualized. The objective planned was to cause the enemy heavy casualties and destroy their aboveground construction, a goal that was one hundred percent achieved. From this point of view, the operation was a success.

In general terms, and considering how the combat developed, the garrison could have been taken. But this was not the purpose of the operation. It was a harassing operation with a strategic purpose. At Madina Boe the combativeness and personal courage of the Guinean combatants was demonstrated once again; it was also again proved that when aircraft have lost their psychological effect, they have

limited importance as an enemy weapon against guerrilla warfare. The conviction that modern military technical methods can be defeated strengthens the capacity to resist any type of offensive.

During the last dry season which, as is known, is the most advantageous for the mobility of the anti-guerrilla forces, the offensives of the Portuguese colonialist army were systematically repulsed. The aggressors were not able to take over any of these areas in spite of employing, on occasion, hundreds of soldiers in their attempts. The Portuguese offensive carried out against the guerrilla base at Cufar employed 2.000 men, supported by aircraft and marines. A guerrilla force of 120 men intercepted it, neutralizing their operation, and after several days of uninterrupted combat, the **tugas** had to retreat to their garrisons at Cufar and Katio.

On the other hand, the fact that the irreparable loss of Major Domingo Ramos, despite its great impact on the guerrillas who adored him, was not an insurmountable obstacle for the strategic success of the operation, showed the degree of political consciousness attained by the combatants of the PAIGC.

Major Domingo Ramos was, indeed, a true revolutionary chief. Constantly at the center of his troops, he was inseparable from them and had won their confidence and love. His name inspired fear among the Portuguese. In the combat at Madina Boe, Domingo Ramos concerned himself as always with all the details of the attack. During preparations he gave the relevant orders and personally reviewed the position of each of his combatants and the role that he would play. He gave the order for the attack and continued directing the guerrilla fire while observing the enemy fire. In this way, in the midst of the attack, he was hit by the fatal shot. From the rear, where he was taken immediately, he was transferred to a small field hospital further removed from the combat zone. As the doctor made every effort to save his life, Domingo Ramos did not lose his lucidity. He still had the strength and courage to write farewell letters to Amilcar Cabral, Major Nino, who accompanied him in combat, and to his fiancée. He confided to her that he had sensed death coming, asking her not to cry but to understand that it was necessary. Faithful to his wishes, she has continued the struggle.

Later, the Political Bureau of the PAIGC issued a special communique informing the people of the death of Major Domingo Ramos, and at the same time declaring him a National Hero. Today Domingo Ramos is not physically present among his combatants. But throughout the world, inspired by Ernesto Che Guevara, thousands of receptive ears have heard and thousands of men have come forward to "intone funereal dirges with the rattle of machine guns, war cries and calls for victory" in that guerrilla jungle.

NAPALM: 260 litres each

Domingo Ramos: "What counts is what we do"



Destructive, but effective

The Madina Garrison

"...we are in the stage of mobile warfare."

meridian
liberation

PALESTINE: AL FATAH COMMANDOS

"Our actions are of two types: commando and guerrilla."



Even the Tel Aviv Government has admitted the efficacy of the actions.





"La raison d'être" of the commandos.



After June 5 of this year: 350 thousand more Palestinians expelled.

PALESTINE: AL FATAH COMMANDOS

by Teófilo Acosta

For the first time a journalist has had the opportunity to interview and photograph commandos of the Al Fatah at their training bases. Until now there has been no such personal account of this much discussed subject.

little skill, by imperialism — under the battle cry of the right to exist.

The fight against Israel must be waged on the grounds that it is an aggressor state, a confirmed instrument of U S imperialism in the Middle East, whose mission is to smash the progressive governments of the zone, hold back the liberation struggle in Africa and Asia, and attain economic power that will permit it to control the wealth of other nations for its own and U S benefit.

Al Fatah whose commandos have won great prestige in recent years, puts bold principles into action with daring and courage. Publication of an interview with leaders of the organization at one of their secret commando training camps will permit the readers of three continents to form their own opinion.

TEAM LEADERSHIP

To reach the secret camp I had first to go along paved roads and then stony paths, setting out from Damascus in a direction that cannot be revealed.

A hundred meters from the camp the unmistakable sound of gunfire could be heard.

A young man in an olive-green uniform, who was on duty at the entrance, with martial air allowed us in. The military head of the unit, Abou Amer, advanced to meet us. I was taken to a small office, full of maps, rifles and campaign uniforms. We sat on cots talking. The true names of those I spoke with cannot be revealed; their **noms de guerre** are used in this article. For military and organizational reasons, the commando leaders reject publicity of a personal nature.

Bashiri, a political leader of the organization in Damascus, forthrightly explained its origins and objectives. "Al Fatah is directed by a Central Committee and a Political Bureau.

"We do not have an individual leader, but rather team leadership. Of course, there are outstanding figures, but we do not want to say who they are. We began our activities on January 1, 1959, amid great difficulties, as only Algeria and Syria gave us aid.

"We are fighting to give the cause of the Palestinian people a revolutionary character. We believe it should assume the form

of a war of national liberation. Life has shown that the sad scene of refugee camps, publicized throughout the world since 1948, solves nothing. Nineteen years of constant aggravation of the Palestine problem stress the inadequacies of the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine, created in 1964.

"In 1964, at the initiative of President Nasser, the Arab states' summit conference gave its support to the OLP to find a definitive solution for the problem of the Palestinian people. Since then, the OLP has tried to organize a Palestinian army of the classic type to pit against Israeli regular forces. But up to now it has been more than proved that battle between regular armies is not a suitable method for defeating Zionism in the Middle East. The correct method is to organize guerrilla warfare and commando action within the territory occupied by the enemy, in order to harass him continually, cut his communication lines, sabotage his industries and force him to fight us on difficult terrain."

What is the purpose of that struggle?

"To bring down the economic, political and social system in Israel, to destroy her institutions through a war that will be long and bloody but sure to succeed."

And what will you do when you have taken power?

"Our movement is not of a racist character. We are not motivated by racial hatred. We are not fighting the Jews as such. We are fighting against Israel as a Zionist state — at the service of U S imperialism — that forcibly displaced our people from their lands and homes in 1948, and more recently, in June 1967.

"For this reason we have not proposed, as have other Arab leaders, to drive the Jews into the sea. Simply, once we have recovered control of the territories that belong to us, we will dismantle the Israeli state apparatus, award indemnities to the affected Palestinians, send the invaders back to Europe or their countries of origin, and invite those Jewish citizens who have long been there to live together with us, if they so desire."

Bashiri was obviously moved as he spoke. He ran his right hand

through his dark hair again and again, his fingers lost there as if helping to formulate his phrases. He continued:

"We know that this is not an easy undertaking but we refuse to regard it as impossible, as do the poor in spirit. Those who hold that point of view say that we are mad, that we are a group of adventurers. The eleven men who, together with Fidel Castro, started off in the isolation of the Sierra Maestra shortly after the **Granma** landing should be asked what they think about this. The heroic Vietnamese combatants or veterans of the Algerian war of liberation should be asked. Go back to the example of the Bolsheviks to determine whether or not we can attain our objectives. This is a question of application of an inviolable revolutionary principle: faith in the power of the masses, organized and armed. Always it is a minority that initiates the battle and dies, if necessary; and we are that minority in the Middle East. The masses, sick of UN resolutions and empty talk, will soon follow us."

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

The man seated opposite me, stroking the butt of his submachine gun, expressed himself calmly and impressively. His **nom de guerre:** Abou Amer. The hard lines of his face contrasted with his warm expression. When he took off his cap we could see that he was balding. His age: forty. Stamping out his cigarette with a muddy boot, he said:

"There is no war without casualties, but it is better to die bringing down the enemy, knowing that final victory will be ours, than to await a slow, miserable death sitting in a tent in the desert. Almost two million Palestinians have suffered this humiliation, and now they are tired of waiting in vain. A new generation of Palestinians is making its appearance, and nothing has changed. For example, thirty percent of the refugees in Gaza before June 5 were born after 1948. How long can this situation last? Neither the inoperative UN nor its highly touted agency for refugee relief nor anyone other than we ourselves can solve the problem. The only road is people's warfare, and we are going to fight.

We are already fighting. In the course of combat we will demonstrate the correctness of our position: struggle in its highest form."

How do you organize that struggle in practice?

"Since January 1959 we have carried out over a hundred actions within the territory occupied by Israel. Tel Aviv itself has recognized our effectiveness. In our press communiques we have been objective and honest, as we were advised by Major Ernesto Che Guevara when we spoke with him in Algeria in 1965."

Where are you operating now?

"In reality, we have had very little assistance, as Bashiri has already told you. Now, since the June reverse, some Arab friends have begun to open their eyes and give us facilities. If we had a strong movement within Israel, the history of the June events might have been different. Look," and he spread a map on the cot, "with forces located in different strategic spots of Israel, open to penetration through constant struggle, we could have hit hard at the economic zones of the Zionist state. Through sabotage actions we could have cut off their land communications, blocking their advance, but it wasn't possible."

"At present we have forces on the west bank of the River Jordan which is under Israeli occupation and in the mountains of Galilee in northern Israel; and we intend to grow strong in the Negev, where we have some men.

"We carry out two kinds of actions: commando and guerrilla. The commandos infiltrate, perform their missions and then return to their bases. The guerrillas remain in their zones, move about, disguise themselves and attack. Natural conditions are of the best. The hilly terrain is favorable to our operations. Not long ago we attacked an Israeli arsenal located in Akko, northern Israel, and also a textile factory in the area.

"Our primary needs are material aid in weapons and military training. Through action, we are proving the serious character of our movement."

In general, what do you think of the situation in the Middle East?

"That there can be no compromise or conciliation with the enemy. We must fight to the last man, showing the same courage in battle as the Vietnamese patriots. Vacillating actions lead to defeat. The so-called Arab world is divided according to the political positions of the countries that form it.

"It is, then, utopian to fight for unity of the Arab world, unless it is unity based on close coordination of the peoples of all countries of the area and the progressive governments. That is our opinion on the matter. We even feel it necessary to deepen the contradictions existing in the reactionary Arab countries so that the masses will upset the established order and take power."

A TRAINING SESSION

Abou Amer then spoke to me about training:

"We have secret camps for training our guerrillas. There we adapt the experiences of other peoples to our specific conditions. As for the commandos..." He took my arm and asked me to follow him. Shots rang out on the training ground, and the young men doing their battle exercises cried out: "Commandos! Commandos!"

With bared torsos, they entered a tunnel full of dirty water and swam to the exit, twenty meters away. The training officer called to them from outside to cover the distance more rapidly. When a man fell behind, the officer fired his machinegun rifle through slits in the tunnel walls that let him observe the exercise.

Completely soaking, the men emerged. Running and shouting, they headed for a nearby slope which they climbed on a rope. Then they jumped to the ground. When they regained their balance, they kept on running, raising their knees to chest-level. Then they went on to special horizontal ladders, crossing in different positions.

The men then engaged in fierce hand-to-hand fighting, combining technique and aggressiveness. This was followed by practice in disarming the enemy quickly, using knives.

After leaving the camp in a jeep, from afar I still seemed to hear the gunfire and the vigorous cries: "Commandos! Commandos!"

VIET-NAM: FIVE LESSONS, ONE VICTORY

by Truong Son

The victory of the 1966-'67 winter-spring campaign and five lessons on military strategy.

During the period 1965-66 the US forces tried to take advantage of the dry season and in September they launched their troops into so-called "mopping-up operations." In the year 1966-67 they started similar operations in October. Today they are obliged to limit themselves to clearing the runways of the airports and bases of debris. The disasters in Tay Ninh during the aforementioned period cost General Jonathan Seaman and Ambassador Cabot Lodge their jobs. Today the strategy of William Westmoreland and Ellsworth Bunker is treading this same well-beaten track.

The Vietnamese people resist the invader with their own way of life and in their own manner of fighting and, in the face of force, with their own concepts and their own ideology which carry them into battle with the best of strategies: a people's war. The strategy of the People's

Liberation Forces to strike at the invaders in various ways simultaneously sought and achieved the objective of compelling the US forces to adopt defensive measures and to convert their bases into small enclaves surrounded by patriotic forces. The experts recognize that the Vietnamese attacks are undoubtedly sustained, powerful and coordinated, with smooth synchronization of military confrontations and political struggle.

In this article —which *Tricontinental* publishes at length as an extensive extract, made by its editorial staff, containing the essential points and the military and political declarations— the experience gained between the winter of 1966 and the spring of 1967 is studied in depth, that experience from which we may derive tactics and strategies of universal value, especially for the peoples of the Third World. Truong Son, an authorized military commentator of the South Vietnamese National Front for Liberation, seems to draw two conclusions from his didactic analysis: the contest between the US invader and the Vietnamese patriots is a struggle between two forces which are governed by opposing rules of war; and, by inference, it is necessary to know the enemy as oneself.

Having sustained a staggering initial blow in the 1965-66 dry season and other bitter setbacks in the ensuing rainy season in both parts of our country, Johnson and MacNamara, though still shutting their eyes to hard facts, could not help but be aware of the following:

—Far from faring smoothly, the U S strategy of a "limited war" of aggression, waged with American expeditionary troops as the main force, had made heavy weather of a time beset with difficulties and complexities.

—In the execution of the said strategy the lightning war and lightning victory policy had proved, through the test of time, devoid of any sound basis.

—The temporary elation generated by the introduction of the U S expeditionary force to rescue the Saigon army in 1965 had evaporated and given way to a nightmare haunting the American imperialists, now confronted with thorny problems. What were the prospects of the war in South Viet-Nam? How could it be brought to a military victo-

ry? How could the political objective in South Viet-Nam be achieved? What should be done in the immediate future? And so on and so forth.

In such a situation, though already somewhat disappointed, the Americans still demonstrated their obduracy and hoped for a military solution; at the beginning of the 1966-67 dry season they firmly decided to launch another strategic counteroffensive involving two and a half times more troops, two to three times more war matériel, firepower included, and financial resources than in the previous dry season.

For their part, the armed forces and the people of South Viet-Nam, led by the Central Committee of the National Front for Liberation, had taken a decision of a strategic character which found expression in these basic objectives:

—To defeat one million American and puppet troops, to foil their so-called "two-pincer strategy" and smash their second strategic counteroffensive.

—To aggravate the U S puppets' impasse and loss of initiative and confront it with new forces to bring about a much greater defeat.

—To create for themselves a new strategic situation enabling them to forge ahead and win more important victories.

Our successes in the winter and spring of 1966-67 and their significance were as great as the enemy's failures were costly.

According to incomplete figures, during the period from early October 1966 to late March 1967, the Liberation Armed Forces wiped out more than 150 000 officers and men (not including 60 000 puppet deserters), half of them American and satellite troops; some 40 infantry and artillery battalions and tank and armoured squadrons, over 200 companies and 250 platoons of the U S and satellite forces were annihilated; 1 300 tanks and armoured cars, 233 guns and over 1 500 aircraft were destroyed. The number of troops knocked out was two and a half times larger than during the previous

dry season, while the quantity of weapons and other war matériel destroyed increased by several times. As before, the NFL controls four-fifths of the territory and three-quarters of the population of South Viet-Nam.

This is the greatest victory we have ever achieved. It is one of far-reaching significance from both political and military points of view. It has undoubtedly opened the enemy's eyes to the fact that after two years their "limited war" did not bring about any strategic success, and that this time they have been plunging farther and farther into a tunnel whose end is not in sight. It has undoubtedly brought home to them the hard facts that, with more than one million American and puppet troops, they were incapable of wresting back the strategic initiative they had lost and were forced to retire to a more defensive position with less combat and operational effectiveness — a situation that this vast army has proved unable by its own action to force upon us. Our dry season victory has probably shown the aggressors that their "limited war" has already gone beyond the scope of Taylor's "strategy of flexible reaction," and that instead of turning the tide of events in their favour they have become involved in a political and strategic situation that has become increasingly complicated both in South Viet-Nam and throughout the world and particulary in the United States itself.

To us this victory has demonstrated that the absolute political superiority of the South Vietnamese revolution has been preserved and powerfully developed; that the absolute moral superiority of the people and the Liberation Armed Forces has endured the trial of strength with the enemy more steadfastly than at any other time. It has also shown us that in the face of a million-strong army and a mass array of steel we were capable of attacking with great effectiveness, of maintaining our initiative in strategy, operational conduct and fighting, and of winning control over the battlefield with original combat methods. This explains why it is that the

longer we fight, the stronger we become. Clearly, our dry season victory has created a more stable political and strategic situation fraught with new elements, new possibilities, and new premises which will surely bring us much greater successes even though we shall have to struggle hard and relentlessly against the adversary's wicked and perfidious maneuvers in the days ahead.

We embarked on the winter-spring campaign from a firm strategic position and maintained our initiative on the battlefield thereby retaining the means to act and to fight as we wished and to force the enemy to accept battles of our own choosing. Consequently, we progressively increased our operational and strategic effectiveness.

A question of great importance arose concerning strategic conduct: which side would secure the initiative of action on the battlefield and control it on both military and political planes? For he who gained the upper hand on this point would win. This objective was hotly contested but we won and are now in a superior position. Thus we may indeed conclude that our strategy and our fighting methods have triumphed over those of the enemy.

Our 1966-67 victory testifies once again to the correctness of our political and military lines and the grim determination of our people and armed forces. It also demonstrates the effectiveness of the close co-ordination between our great, northern rear and our huge front in the South.

Our victory is linked with the wholehearted support and assistance of the socialist countries and of our friends throughout the world.

With this great victory we have considerably steeled ourselves and matured. We have also acquired valuable experience that should be summed up.

I—TO ASCERTAIN THE ENEMY'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE, CORRECTLY TO ASSESS HIS RULES OF ACTION AND HIS CAPABILITIES IN ORDER TO DEFINE OUR OWN STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE AND

COMBAT METHODS

To know the enemy and oneself is a principle which any belligerent should abide by to secure victory in a war. In South Viet-Nam, particularly during the winter of 1966 and the spring of 1967, this principle required that we should ascertain the adversary's scheme and strategic objective he was resolved to attain, and should know his rules of action and capabilities. Only by so doing could we define our own strategic objective and pursue it with all our determination. For prior to any engagement, operation or campaign, the first thing that the command at every level normally has to establish is the enemy's situation and, relying on past experience and on all data available, ascertain his plans, the methods used to conduct his activities, and his capabilities.

For this purpose, starting in the summer of 1966, the N F L., the L A F Command and Front bodies at various levels, had focused their attention on studying the enemy's situation in the following respects: What was his strategic design for the dry season? How effective were his troops and how great his capacity? Where would he use them? What rules would govern his action? At that stage of course we could make only preliminary evaluations but these had to be fundamentally accurate. Otherwise, our actions would lack coordination and force us into strategic and tactical inactivity. Apart from other causes, we owed our 1966-67 victory to the fact that from the very outset we had in the main accurately assessed our opponent's strategic plans and rules of action.

1. We had accurately appraised the strategic objective that the enemy was determined to attain. In the spring of 1965 we had already foreseen that in the 1965-66 dry season the adversary would certainly meet with heavy setbacks, and that in the following rainy season he would carry out routine activities in preparation for a large-scale counteroffensive in the 1966-67 dry season,

involving probably up to one million American, puppet and satellite troops, among whom the number of GI's might reach 400 000. This prediction was of great importance for the ideological preparation of our armed forces and people as well as for our organizational preparations. Though we did not anticipate every eventuality we had forecast by then —and were strikingly correct— that, after sustaining big losses with a 700 000-strong army in the 1965-66 dry season, the enemy could not turn the tide in their favour in the following dry season with even a million men.

We had thus accurately foreseen the ferocious determination of the US imperialists to attain their strategic objectives, their great ambition, the extensive force they would field as well as their brutal and treacherous tricks which were however littered with weaknesses and complications. In other words, the strength and means of execution that they would use to achieve their purpose would be beset by negative factors and the seeds of failure.

From this assessment we arrived at certain conclusions serving as guide-lines for our action. For instance, we should not underestimate the aggressor's determination to achieve this strategic objective; apart from weak points he possessed strong ones to which we should pay the closest attention; we should prepare resolutely to crush his new strategic counteroffensive; objectively we were in a position to win in the 1966-67 campaign provided we exerted strenuous efforts. Such a significant victory would create new premises for greater victories.

2. To grasp the enemy's rule of action so as to foil his plans in every theater of operation.

In order to know the adversary one should not proceed incoherently. Rather, one must learn his rules of action.

One should tackle the problem with great care because it requires data, the ability to analyse and draw the necessary conclusions and a sound judgment. One of our successes over the past two

years has been our ever improving knowledge of the U S. forces' rules of action. This formed a basis for us to work out our own rules of action. The contest between the enemy and ourselves on the battlefield is a struggle between two forces governed by opposing rules of war.

The following are some of those rules that we had correctly gauged and ascertained:

a) Coordination between the "search and destroy" and "pacification" pincers. In the South what the adversary calls "search and destroy" and "pacification" operations means essentially the use of both American and puppet armed forces and military action.

b) Combination of the offensive and the defensive. In the previous dry season our opponent laid emphasis on the offensive while coupling it with the defensive. Now his counteroffensive strategy was to combine the offensive and the defensive in an effort to firmly strengthen the defensive, preserve his forces, bases and defensive zones by fanning-out raids, by preventing our preparations for attacks, breaking our grip and enlarging the cordons around his bases while mounting attacks in order to prevent or restrict our large-scale operations. Unlike the French defence, the American defence was mobile. But after two years of confrontation their rear and rear bases enjoyed no safety and they found themselves forced to fight longer battles than they had expected. To adjust themselves to the situation, they resorted to new measures such as deeper raiding thrusts, occupation of more territory, more prefab fortifications with a surrounding no-man's land, etc. As to their offensive, it did not differ from that of the French. However, to better suit the situation they attached importance to both large and medium-size operations, lasting for many days on end and continuing simultaneously on several fronts. They combined "pacification" and defensive activities to deliver steady and strong blows, to strike after or in the course of "sweeps," to hit after tightening the noose, to destroy and deci-

mate at the same time, etc. All those tactics had been tested by the French in Indo-China and Algeria and had not staved off their failure for they were nothing short of a passive and expedient makeshift and as such could not help the U S aggressor militarily or politically.

c) Combining actions inside and outside South Viet-Nam to encircle and isolate it. By intensifying their war of destruction in North Viet-Nam, the Americans tried to halt the assistance provided by the northern rear to the big southern front. Simultaneously, they stepped up their operations on land in the South and their air strikes against the North. They used their air force, navy and ground artillery in an attempt to isolate the front from the rear hitting both fronts simultaneously.

d) Combining military, political and diplomatic actions. The enemy extended his activities in all the hill-forest, rural and urban sectors. He combined his military and political counteroffensives on these three fronts and his diplomatic counteroffensive—his "peace negotiation" hoax—with a view to bringing military pressure to bear on us and deceiving and bribing the people politically and economically. All this was done in the hope of impairing our revolutionary combativeness and our people's resolve to fight.

3. To appraise correctly the capabilities of a million-strong army to devise efficient combat methods.

Preparing to confront and fight off one million American and puppet troops, the South Vietnamese armed forces and people, using their experience in the 1965-66 dry season and the revolutionary and scientific appraisal of the correlation of forces and the strategic positions of both sides came to the following conclusions: the enemy had very substantially increased his numbers and war matériel but not his combat effectiveness; from a defensive, losing position his million-strong force could exert no appreciable strategic effect nor devise strategically effective

combat methods as they had in the European and Pacific theatres.

In World War II, no more than six months after the deployment of their forces, Japan and Germany had secured strategic, if temporary, victories. In the South of our country, two years after it committed its expeditionary forces, the United States is still unable to attain any strategic objective. Why? To answer this question one has to understand the many complex underlying causes. The following are some immediate ones:

—The United States unleashed its "limited war" after the failure of its "special war." For this reason, it has been on the defensive from the very outset.

—The U S forces are not so strong as people think; they do have strong points, but their weaknesses are many and these are important, basic ones.

The strategy of the U S aggressive "limited war" has to rely on two strategic forces, the American and puppet troops. The latter, being too weak, undermine the strength of the former.

—The U S local rear support is also very weak while its social and political bases in South Viet-Nam are very shaky; the puppet administration which constitutes its prop is rotten to the core.

—The U S forces are not confronting the army of a bourgeois country but a people's war in a land where the armed forces and people hold a winning position, have the initiative on the battlefield and are not alone in their fight.

II—TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE OUR UNREMITTING OFFENSIVE POSITION, HOLD AND DEVELOP OUR INITIATIVE ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND FORCE THE ENEMY INTO FIGHTING BATTLES OF OUR CHOICE

Since the beginning of the 1966-67 dry season, while widening the target area of our actions we have been speeding up the tempo and increasing the

scope of our attacks on the enemy. We have also been holding and developing our control over the operational fronts.

These are the prominent features of the situation on the battlefield during the dry season: On our side, the L A F 's continual offensive position and control over the battlefield developed evenly and in depth, leading to a series of offensive actions and counteroffensive actions with an offensive character from mid-October 1966 to mid-February 1967. At the same time we lured adversely situated troops out of their positions to hit at them, successfully c o u n t e r e d their "search and destroy" operations and large and medium-size terrorist raids, and struck them in the vicinity of their bases deep to their rear. Strengthened by their earlier successes and thanks to adequate preparations in every respect — moral, organizational and technical — the armed forces and people of South Viet-Nam soon unleashed their offensive and delivered telling blows simultaneously on many fronts from Quan Tri, Thua Thien and Central Trung Bo to the Western High Plateau, Eastern Nam Bo and the Nam Bo plains.

The offensive took place on both the military and political fronts with the participation of both our military and political forces, the three categories of the L A F., our three spearheads — military struggle, political struggle and agitation among enemy troops — on the hills and in the forests, and rural and urban sectors. All people's war methods were put into operation against all the adversary's forces — American, puppet and satellite — to wipe them out, frustrate their "pacification" and nibbling operations as well as to preserve and expand the liberated areas, maintain and promote the right of the population to be masters of their land.

On the enemy side, more troops were committed in the dry season and deployed rather early. Instead of massive fielding on all fronts as before, they carried out attacks and "pacification"

activities by priority sectors, launched large-scale "search and destroy" and "pacification" operations in which they raided the same places again and again, and for many days running. They attacked in the hills, in the forests, in the plains and around urban centres. As they had lost their strategic initiative, the trend in the main towards the defensive all through the dry season became more pronounced. This was the case even though they had been able at times to mount big campaigns such as operation Junction City (Tay Ninh) to hit at us before we came into action or to engage us as on Highway 9 (Quang Tri). The number of troops fielded in operation and "pacification" activities rose in comparison with the previous dry season. Operations of division size and upward also doubled within a year.

Nevertheless, the dry season trial of strength has resulted in the South Vietnamese armed forces and people holding firmer positions in the operational fronts and a greater initiative of action. Their opponent has been driven into an ever more defensive and puzzling situation.

From the above, the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. To attack unremittingly is the most effective method to maintain and extend our control of the battlefield.

2. We must keep our forces well in hand and concentrate their activities on meeting our basic requirements in order to maintain and develop our control of the battlefields and to drive the enemy into a more disadvantageous position.

In order to do this, the liberation forces and people satisfactorily met the following basic demands:

First, to be firmly determined to fight and vanquish one million American and puppet troops.

Second, to extend our "people's war" — fought by all our people on all fronts — and bring it to a higher stage. We used the integrated forces of a highly developed people's war to defeat the enemy's aggressive professional army, to maintain and develop our control of the battle-

field, to strengthen the three categories of our armed forces, and resolutely to attain by all means our three strategic objectives, namely, to wipe out enemy forces, safeguard and expand the liberated areas, and hold and promote the people's control of the battlefield.

Third, to push forward our offensive on all the hill-forest, rural and urban regions. The realities of the revolutionary war in South Viet-Nam have demonstrated the necessity of attacking the enemy in all these three regions, both politically and militarily.

Fourth, constantly to develop among the fighters and people on each front the sense of being always ready to cooperate with other fronts, to achieve harmonious coordination between all regions. Equally effective actions in all parts of a given region generate strength but they do not suffice.

Fifth, to consolidate our rear and liberated areas, to preserve and expand our bases. We have to build our liberated zones into a solid rear area from all the military, political and economic points of view, and thereby strengthen our bases.

The realization of the points mentioned above involves a relentless struggle to gain and maintain the initiative during the whole process of the war. From the point of view of military strategy, of armed struggle in particular, this initiative may be expressed briefly as combat methods and the basic principle governing these is: We must force the enemy to fight battles of our choice so that he cannot bring into play his best combat tactics.

3. To force the enemy to fight battles of our choice is a prerequisite of the control of the battlefield.

To compel the opponent to fight as we want him to constitutes the governing principle for the utilization of his forces by any commander. The question is whether objective conditions are available for the implementation of this principle.

What do we mean by forcing the enemy to fight battles of our

choosing, and how do we achieve this so as constantly to keep him on the defensive and maintain our initiative? From experiences drawn from our recent victory over one million enemy troops, these main conclusions can be reached:

a) Force the enemy to scatter and spread thin his forces.

b) Prevent the opponent from using his best combat tactics.

c) Do not allow the enemy to encircle and split our forces and strive to counter him strategically, operationally and in combat; promote the see-saw pattern of the war to the greatest degree possible in an effort to encircle and split his forces strategically.

d) Deprive the enemy of the possibility of taking consistent defensive and efficacious offensive actions by bringing to bear such strategic people's war methods as guerrilla warfare, communications-demolition operations, concentrating forces on definite targets, etc.

e) To prevent U S forces from serving as a shield for puppet troops.

f) Not to give the adversary the opportunity to mount engagements with combat effectiveness and operational and strategic effect.

g) To prevent the enemy from taking control of contested areas, even those adjoining big U S-puppet bases and urban centers.

As a result we shall tie him down to an ever more defensive position and the more he thrashes about the further he will embroil his strategy and tactics. We shall continue to create a more advantageous strategic position and hold and develop our initiative in offensive. This is the vital question wherein lies our strength and the enemy's weakness in the conduct of military strategy in South Viet-Nam.

III—TO UNDERSTAND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY FORCES AND THE PROMOTION OF THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE MASTERS OF THEIR COUNTRY; TO IM-

PROVE THE COORDINATION OF MILITARY ACTION, POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND PERSUASION AMONG ENEMY TROOPS

In his war of aggression on a neo-colonialist pattern, the enemy couples military operations with political and economic maneuvers under his "two-pincer" plan — "search and destroy" and "pacification" — aimed at three objectives: destruction of the Liberation Armed Forces, occupation of territory and submission of the people. These are closely related. He maintains that unless he defeats the L A F, he cannot occupy territory, nor suppress the population. And, should he fail in the task of occupation, he will be deprived of a territory to deploy his troops in and unable to restrict the scope of the L A F activities. However, occupation without the people's submission would simply amount to scattering his forces to face annihilation in sweeping numbers and, as a result, continuing to fight without rear support in the locality. In reality all his plans and schemes to achieve these three strategic objectives have been foiled from the very start, ever since the launching of his neo colonialist war of aggression in South Viet-Nam.

For the enemy met with repeated attacks and powerful counter-blows from the L.A.F and the people of South Viet-Nam. Both the "pacification" and the "search and destroy" pincer programs were broken down; the "pacification" program came to naught with heavy losses to military forces and "pacification" teams.

From their successful struggle on two fronts against the "search and destroy" plan and the "pacification" program, the L A F and the people have drawn the following practical conclusions:

First, the relationship between the destruction of enemy forces and the upholding of the right of the people to be masters of their country should be understood in accordance with the characteristics of the South Viet-Nam revolutionary war and our line of strategy.

Second, we should regard the combination of military and political struggle, and the coordination of the three offensive thrusts — military and political attacks and persuasion among enemy troops — as basic methods of struggle to emphasize constantly the effects of the annihilation of enemy troops, to maintain and extend the people's control, and to counter "pacification."

Experience in numerous areas has demonstrated that unless we brought into full play all our forces and every form of struggle, and adequately combined political and military efforts, we could not solve the problem of defending the territory and people in the face of enemy deployment of a dense and formidable network of occupation forces. Hence this fact: although in places the enemy has set up nearly one hundred garrisons and posts, he cannot subdue the people who still control the situation. Our people call such places "a liberated area with enemy posts." From the lessons they have learned at the cost of their lives, the liberation forces and people of South Viet-Nam conclude that only by adhering to these forms of struggle can they stand firm in the face of their opponent's relentless attacks, and eventually foil all his schemes. That is our approach to the problem. And that is why military and political struggles must be closely combined.

Military and political forces play equally important strategic roles and generate equally significant effects. Political struggle serves military struggle, which in turns supports the former to win victory in the war by our own methods, and eventually to accomplish the political task of the South Viet-Nam revolution.

IV— TO IMPROVE UNCEASINGLY THE FIGHTING EFFICIENCY AND THE OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC EFFECT OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR UNIQUE COMBAT METHODS

In this winter-spring period a

bitter contest has taken place in the operational fronts between our and the enemy's combat methods. Our people's war methods have clearly shown their superiority. They have become more intense, reached a higher standard of development, and repeatedly held in check all U S tactical initiatives.

Nothing testifies to this more eloquently than the reality on the battlefields themselves. Here are a few remarks:

—Our activities developed evenly in all fronts with all the three categories of armed forces fighting well and scoring major victories. We undertook major and minor engagements, large and small scale operations, and those of long duration bore definite characteristics and yielded good results. Offensives, counteroffensives, counterraids and anti-pacification actions were equally successful.

—The impact of this strategy lay in its being aimed directly against the right troops and targets, in its affording us the possibility of scattering, decimating and annihilating military and political forces while reducing our own losses.

—Our tactical forms of fighting developed considerably. In every front, in every area and army unit, we devised new and extremely diversified combat methods: spiked and mined traps; sniping; ambushes; nibbling and surprise attacks; assaults; artillery shelling; actions against heliborne troops, landing and armoured personnel carriers; attacks inside and outside fortifications, on camp bases and rear bases; also a combination of all these methods, fighting round the clock in the plains and in the hills and forest areas stretching up to the border, and so on.

The superiority, originality and effectiveness of the people's war methods have been shown by the realities in the South Viet-Nam theater in the following condensed points:

1—These fighting methods reflect a rational distribution of combat tasks which notably increases the fighting capabilities of the Liberation Armed Forces and of the

fourteen million people of South Viet-Nam.

Just as an agricultural cooperative in North Viet-Nam owes its high labour productivity to a proper division of responsibilities among its members, so combat and operational effectiveness derive from a rational distribution of combat tasks.

2—We have utilized all our weapons, from the most rudimentary to the most modern, and have created an integrated force with a very great destructive power.

With our combat methods everything in our people's hands can be turned into a weapon against the enemy — even a stick, a carrying pole or a heap of stones. With rudimentary weapons, which we use skilfully and extensively, we have caused heavy losses to the GI's. And it is not without reason that these American "playboys" dread the spiked pits and booby traps laid by our guerrillas and people, into which they fall every day. The American press has admitted that 25 percent of the casualties sustained by the US marines stationed in the 1st. Tactical Area resulted from traps of all kinds. US troops are still more frightened by our infantry weapons, and by our cannons and mortars of various types, which raised their casualty list to a new level in the first few months of the current year.

3—To defeat the enemy, one usually employs a big force against a smaller one and vice-versa, or a combination of both these methods. Usually, when dealing with operational and combat action, one almost exclusively has in mind the use of a big force against a smaller one in order to secure victory. In practice, however, we resort to varied methods and win splendid successes, fielding now more troops than the enemy, now less, now as many as he does. Not only in guerrilla warfare but also in large unit operations we employed all those methods, depending upon the circumstances; when it was necessary and conditions were favourable, we deployed a large force to overwhelm the enemy's inferior

numbers, in this case, fought rapidly and caused wholesale destruction of his important units. On the other hand, we tried to seize every opportunity to fight a larger force than ours by bringing into full play all our forces, by restricting to the minimum the adversary's powerful firepower and his high mobility in combat and operation, and, through our strong position and the superior quality of our troops, by overwhelming the opponent to achieve victory.

4—We were able to undertake small and large scale actions and to combine these two forms of fighting. In South Viet-Nam evenly developed small-scale actions have made it possible to defeat enemy forces over a very extensive area, to pin them down and scatter them. We also frequently resorted with flexibility and determination to large unit actions of various sizes, and with powerful blows improved our capacities to destroy the enemy. This has clearly demonstrated that if we concentrated on large unit actions only and overlooked the development of minor and medium-size engagements, it would be practically impossible, and indeed very dangerous, to mount large scale operations. It would be equally wrong to confine ourselves to small unit actions.

5—We defeated the enemy in all situations; inside and outside fortifications in hinterland bases, by day and by night, in the hill-forest, rural and urban fronts. Ours are flexible, diverse and highly effective combat methods since they prevail over those of our adversary in every conceivable combat situation.

While attaching importance to destroying enemy forces on the move, those who have just landed from the air or are in provisional encampments, etc., by means of ambushes, surprise attacks or artillery shelling and so on, the L A F and the people of South Viet-Nam tried to take advantage of every opportunity to strike at them at their bases, and in extremely bold attacks. Sometimes, using few troops, thus limiting the effect of the

enemy's firepower, they scored major successes and reduced their own losses. On the other hand, while they lured the enemy into the hill-forest battlefields and forced him into accepting battles of their choice so as to annihilate him, they also resolutely harassed and attacked him in the plains and urban centers. By striking accurately at his principal bases in towns and cities we not only wiped out part of his forces and advanced our armed and political struggles but we also stabbed him in his very heart.

6—Our armed forces and people were capable of independent action, sustained action for a definite period, and operational action. Our combat methods derived their superiority from the fact that they made it possible for every fighter and every unit to search out the enemy independently, to eliminate him or to cooperate closely with other fighters and units, according to a common plan in each operation and series of operations.

7—We combined activities of various types to attack the enemy in the military, political and economic fields. Ours are combat methods in a people's war directed against the adversary in all respects. This spirit permeated every one of our combat guidelines, every form of fighting, every tactic. In practice, certain engagements had no great military value but assumed a far-reaching political and economic importance. Our attacks on Saigon and the provincial capital of Quang Tri (April 6, 1967) for instance, are significant not only on account of the annihilation of a number of enemy officers and men and the destruction of a quantity of war materials, but especially on account of their great political impact on the U S puppet command and the Saigon administration. Apart from their military effect, our operations to destroy communications again and again sealed off the land connection between Ca Mau and Saigon, which forced the puppet authorities to import nearly one

million tons of rice, thereby causing them many difficulties. Herein lies the strong overall effect of our attacks on the military, political and economic fronts.

Reality on the battlefield has given the South Viet-Nam armed forces and people good reason to claim and take pride in the superiority and strength of their original combat methods. These reflect a rational distribution of combat tasks designed to develop to the fullest extent possible the strength of our fourteen million countrymen and of the three categories of our armed forces, who possess a very high revolutionary consciousness and are tempered in the crucible of war. They have powerfully improved the creative and independent thinking of the popular masses and the organizational and planning capacity of our people's war. It is safe to say that the most successful experience gained by our liberation forces and people in strategic conduct and execution is to have creatively developed and gradually perfected the above-mentioned methods so that these constantly boost our effectiveness in combat and our operational and strategic impact on the battlefield.

V — TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF OUR TWO FORCES, AND OF THE THREE CATEGORIES OF OUR TROOPS; TO SETTLE CORRECTLY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN QUANTITY AND QUALITY

The victory of our army and people over one million American, puppet and satellite troops speaks eloquently of our great success in the growth and development of our forces. This is a result of the correct interpretation of both the combat and strategic guiding principles which we have observed and implemented with the utmost care. This was undertaken in accordance with the specific conditions of our country,

our own fighting methods and the trend of development in the South Viet-Nam theater and in order to vanquish an adversary who possesses a great troop-strength and overwhelming superiority in war matériel. The following are examples of these achievements during the winter of 1966 and the spring of 1967.

First, we developed both our political and armed forces in a powerful and well balanced manner.

In the face of the U S intensification of the war, which was fraught with very serious consequences, we never wavered during the process of building up and developing our forces. We firmly adhered to our strategic guiding principles and others ruling the combination of military and political struggles. We were always able to define the strategic position of our armed and political forces in the South Viet-Nam revolution. We satisfactorily meshed the interrelations of these two forces as we developed them and thus made possible their powerful and well-balanced growth and effective exploitation.

Parallel with the growth of our political forces, we strove our utmost to increase our armed forces. The three categories of our troops had matured evenly in a planned and well-balanced manner in keeping with the realities of each operational front and the combat tasks of each category.

Born of the political movement and the political forces of the people, the militia and guerrilla forces had undergone extensive development, taking on multifarious and appropriate forms of organizations and bringing the strength of the whole people into action against the enemy.

Our regional troops have been augmented and strengthened on every front into strong, mobile units capable of independent action, of cooperating with and fighting alongside our regular forces and of coordinating their activities with militiamen and guerrillas to wipe out enemy troops, defend the population, expand guerrilla warfare and

support political struggle.

Our regular forces have also matured and acquired great fighting capacity and good mobility. They are expert in confronting their opponent in every form of tactics, with every combat method, in any strength or terrain. They can now quickly destroy complete units of American, puppet or satellite forces including infantry, tank and armoured car units.

Thus, each category of our armed forces has a high fighting spirit enabling it to accomplish its tasks. Each of them have been rationally deployed on all operational fronts and can to the best of their abilities play the role and bring about the strategic effect expected of them. They achieved close coordination in every front, in every major action, every operation and every engagement, thus establishing the pattern of unremitting offensives against the enemy. At any time, a unit of one category could replace one of another category in order to harass the enemy, while men of the other unit attend a refresher course or take a rest.

Second, in the process of building up our armed forces, we correctly settled the relationship between quantity and quality. In order to prepare ourselves to defeat one million enemy troops, and basing our preparations on the guiding principles of our strategy, we advocated the establishment of revolutionary armed forces to include a widespread and powerful militia and guerrilla force, and crack regional and regular troops in appropriate number.

One of the key methods to bring into play such refinement of organization is the improvement of the quality of the armed forces. This quality involves high combativeness, determination to remain on the offensive, light numerical strength, strong and well equipped troops, good technical and tactical capabilities, good organizational ability of cadres and a qualified command, a high sense of discipline, creative combat methods suitable for the technical and other material means available and their wise applica-

tion.

The great successes of our armed forces and people throw a strong light on the principle governing the build-up of forces in revolutionary wars, that is, to build while fighting, to closely combine fighting and building in order to win, and to win in order to build and develop the armed forces, for the longer one fights on this basis the more successes one scores, and the stronger one becomes.

So, with an appropriate number of top quality troops, with our armed forces properly arrayed on the operational fronts, with the coordination of their activities and those of the political forces, with the favourable general position of our people's war, and with particular emphasis on combat methods, the liberation forces and people of South Viet-Nam are in a position to defeat their opponent, even though he is superior in numbers.

The above comments are related to the five lessons learned from our successful implementation of military strategy. They are the result of creative actions by the fourteen million people and Liberation Armed Forces of South Viet-Nam, actions reviewed time and again by the N.F.L Central Committee over more than ten years. We have, by and large, made a good application of these lessons, but in certain places, and at certain moments, there are still shortcomings which we should strive to correct so as to assure a steady advance.

We have been fighting against one million American and puppet troops. We shall fight two million if necessary. And if necessary we shall fight five, ten, twenty or more years.

Having tasted the bitterness of living as slaves for generations and having enjoyed the sweetness of life, our people are aware that nothing is more precious than independence and freedom.

For independence and freedom, let us march on and fight the U.S aggressors!

For independence and freedom, let us march forward resolutely and defeat the U.S aggressors!

We are sure to win!

tricontinental

GENERAL DECLARATION OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE

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GENERAL DECLARATION OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE

The First Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America was held in Havana, capital of the Republic of Cuba, from January 3-15, 1966. The completed task is of great significance. For the first time in history, a very broad representation of the revolutionary forces of 82 countries of the three continents has exchanged experiences and initiatives, strengthened the ties of revolutionary and anti-imperialist solidarity, and adopted basic agreements in the fight against the system of imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist exploitation, against which they have declared a war to the death. The deliberations of the Conference have demonstrated that imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, led by Yankee imperialism, are following a policy of systematic intervention and military aggression against the countries of the three continents.

The Conference was held at a time when the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as in other parts of the world, are waging a violent struggle against all forms of imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist domination, with Yankee imperialism at its head. The world situation favours the development of the revolutionary and anti-imperialist struggle of the oppressed peoples. The increasing tide of national liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America is an outstanding event of enormous significance.

Imperialism will never willingly renounce its policy of exploitation, oppression, plunder, aggression and intervention. The peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America know from their own experience that the main bulwark of colonial oppression and international reaction is Yankee imperialism, implacable enemy of all the peoples of the world. To destroy the domination of Yankee imperialism is an imperative issue for the complete and definitive victory of the anti-imperialist struggle in the three continents and all the efforts of their peoples should be directed towards that end.

The true nature of imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism was dramatically revealed in the debates of the Conference. On comparing the privileges, profits and riches extracted by imperialist monopolies from the three continents with the miserable living conditions of their peoples, the acute aggravation of one of the major con-

tradictions of our days is observed: the contradiction between imperialism and the oppressed nations and peoples. Yankee imperialism is the main pillar of oppression; it leads, supplies and supports the world system of exploitation.

The monopolies of the imperialist powers appropriate for their benefit the enormous riches which belong to the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America. This pillage has been carried out for centuries under different forms. They seize the natural resources of the soil, subsoil and maritime platform; control through investments, the most important branches of industry and services as well as foreign trade; and impose their harmful conditions on international exchange relations, taking over completely banks and national finances.

This situation as a whole permits the imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist powers to exercise economic domination over the subjected countries and carry out the systematic plunder suffered by our peoples, compelled as they are to swell the coffers of the monopolies.

The rate of annual per capita income of exploited nations of the three continents is incredibly lower than that of the exploiting powers. The astronomical figures which reveal the profits obtained by the monopolies are in sharp contrast to the extremely high index of infant mortality, the high percentage of illiteracy, the almost total lack of schools, of medical assistance and hospital services; in short, to the conditions of hardship, unemployment, hunger and poverty in which our peoples live.

This injustice is more starkly revealed by the tremendous contrast between the promising future that the present development of science, technology and culture offers to mankind, and the shocking fact that the exploited masses of Africa, Asia and Latin America are deprived of every possibility of access to the enormous material and intellectual wealth that the knowledge and the work of man have accumulated for centuries. Our peoples are deprived of the benefits of the achievements of science and technology whose doors are closed to them by the system of exploitation; consequently, they find themselves in a disadvantageous position which increasingly widens the gap between standards of living of the victims and the exploiters. It is quite evident that under the present social and economic structures to which the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America are subjected today, it is impossible for them to at-

tain these higher material and intellectual living standards. These are reasons enough to condemn without appeal, imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist oppression and exploitation.

In its eagerness to protect this system over which it presides from the powerful onslaught of the peoples, Yankee imperialism maintains and fosters international tension; threatening peace and security; encircles the world with agressive military bases; promotes military pacts in open violation of the principles of national sovereignty; proclaims, with incredible cynicism, the self-assumed right to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and to occupy by force, all or part of their territories, arrogating to itself the shameful role of international gendarme; finances and supplies arms to decadent colonial nations to help them hold on to their spoils, and shares the profits with them. With arrogance and insolence it insists on imposing its ideology, and for this purpose makes use of a world-wide propaganda network; tries to penetrate all nations with the decadent expressions of its culture; distorts history; twists facts; and slander is its weapon. It imposes economic blockade in the vain attempt to subjugate the peoples by means of starvation and in its impotency, insists on extending its turbid and criminal conduct to the commercial policy of its allies; plots the promotion and support, on a world scale, of anti-popular and anti-national regimes which sustain the system of exploitation; inundates the globe with its capital, annually drawing off millions of dollars for its monopolies. It commits every kind of abominable crime against the peoples, and feverishly prepares to attack the socialist countries and world peace.

Because of the very nature of their system of exploitation, imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism strongly oppose the peoples' independence, sovereignty, and national and social liberation. In struggling against this, the oppressed peoples of the world fight for the principles of self-determination, sovereignty and independence of the nations. The liberation movement of the peoples of the three continents has developed into one of the most important forces of world struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, and together with the peoples of the socialist countries and the international proletariat, plays a decisive role in the history of mankind. The imperialists isolate themselves and become weaker. The crisis in their system becomes more acute from day to day.

National liberation interests are closely linked to the needs of the social revolution. The national liberation movement; the peasants' demands for land; the struggle of the working class for its great social and political gains; the determined action of students and youth; the demands of the intellectual workers and other strata of the population for their rights up to now trampled and scorned; the fight against the oligarchies and military dictatorships at the service of the ruling classes; the battles against racial discrimination and other social inequalities, constitute a powerful current and are part of a movement which is destined to play a significant role in the progress of mankind.

The peoples who have succeeded in abolishing the exploitation of man by man and establishing socialism, offer a valuable stimulus, with their example and aid, to the struggle of the peoples oppressed by imperialism.

As the movement of liberation of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America advances, the working class and the progressive sections of capitalist nations will be able to help it in a more direct and effective manner. Unequivocable evidence of this is the growing movement of civic protest of the people of the United States against the war waged by the U S Government against the Vietnamese people.

The effective revolutionary actions of the South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation and the heroic resistance of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, contribute to raising the fighting spirit and the political awareness of the people of the United States, who, with ever-growing vigour, express their opposition to war. This is proof that the liberation of Africa, Asia and Latin America will hasten the struggle of the working class and other oppressed sectors of the population in the United States and in the developed capitalist countries in Europe against the rule of monopoly capital, against oppression and exploitation, and for social progress. In turn, the development of this proletarian class struggle and that of all workers in capitalist countries, will contribute to the advance of the struggle for the national liberation of Africa, Asia and Latin America and, thus, the common effort will defeat the common enemy of all the peoples: imperialism and particularly, Yankee imperialism, the most ferocious and aggressive of them all.

A number of countries in the three continents have achieved political independence; many others are fighting to attain

it. Those who have obtained their independence and those who are struggling to achieve it, today close their ranks in the Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America and deliberate on how to carry out their international duties in order to favour the common cause of all peoples: the liquidation of the colonialist, neocolonialist and imperialist system of oppression and exploitation.

There are still some territories which suffer under the most backward forms of the colonial system. The representatives of many of those peoples are present in this Conference. In order to face the serious problems involved in economic and social development and the complete liberation of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, it is imperative to uphold the principles of self-determination of states, national sovereignty and political independence.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: The inalienable right of all peoples to full political independence and to resort to all forms of struggle that may be necessary, including armed struggle, to conquer that right. There is no task more important for the subjugated peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America which have achieved their political independence are becoming aware that the juridical status of a formal sovereignty does not suffice to insure full liberation. In order to achieve total liberation it is necessary to eliminate all forms of imperialist oppression and exploitation, carry out profound changes in the social and economic structures, lay the material and technical foundation and build a society of free men. To political emancipation must be added economic liberation. Only in this way can social equality of all men and true independence of all states be insured.

The peoples of the independent countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America must oppose all infiltration, subversion, oppression, exploitation and plunder of imperialism and develop to the utmost their initiatives and resources, strengthen reciprocal aid and cooperation with friendly countries, destroy imperialist and colonialist aggression and infiltration, and build and develop their national economy and culture.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: The right to national control of the basic resources; to the nationalization of the banks and vital enterprises; to state control of foreign trade and exchange; to the growth of the state economy; to the reconsideration and rejection of the spurious and anti-national debts which

were imposed upon their economy; to the achievement of a true agrarian reform which eliminates feudal and semifeudal ownership; to advance agricultural development; to raise the standard of living of the farmers and other agricultural workers; and to contribute to the increment of the national economy and export trade as common principles of the struggle for the peoples that, in Africa, Asia and Latin America, are determined to eradicate every remnant of imperialist economic domination and to build their own economies, and as a program for those who are still striving to attain their liberation.

The implementation of these principles will permit them to develop fully their natural resources and their industrialization according to the prevailing conditions in each country, thus achieving their economic emancipation.

The imperialists make every effort to strangle the countries which have conquered their independence by imposing obstacles on their trade, using the monopolist control of transportation, resorting to criminal blockade, ruining their economies through the forced lowering of prices of raw materials and the constant fluctuation of those prices.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: The right of all liberated peoples to trade with all other countries of the world on an equal basis; the need to put an end to the constant fluctuation of prices of basic products and to fix these prices at a fair level so that they may bear rational relation to those of the industrial products; and the urgent need to break the imperialist blockade of trade and transportation of the liberated countries through the common struggle of the peoples of the three continents, with the cooperation of the rest of the world.

Imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist rule leaves a dramatic balance of technological b a c k w a r d n e s s among the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, which prevents city and country workers, whose toil is the foundation of national development, from increasing their productivity through the application of more advanced techniques in agriculture and in industry.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: The right of the peoples to have access to technology, as well as the need of the liberated countries for mass formation of technical cadres from among the people, implying a revolution in education which, starting with the eradication of illiteracy, will lead to the technical revolution.

The countries which free themselves from imperialism inherit the most terrifying lack of public health services, without

hospitals or auxiliary medical centers, and without the necessary professionals to staff them.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: The right of the peoples of the three continents to enjoy a healthy life, to adequate medical assistance and preventive medical services, as well as the need of the liberated countries to receive all possible aid from the more developed countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, in order to establish a system of medical and hospital services, with emphasis on the training of professional and auxiliary cadres with which to carry out this massive task under the planned direction of the state and with the broadest participation of the masses.

Racial discrimination is practiced by the imperialists, colonialists and neocolonialists in important areas of the world, and reveals itself in its most repulsive, brutal and diabolic form in the policy of **apartheid**, which oppresses and humiliates the people of the Republic of South Africa and threatens the people of Zimbabwe, subjecting them to a permanent state of servitude. It is an instrument of exploitation and is one of the most unfair and barbaric forms of inequality.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: The full equality of all men and that it is the duty of the peoples to fight against all expressions of racism and discrimination, and therefore proclaims its full support to the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe against the racist government of Ian Smith and to the international movement of solidarity against the South African regime, calling on all countries represented in this Conference to impose a political and commercial blockade as well as a boycott on shipment of arms and petroleum to the Republic of South Africa.

Military pacts, the existence of military bases, and the presence of imperialist or mercenary troops in foreign territories constitute a violation of national sovereignty and a danger to peaceful coexistence among states. Imperialism maintains this situation to strangle national liberation movements, intimidating their neighbouring countries and committing aggressions against the newly-liberated countries.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: The right of the peoples to free themselves of foreign military bases and appeals for the stepping up of the fight for the achievement of this aim, and against military pacts and the stationing of imperialist or mercenary troops.

The peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America struggle to defeat the native

reactionary classes which, servile to foreign interests, help to maintain the system of neocolonial oppression and exploitation. In this struggle the reactionary classes offer fierce resistance and will not easily permit that power with which they exploit and oppress the peoples to be taken away from them. The revolutionary and patriotic struggle of any one people is a contribution to the liberation of the other countries.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: The right of the peoples to their political, economic and social liberation by whatever means they deem necessary, including armed struggle, to achieve this goal.

Imperialism and the reactionary classes in every country confront the liberation movement of the peoples with all possible military, political and pseudo-legal resources. They ignore their international commitments. They pretend to mask their crimes by inventing all kinds of fallacious arguments to violate the principle of self-determination and national sovereignty and the right of the peoples to bring about revolutionary changes in their economic and social structures. They do not hesitate to resort to all kinds of crimes and abuse: subversion, infiltration of spies, saboteurs and criminal agents, and direct aggression to thwart the legitimate aspirations of our peoples; they make use of violence and of their armed forces to carry out their objectives.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: The right of the peoples to oppose imperialist violence with revolutionary violence, in order to safeguard national sovereignty and independence.

The struggle that the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America wage to this effect, is a decisive and positive contribution to the anti-imperialist fight in the three continents, for the liberation of their own peoples and the strengthening of world peace. Each popular victory inspires new victories.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: The right and the duty of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America and of the progressive states and governments of the world to give material and moral support to the peoples that are struggling for their liberation or suffer direct or indirect aggression of the imperialist powers.

U S Armed Forces now occupy the territory of the Dominican Republic. Imperialism, in violation of the will of the Dominican people, intervened in the popular revolution to support its puppets; violated national sovereignty, trampled on the principle of non-intervention and murdered not only those who fought against them, but also their

women and children.

The Conference therefore PROCLAIMS: The right of the Dominican people to fight against the U S occupation forces with all the means at their disposal, especially the people's revolutionary war, as well as the right to request the support of all the peoples and governements of the world.

The Vietnamese people's heroic resistance to the imperialist aggressors is not only in keeping with the justified defence of the independence of that country, but also safeguards the right to self-determination and sovereignty of all the peoples of the world.

The Conference strongly CONDEMNS: The war of aggression of Yankee imperialists in South Viet-Nam and their bombings of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and condemns them as war criminals for their barbaric actions against the Vietnamese people. The Conference denounces the deceptive peace statements of Johnson's Government and totally SUPPORTS the points set forth by the government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and by the South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation for the solution of the Vietnamese problem. The Conference PROCLAIMS that the South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation is the true and only representative of the people of South Viet-Nam and expresses its firm conviction that under its leadership, the Vietnamese people will undoubtedly achieve final victory.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: Its solidarity with the armed struggle of the peoples of Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, so-called Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique, Angola, Congo (Leopoldville) and with the decision of the peoples of the Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tomé and Principe, to put an end to colonial domination; SUPPORTS the peoples of French Somaliland, of the Spanish possessions of Africa and the people of Zimbabwe, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland in their right to self-determination and independence; the colonial peoples of Latin America, Puerto Rico, the Guianas, Martinique, Guadeloupe and others in their struggle for national independence and self-determination; the right of the people of Cyprus to unrestricted independence and complete self-determination; supports the peoples of Malaya (including Singapore) and North Kalimantan in their struggle for national liberation and for the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops, as well as the demand for immediate independence for Occupied

South Yemen and the dismantling of the British military base in Aden and the US bases established on Saudi Arabian territory; CALLS FOR the solidarity of all peoples with the Arab people of Palestine in their just struggle for the liberation of their homeland from imperialism and Zionist aggression; CONDEMNS the policy of aggression of the United States Government and its Asian agents against peaceful and neutral Cambodia, and advocates the rejection of any political, economic, diplomatic and cultural cooperation with Yankee imperialists and with all puppet governments that help the US Government in its policy of aggression against the Indo-Chinese peoples; SUPPORTS the heroic struggle of the people of Laos against the US imperialists and their puppets; DENOUNCES the aggressive manoeuver of the Yankee imperialists, who, in alliance with the Japanese militarists and in connivance with their puppets of South Korea, plot the establishment of the Northeast Asia Military Alliance as shock brigade against the Korean people and the peoples of Asia, in order to provoke a crisis in that part of the world. At the same time it SUPPORTS the struggle of the Korean people for the reunification of their homeland and the expulsion of Yankee troops from South Korea, and expresses its solidarity with the fight of the Korean and Japanese peoples for the abrogation of the South Korean-Japanese Treaty. It CONDEMNS as an act of aggression against the Cuban people, the blockade against Cuba by the U.S imperialists, who have gone so far as to prohibit even the sale of foodstuffs and medicines, and calls upon the peoples of the three continents to increase their trade with this aggrieved fraternal country, so as to definitively break the blockade that the imperialists seek to impose on it.

In the face of the attacks of the reactionary forces directed by Yankee imperialists, the Conference CALLS FOR the militant, active and dynamic solidarity of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, and urges them to intensify, under the banner of anti-imperialism, the national liberation movement, develop it with even greater vigour and unite all progressive mankind in that struggle.

By penetrating the countries it exploits with decadent culture, imperialism tries to dull the national consciousness of the peoples employing mass-media for this purpose, destroying their scientific,technical and cultural heritage.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: The right of all peoples to maintain and develop

their cultural heritage, nourishing it with the contributions which arise from the exchange of genuine cultures of other peoples and the need for the peoples of the three continents to wage an active fight to expel from their cultural life the expressions of imperialist influence, thus enriching the lives of their peoples with true art and culture.

The Conference extends warm greetings to the working class and progressive movements of the capitalist countries in Western Europe and the United States, and invites them to strengthen even more the fraternal ties of solidarity with the peoples of the three continents, to fight jointly against the imperialist monopolies and the policy of intervention and aggression, as they are also victims of the system of exploitation and oppression.

The First Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Organization that has emerged from it proclaim themselves genuine representatives of the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and anti-neocolonialist, patriotic and national will and fighting spirit of the peoples of the three continents.

The Conference PROCLAIMS: That the main task of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America is to intensify the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism so as to conquer and consolidate national independence, democracy, social progress and peace.

The peoples of the three continents, determined to sweep all obstacles out of their way and to struggle unyieldingly for a new Africa, a new Asia and a new Latin America definitely emancipated from imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, will stand together as one until final and total victory is achieved. They have full confidence in their future.

The coordination of the efforts achieved by the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America at this Conference, and the future tasks and fundamental perspectives that have been established, will turn the active solidarity of our continents into a historic instrument of tremendous drive that will destroy the strongholds of imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, whose foundations have already been weakened by the victorious liberation movements in recent years, and by the inexorable course of history.

THIS GREAT HUMANITY HAS SAID: "ENOUGH" AND HAS STARTED TO MOVE FORWARD, AND ITS GIGANTIC MARCH SHALL NOT STOP UNTIL IT CONQUERS FINAL LIBERATION.

IN SANDINO'S FOOTSTEPS

"We shall go on to liberty or death, and if we die our cause will go on living. Others will follow us." **Sandino**

A group of young men were meeting at a house in the Monseñor Lezcano district of the city of Managua, Nicaragua. One of them was recovering from wounds received in a battle against Somoza's troops in the mountains of Matagalpa.

The National Guard surrounded the house, the first shots rang out and then shooting became generalized. Killed in that encounter were Casimiro Sotelo, Edmundo Pérez, Roberto Amaya and Hugo Medina. The eldest of the four was only 24. They fell fighting the Somoza tyranny which for the last 30 years has ruled the nation as its own private fief. All four victims belonged to the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional.

Today the banner of resistance flies over the city of Managua and in the Isabelia and Dariense mountains. Nicaraguan youth are following the example of Sandino, the General of Free Men.

Casimiro Sotelo headed the FSLN delegation to the First OLAS Conference. He studied his last year of law at the Central American University and was President of the student body. At the time of his death he was General Secretary of the Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario.

In the plenary of the OLAS Conference he stressed the decision of the Nicaragua revolutionary movement to fight. "Sandino showed us that the gringos tremble with fright in the face of the peoples' patriotism and that they can also be filled with lead from rifles in the determined hands of *campesinos* who demand land and sovereignty."

While in Havana during the OLAS Conference, Sotelo avidly followed events in Nicaragua. The guerrillas were already in the mountains and he expected the first clashes at any moment. He knew his duty was there in his country and as soon as the sessions ended he departed for home. When he spoke of the resistance fighters he stressed the fact that they held the conviction that if caught by surprise they would not be taken alive. Sotelo and his comrades are today among the nation's martyrs.

In honor of his memory, *Tricontinental* presents its readers an unpublished interview that may contribute to their better understanding of the reasons and needs that motivate Latin American youth to join in the frontal attack on the misery and oppression that plague the continent.

Casimiro Sotelo

IN THE FIELD OF FACTS

Sotelo's conception of the conditions that must exist for undertaking the armed struggle in Latin America is the following: "A specific situation exists in Latin America, a great offensive, if not with arms by other means —ideological, for example— conducted by different organizations such as the Inter-American Peace Force and the Alliance for Progress, which imperialism uses shrewdly —to a certain point— to penetrate the peasant sector, the working class, all popular sectors, as well as the universities, with joint development plans for Central America. And all these things, for us, constitute an imperialist offensive that tends to influence the mentality of our people, to try to develop (the imperialists are always trying to develop something) within the people, a new concept of what imperialism is. However, through the years, for centuries in fact, they have made their position and their attitude crystal-clear, above all, now with the war in Viet-Nam; with military interventions everywhere; with aggression against Santo Domingo. They can no longer deceive the people but they take advantage of all means to establish schools, religious missions that conduct espionage, a very up-to-date espionage service that extends to all sectors of the national territory. We therefore feel that to delay initiation of the struggle until a real guerrilla base is developed would be to run the risk of the movement being discovered in its embryonic stage and the further risk that the movement suffer temporary failure. We, therefore, feel that at least minimal effort should be exerted in solving such matters as supplies and information which are necessary and indispensable to the guerrillas, but establishment

of a firm base must not be a requisite for beginning the struggle. The struggle must be initiated when the minimum conditions exist; but we emphasize that these minimum conditions must actually exist.

"We also believe that in the beginning the guerrilla forces must be mobile, and at the outset —under conditions prevailing in Nicaragua— should not try to defend a specific territory because that is not the objective of the struggle in the beginning, but one of the final stages of guerrilla warfare. We must begin by annihilating the enemy's forces and increasing our own. Thus, little by little, the other factors will come into play. But what is fundamental now is that we begin to strike out at the enemy and that is not only what we believe, but what we intend to do."

Speaking of composition of classes in Nicaragua and the role played by unemployment in the revolutionary struggle, the revolutionary leader stressed that: "At present, according to an objective analysis, following in the wake of various research polls conducted by Nicaraguan social groups, we have ascertained that statistically the **campesinos** represent 70% of the population. This is the sector that has suffered most acutely the brutal exploitation of the oligarchy allied to imperialism. Throughout the countryside this oligarchy has subjected the peasant population to all manner of abuse, dating back to the days of Sandino, the General of Free Men, assassinated on orders from Anastasio Somoza and the U S ambassador. Immediately following the assassination of Sandino, on that same night, Somoza ordered the extermination of 300 **campesino** families of men who had fought under General Sandino. Somoza's forces razed an entire village murdering even the women and children. This event left its indelible mark on the history of the Nicaraguan **campesino.** Following this massacre, Somoza was awarded the presidency as payment for Sandino's assassination, and he immediately imposed a reign of terror in Nicaragua to hide the economic exploitation to which he subjected our people. The Somoza family owns large amounts of property, great tracts of land on which the laborers are cruelly exploited. The Somozas also concern themselves with protecting their cohorts, their allies in exploitation, the oligarchies, Liberals or Conservatives —be-

cause the differences between the two arise only in regard to who will exploit what.

"The **campesino** has suffered brutal exploitation, has been forced to eat his own excrement, has been thrown off his land, has been robbed of his land; all of which means that there exists in the countryside a large percentage of salaried, seasonal workers. They find regular employment only during the harvest season and the rest of the year they drift from place to place, leading a very precarious existence, surviving as best they can. Being 70 percent of the population, the **campesino** constitutes the most exploited sector of the population, and it was precisely this sector —the nation's potentially most revolutionary sector— in which the glorious movement of Sandino, composed exclusively of **campesinos,** found its strength. The **campesino** is a revolutionary class in itself, and I believe that it is the main force that will bear our revolution to victory; the movement born in the countryside will spread to the cities and take power.

"We have also analyzed the role of the workers in our revolution. Nicaragua has little industry. Until now it has been included in the so-called Central American Economic Integration Program which is nothing more than the investment of foreign capital allied to the oligarchies. A few small assembly plants have been set up, but no heavy industry and the percentage of workers is small. Included within this working class is what we could term the aristocracy of labor, which the oligarchy has been accused of creating and, in turn, of controlling the trade union movement, hiding behind the skirts of Social-Christian organizations. Therefore, the role of the working class within our **Frente** is minimal owing to the above facts.

"At the same time, we have found a rich source of revolutionary material within the student sector, in fact, our maximum leader, comrade Carlos Fonseca Amador, emerged from the ranks of the student body as did comrade Fernando Cordillo, now deceased. In other words, many comrades in the leadership are cadres who left their university studies to join the ranks of the revolutionaries in the mountains. The student sector in Nicaragua has a great tradition of participation in the revolutionary struggle.

"In 1959 several students were assassinated, but this did not deter their advance. On the contrary,

it acted as a stimulus for the revolutionary struggle. Since 1959, the student movement has participated in many actions and demonstrations against the Somoza tyranny, and a large number of students have left the city for the mountains. Therefore we cannot say that students have limited themselves to calling for fulfilment of student demands such as university autonomy or demands for scholarships; but have become fully integrated in the political life of the nation. They have not been bogged down with a bourgeois-student policy, but have understood that their role is intimately bound up with our people's future, which is that of our workers and **campesinos** —that of our nation's exploited classes. Students are struggling side by side with these sectors, and there is no differentiation between them and the other combatants within our ranks. In the countryside we see the unity among students, workers and **campesinos** in the revolutionary struggle, and this contributes to uniting progressive forces even more. And from there will later come the nation's revolutionary leaders.

"Making a complete analysis of the class composition within the country, for a later analysis of the correlation between the popular forces and those of the oligarchy and imperialism, we realize that if we must face the powerful, obligarchic-imperialist military apparatus, it is also certain that we will face it with enormous moral resources, with great revolutionary awareness, and that the process of struggle will include the great masses of the population in order to triumph, to obtain the victory of our revolution. We therefore feel that the analysis of the correlation of forces demonstrates that if in the military aspect we are less powerful than the imperialists' forces, in the field of morale and popular force —which are stronger than military might— we rank higher than the discredited oligarchs, the discredited Somozas and Chamorros, etc. The discredited U S imperialists will soon see a revolutionary movement of great strength within Nicaragua."

On January 22, 1967, thousands of persons expressed their repudiation of the Somoza candidacy. Demonstrators filed through the streets of Managua demanding that the elections, scheduled to be held within a few days, respect the people's will. The dictator mobilized the Air Force, tanks and the National Guard,

and in the massacre that followed, more than 200 were killed and hundreds injured. "Opposition" leaders Agüero and Chamorro sought the protection of the U S embassy, abandoning the masses.

Sotelo pointed out the following concrete experiences derived from those events: "Its fundamental importance lies in the fact that the January 22 massacre gave the people the objective lesson that the path of armed insurrection was the correct and only way.

"Moreover, another very important lesson was learned in the field of struggle, and that was the loss of confidence that some sectors of the population have adopted toward the leadership of the conservative oligarchy. That was a good lesson besides the others that were derived from the January 22 massacre which marked the beginning of a new stage in the process of the struggle in our country.

"Dashed was the myth that the National Guard was invincible and that bullets would not kill guardsmen. It was proved that the armed struggle is the only way, and that the conservative, Social-Christian leadership did not represent, nor would it ever represent the people's interests. That is objective reality.

"And why do I say that this second point is a great object lesson?

"Because in our country there are two traditional parties, the Liberal and the Conservative parties, bourgeois parties that represent the obligarchy. These parties developed, and as they were the only existing parties, they had great influence among the masses; this we cannot deny. And that influence was based on **caudillismo** (strong-man regimes) which were in turn based on ignorance, illiteracy and lack of culture. And it was those tyrants themselves who denied the people access to culture. Based on that ignorance and illiteracy, tyrannies were established, and in one way or another they have deified them, created myths about those tyrants such as Somoza and Chamorro, for example, to cite only two.

"But we are not going to enlighten the people with speeches, we will not enlighten the people with lengthy statements. The people themselves will learn the truth through the revolutionary struggle. We have seen how the events of January 22 have served as an object lesson for the people. And this lesson is different from others. Why? Because under

existing conditions, a revolutionary organization called the **Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional** showed the people another way. And when they saw for themselves, and realized, that traitors like Agüero, the Somozas and the Chamorros would never satisfy their needs, but would only work to satisfy their own personal interests and those of their clique, of the oligarchy, the people's awareness awakened to the need for revolutionary struggle and that is how they acquired true awareness.

"Great perspectives in the field of struggle lie before us. Why? Because of those conditions. The people know that the only way is that of armed struggle and that crooked politicians won't help them nor will such men struggle for the people's interests. The people will believe in those who fight in the mountains and in the cities. We have no agreements with the oligarchies or with imperialism, our only commitment is to the people and we are certain they will have confidence in us and will support the revolutionary struggle.

"The fact that these crooked politicians leave the Gran Hotel in a limousine sent by the U S ambassador or with the Papal Nuncio, guarantees their inevitable defeat. We could say that the people no longer have the confidence or the hope they once had in those leaders who delivered lengthy orations before congress or parliament.

"For us January 22 signifies the beginning of a new phase in which revolutionary struggle created a new awareness, an awareness that we must take advantage of, stimulate and strengthen even more, emphasizing the need for armed struggle."

Regarding the standard of living of the Nicaraguan miner, a question that Sotelo had the opportunity of studying while a university student, he told TRICONTINENTAL: "Nicaraguan mines along the Atlantic coast are practically all abandoned. There are no means of communication with these mines except by air, and the only existing air transport is provided by NICA, a Somoza-owned enterprise. There are two principal mining companies on the Atlantic coast: the Neptuno Gold Mining, a U S -owned enterprise in Bonanza; and the Canadian-owned Gold Mines Ltd. in Suili, undoubtedly run with U S capital.

"We conducted a study on the mines in that area, on the socio-economic situation of the miners,

and we can give you an idea of conditions. For example, the companies pay certain government officials — particularly General Somoza — for 'protection.'

"In the field of medical attention, an important aspect of this situation, we can affirm that the miner, according to law, must receive a medical check-up every six months, and those working in the tunnels should receive a check-up every three months.

"We spoke with the workers there, and later, reading their files at the Ministry of Labor, we could verify that the miners do receive their periodic medical check-ups, but if tuberculosis is diagnosed, the miner is not even told, and he is forced to continue working until he drops. And when he can no longer work he is told he has TB and fired without vacation or severance pay. And as the Ministry of Labor is in Managua, and plane fare is expensive, he cannot even appeal the decision. And what happens? He is fated to die, abandoned, in the mountains. And, if by chance, he should manage to get to the capital, they send him to a sanatorium on the outskirts of the city which has no facilities to treat him, or they simply abandon him with no vacation or severance pay.

"We obtained signed statements from the doctor of the mine's hospital who confirmed that he had been approached by the mine-owners offering him 300 dollars a month to give the miners pain-killers and pass them off as vitamins.

"This will give one an idea of the outrageous treatment afforded the mine workers. They live in filthy structures, some without plumbing, and large numbers of persons are forced by necessity to occupy the same dwelling. During election campaigns, the politicians converge on the mining communities promising all kinds of improvements. In the mines, they say: 'We don't belong to Nicaragua, we aren't Nicaraguans.' There are those who live there who have never left their own community. They don't know the capital, have never seen the Pacific, and know only misery and suffering in the mines.

"Another important factor is the extraction of gold from Nicaragua. According to the national budget, 250 000 **córdobas** annually are paid into the national treasury. In other words, the only benefit that Nicaragua derives from its gold mines is the

equivalent to 20 000 dollars per annum in taxes paid by the mine-owners. Nicaragua ranks tenth in production of gold. The companies have adopted the procedure of not exporting gold in ingots, but have built a highway to the Atlantic (at a cost of a million **córdobas**, or more than 250 000 dollars), where they load the gold on ships arriving expressly for that purpose at an unknown Atlantic port —unknown, that is, until the procedure was denounced, and it was revealed to be Port Isabel. There, foreign vessels load the unrefined ore. They take thousands of tons of gold to the German Federal Republic where it is processed, refined and cast in gold ingots. In that way, no one can tell how much gold is taken out of Nicaragua.

"The mine-owners continually allege they are on the verge of bankruptcy. When we visited the mines, they claimed that they were only there because they didn't want to leave the miners without work, painting themselves as generous and magnanimous. They claimed they made no profit, and that the companies often ran in the red. "According to the national budget, these companies pay only 20 000 dollars in taxes (annually) and yet Nicaragua is the tenth ranking gold producing nation in the world. It is also, I think, the largest producer of TB in Latin America."

Questioned on the common strategy that the national liberation movements should follow in confronting imperialism and the national oligarchies, the FSLN leader explained: "At present, in each country of Latin America, it is not correct to limit ourselves to analyzing the correlation of forces between the revolutionaries and the oligarchies' armies. We feel, and we are in complete agreement with Ernesto Che Guevara, that U S imperialism must be forced to disperse its forces; must be forced to divide them up among the different countries of Latin America and other countries on other continents where imperialism already has large numbers of troops deployed.

"We are morally obligated to create in all those countries in which conditions permit, armed revolutionary fronts, and by so doing reach the point at which imperialism will be forced to intervene in a large number of Latin American countries. Because this is objective reality. We must realize that imperialism will intervene, it must intervene

in all those nations in which revolutionary struggle is being conducted along the correct path, that of armed struggle. Then imperialism will see itself forced to disperse its troops even more than now. It already has troops in Viet-Nam, in Europe, in Asia, and in many other countries. On dispersing its forces, we will advance with much more force, because the liberation army will not simply be the liberation army of Colombia, or Venezuela or Nicaragua, but will be the army of liberation that will oppose the military might of imperialism. That is, we will begin the struggle with our army against the oligarchy of our own country. But following the first clashes, and with the first victories by the revolutionary forces, — a certainty — the imperialist army will enter the picture and we will have to fight the imperialist army. But we will not have to fight the entire imperialist army alone. We will fight a part of the imperialist army, which is not the same as fighting the entire apparatus, and the time is not far off when we will begin a common strategy and take up concrete steps based on militant and revolutionary solidarity. I believe that the time is not far off when imperialism will be buried on the Latin American continent."

On the importance of the Tricontinental Conference and the First OLAS Conference, Sotelo stressed: "We feel that the Tricontinental Conference has been a great advance and a very great step forward in the struggle against imperialism and words are not the proper vehicle through which to express the fruits of the Tricontinental or O S P A A A L; deeds demonstrate such success. We must stress the great help they have lent the revolutionary movements in those countries engaged in struggle, and the growing number of revolutionary organizations that have received ever greater stimulus through the Tricontinental. I think that when OLAS begins to function following this Conference, it will mean a great step forward in this struggle against the common enemy: U S imperialism.

"It is concrete deeds and not words which will show the effectiveness and the fruits of these organizations. When revolutionaries meet in conferences such as these and create organizations of this nature, it is to put all that they say, all that they agree upon, into action."

Dr. Hoxeng, Dean of the Interamerican University, converses with students of San German.

publicity in **Time**

THE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN THE PORTO RICO OF TODAY LISTEN TO THE AUDACIOUS NEW PLANS OF THEIR DEAN

REALLY AUDACIOUS:
IT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT DR. HOXENG IS THE ARCHETYPE OF THE CIA FOR ESPIONAGE PLANS SUCH AS "CAMELOT" AND "SIMPATICO" WHICH ARE CARRIED OUT BY THE UNIVERSITIES

Dr. Hoxeng's position is well earned: he is one of the investigators of the Manhattan Project for the development of the atomic bomb.

GUINEA: REVOLUTION AND CULTURE

by Condetto Nenekhaly-Camara

C N Camara, Secretary to the President of the Government of Guinea since 1962, has received an award from the International Festival of African Art and Culture. A Bachelor of Arts and playwright, he is also a well-known specialist in ethnology. *Revolution and Culture* is a profound study which goes deep into the complexities of African culture, particularly that of Guinea. It leads us through the maze of different tribes, diverse languages, dances, instruments, drums and melodies which today form a harmonious whole, the amazing ethnic and cultural mosaic which is the Republic of Guinea. This article, sent to *Tricontinental* by its author, is also an eloquent example of what a people advancing toward its liberation can achieve, and of the significance of the revolutionary work to rescue its values, which had been neglected under the colonial yoke; of the forgotten lore which emerges once the chains of obscurantism and underdevelopment are broken; of a centuries-old folklore and culture taking their rightful place once more, acquiring new life and exceeding former splendours.

The Revolution is a sum of phenomena which upsets a society's structures in order to build on the ruins, new institutions which restore grandeur, dignity and the sense of justice to man. It implies the process of learning new habits of living, new ways of thinking, the acquisition of new intellectual reflexes, but which far from exalting "man-as-individual," on the contrary enhances "man-as-peo-

ple." It is the community, the nation, the universal Society which count in this process, in the sense that man, by assuming full responsibility of his destiny, will strive to consolidate and enrich them. The Revolution gives the broadest and deepest sense to the concept of "masses" and explores the most fruitful aspects of their nature by identifying itself with their actions. Ideas and acts thus merge into a dialectical unity which transforms people and things into a reality of superior quality.

President Sékou Touré has said: "Civilization is the aggregate whole of conscious relations between man and Society, and man and nature." Let us say that culture is civilization's legacy to man, that which echoes him, a way for him to purify the data and deeds of civilization.

It would seem then, that the Revolution is a civilization as well as a culture. It is furthermore, the highest form of culture, for it sums up all the traits of the most accomplished culture. The Revolution is a project —in the philosophic sense of the term— and at the same time, a permanent act. Future and present, at the same time. Because of it and through it, a whole series of sudden changes takes place, based on what has been lived, that is to say, on the past as a forger of the present. This is how a people becomes aware of the links that guarantee its continuity in the perpetual risks involved in its struggle for survival. If that can characterize evolution as well, then the Revolution takes into account the shortcomings, the offscourings and the flaws which inevitably mark every process of transformation. It takes the failures of the past and transforms them into the successes of the present or of the future. This is its method of solving the inherent contradictions in the life of the peoples.

During his long quest for a better future, man has sought not only material nourishment. His activity has been constantly aided by the absorption of a no less indispensable intellectual and spiritual nourishment. In this way, work and thought are united in an enriching and renovating symbiosis thanks to which the various historical epochs have contributed to restore to man his present stature, which permits him to dominate nature. Culture enables him to lay the groundwork for the future stages of his full accomplishment, and to dispense with much groping in the construction of a universal civilization. This is no longer the heritage of a privileged class. It has become the concern of the vast majority of the largest strata; of the most numerous masses. Nowadays, the armies of workers and peasants are concerned with, and live through this exalting epic which consists in laying the foundations of a truly humanistic society. In our century, the personification of man is not to be sought in a lecture room or in a laboratory, but in the factory and fields. And one finally realizes, with the help of anthropo-

logical research, that the most learned poem, the most beautiful of songs or the most finished of paintings, has its origin in a proverb or anecdote of the countryside, in the cry of a shepherd or the sketch of a child. Revolution necessarily means culture, as real culture must mean revolution, that is, an instrument able to make possible the main aspirations of a people. These, at least, underlie the vocation and meaning of the Guinean Revolution.

Culture in Guinea has its roots in the dim past. A common meeting ground of different cultural areas, the young Republic astounded the whole world with its "Ballets" even before attaining independence. Heir to a long tradition bequeathed by peoples of different origin, this culture constitutes today the common substratum to which contribute the Malinke (Sudanese zone) Sousseu, Baga, Nalou (coastal zone), Foulah, Djallonké (Fouta Djallon) Guerzé, Kissi, Toma (forest zone), to mention only the most important peoples. It is not a question of a specific Guinean background, as the peoples that have created these particular cultures trace back their descendants in other African countries. Still, it is the Guinean Revolution which brought together these component parts in the melting-pot of a new and original culture whose essence retains but a very faint resemblance to the initial mainspring.

Foreigners like to think of Guinea as the land of the large Nimba fertility masks, or as the chosen country of the Pomta (singular Pomde), those steatite statuettes of the Kissi region, but preceding the Kissi civilization, which still bear great resemblance to the products of the Nok (Eastern Nigeria) culture or even to the Sao statuary of Chad. Guinea is also the land of the Birdmen (forest) or the knife-throwing acrobats of the N'Zérékoré region, or the place where the great epical tradition of the Mandinga is perpetuated, putting into song the feats of Emperor Seundiata Keita.

But these are no more than islets in a countless archipelago, for there is not a spot in Guinea that could not be the cradle of a series of elements belonging to a rich culture, the paradox of which consists in having escaped the eye of the traveller or the foreign researcher.

It was the task of the new regime, instituted by the Democratic Party of Guinea, to fertilize this land of grace so that it might yield the best fruits of culture. The history of the cultural renaissance of this country, and that of the artistic explosion that characterized it after September 28, 1958 are inseparable from the history of the people and the party that have made it possible.

In order to crush colonization completely and create the new man in Guinea, the people conceived and carried out, wherever needed, a policy designed to create a new way of thinking which was to give them a new

cultural awareness based, primarily, on the knowledge of African realities and values, especially those of Guinea. Having become a State, Guinea then had to become a nation. This was only possible in the same measure in which a revaluation of Africa and Guinea, was successfully carried out. It was in no way in keeping with a vain narcissism that Guinea took pains to highlight all the elements of its culture that had been kept alive, and which seemed conducive better to forge the character of an emancipated, open-minded, totally free man. During this exacerbated period of the class struggle, the traits and characteristics of this culture had to be defined; a culture destined to preserve the eminently popular and democratic character of the regime and of its institutions. Hence the just contempt for absolute and unfounded intellectualism, without influence or bearing on the given reality which it was called upon to transform.

Marx said: "The tradition of all generations weighs heavily on the brain of the living."

Thus, a people builds up its new culture, starting from what is most dynamic in its past. Moreover, here, it is less a question of contents than of outward form, and the former must necessarily reflect the nature and the quality of the action undertaken by the people in order to survive and in its search for well-being.

The new Guinean culture thus presents itself as a synthesis cast

in the mould of traditional forms, but expressing daily realities, worries and aspirations, drawn from the practice of revolutionary experience of a country free from the complexities which concern the great civilizations of the world, and confident in the brilliant prospects of its future. In less than ten years of independence, Guinea has created a cultural wealth which is the admiration of all. It is not only the different forms of art developed, but in itself, the behavior of Africans living in Guinea which vouches for this transformation, to such an extent that the nightmare of cultural alienation, which marked the somber periods of the colonial regime, has become a thing of the past. Not, however, because of its damaging effects having totally disappeared; they firmly remain ingrained in the spirit and in the consciousness only of those who do not believe in the revolution or fight against it. Guinean culture has become a decisive instrument of total emancipation for the country's citizenry, which henceforward devoted itself to the task of building a better future for its country. Hence, the profoundness that characterizes it, the greatness which marks its dimensions and the lasting repercussions it will have on the general progress of ideological evolution in the African continent. There can not be a better contribution to the construction of a universal civilization than that which is capable of rallying a whole people, of forging their convictions and consolidating the difficult and ascending path to the summits of human progress.

Culture is the dialogue of man with nature, a dialogue best expressed by the progressive acquisition of the means to master phenomena through science and technique. No wonder, then, that Guinea has made immense progress in this domain. Education, the base of modern culture, to which one-fourth of the national budget is devoted today, is guaranteed, free and compulsory, to more than 250 000 children and young people, compared to 42 000 the day after September 28, 1958. The rate of attendance varies from 60 to 80% according to the administrative regions accounted for, while it only amounted to 8% at the end of the colonial period. But the interest aroused by this cultural promotion is more remarkable in itself than from a statistical standpoint, due to the quality attributed to it. It is an education that has a vast introduction to science and technique and binds school and life together according to the words of President Sékou Touré. Primary school education is afforded in the smallest town or village and secondary school education is also afforded in each of the 29 administrative regions of the country; this leads to higher education which at the Polytechnical Institute in Conakry, and the Ecole Normale Supérieure Julius Nyéréré, in Kankan, trains the engineers, professors, physicians, magistrates and heads of enterprises which the new Guinea is

in need of. The aim of the education granted in Guinea is not that of creating a middle class of bureaucrats, but that of training producers soundly initiated in modern scientific knowledge. It is directly administered in the rural environment in which it creates certain convulsions, but the social and human wealth of which it wishes to preserve. It is perhaps the solution to the tendency of the hegemony of technique which progressively makes a mere object of man, imposing itself on societies which it has emptied of flesh and blood. The development of old civilizations started in the cities. Why not let the countryside assume today what up to now was considered pertinent to the cities? In this sense we must be aware .of why the training of the future generations of the builders of Guinea could not be the sole aim of those responsible for conducting the destiny of the nation. This interest is widely extended to all towns, thanks to the adoption of a vast literacy campaign in all national languages. The people, as a whole, must see the doors opened to the progress that will consecrate its complete and definitive emancipation.

The revaluation and transformation of the national languages disdained or ignored by the colonizer until yesterday, will soon make them fit for the translation of the most abstract thought and will transform them into real instruments of culture, the best

that can be found to express or translate the true genius of our people. In this manner, the people will be more able to preserve the rich treasures of their long and solid traditional culture, which must be inventoried, catalogued and registered by them. No memory is more faithful than collective memory, especially when it has at its command modern instruments of preservation such as writing or the tape recorder or the camera. To make the people culturally and intellectually responsible for its destiny remains one of the great ambitions of the Democratic Party of Guinea, which is willing as of now to maintain its hold and to come out a winner in the wager it holds forth, in spite of those inveterate upholders of modernism in culture who think, even in Guinea, that these efforts are useless and vain. The problem of the literacy of the people is one that a responsible State or nation should not evade, under penalty of mortgaging its future. It is above all, quite essential for an underdeveloped country whose productive energy stems entirely from its peasantry. The most efficient political organization will be impotent to promote progress if it does not fight ignorance and poverty successfully. Therefore, only by assuming the responsibility of creating material, psychological and moral conditions which will enable to guarantee its economic emancipation, can the peasantry solve the difficulties that hinder its development. But this will not be possible if it does not forge by itself the indispensable cultural instruments necessary to carry out this task.

If we insist in considering culture as a vast movement which informs, embraces and transforms all the active sectors in the life of a people, it is because we share with Marx the belief that "social life is essentially practical and all the mysteries which deviate theory toward mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice." Culture is the most complete and the most total form of this comprehension. Thus one cannot dissociate the activity of the production of agricultural commodities from the no less necessary production of spiritual goods. Etymology itself, furthermore, explains the different meanings of the word culture which binds together the same dialectical ties. From music to dance, from handicraft to painting, the different forms of art are only expressing, praising and magnifying the work and the principles that inspire and support it.

The National Ballets continue, in an unceasingly refreshed and improved form and spirit, the tradition created by the old African ballets of Fodéba Keita, which have since founded a school on the continent. This ensemble, comparable to the best in the world, has given folklore a new dimension enlivened by a modern scenic spirit. The programs of the National Ballets are not concessions to the exotic; they express the aspirations and

dynamics that move a free people. It is an understatement to say that their essence is revolutionary, for they are far removed from any political or social dogmatism. Substance and form make for such perfect alliance in the National Ballets that each spectacle not only constitutes a relaxation and a rapture but also an enrichment of the spirit. One only has to evoke certain productions such as **Bagana, Midnight,** or **Sacred Forest,** that recreate the atmosphere, views of life, even the tense dramas of everyday existence, in the background of Guinean villages. The specific quality of folklore has herewith been surpassed in the sense that this art really gets at the universal, to which it has given access to African music and choreography. Sense and formal investigation are also made evident in the use of the libretto and music, no longer as an element of accompaniment, but as a means of total adequacy and integration. How many spectators, although blasé, nevertheless furtively shed a tear when thinking of **Midnight** or painfully contract themselves in their seats when contemplating the drama of the two betrothed of the **Sacred Forest**! The art of the Ballets is not static or immobile in Guinea. Proof of it are the new experiments that have presided the constitution of the Djoliba Ballet, the second national troupe, but second only in historic sequence. As far as evolution is concerned, the Djoliba opens up new roads. The duration of the themes is lengthened, the choreography is more homoge-

neous and classic in the sense of the codification of the steps and a more important role is accorded to music.

Two currents seem nevertheless to share favors, without one winning out over the other; the first is that of the ballet danced according to a certain theme; the second is that of the operetta or the opera. The second part of the program of the Djoliba illustrates the second tendency dominated, it is true, by the personality of the greatest tenor Africa has yet produced, the singer Kouyate Sory Kandia. The Djoliba is a recent experiment. That is why its evolution should be followed with interest along both these fruitful paths that seem to combine so harmoniously.

Together with the Ballets the most significant cultural development is that of the theatre.

Expressing itself chiefly in the national languages, it is the result of the infatuation of the masses for this form of art, immediately accessible, because it constitutes a representation of social reality, be it through illustration or through discussion. Close to daily cares, it becomes didactic, that is to say, charged with political and moral intentions. The style varies between comedy, satire and drama. Two plays are representative of these two currents: **Mory-Wankon** (Mory the Crab) and **Ousmène**. The first stages the tribulations of a husband — who is mistakenly jealous — whom his wife tries to educate, while the second is about the adventures of a student recently returned from Europe, who considers himself a misfit in his society. **Mory-Wankon** is a psychological character study, implying laughter in the best tradition of the comic theatre, while **Ousmène** presents the effects of the situation drama. Besides **Mory-Wankon** and **Ousmène, Rural Exodus, Pakary Oulen** and the **2 V's** should be mentioned among others. The personality of some entertainers is clearly evident in some troupes and in some productions, but that does not mean that it is an authors' theatre. And the purpose of the plays, is not so much the manner in which a character is presented, as the relations which bind him to a general concern. Thus the theatre becomes the best aid to political action, the insufficiencies and deviations of which it does not abstain from denouncing and scourging. It is also a powerful means for mobilizing the masses, who cannot be misled as long as the fraternal spirit of artistic competition maintains collective fervor at a high pitch. Thus the plays often reflect the degree of commitment of the people, make their concerns known, and propose solutions to the problems raised by them. The style and manner to which the Guinean theatre can be compared is that of the **commedia dell'arte**, where the imaginative contribution, the talent and the participation of all concerned are required. And so it is not strange to see an original play undergoing successive transformations to improve it, to the extent of making it unrecognizable in its final ver-

sion. In reality, it is in the process of elaborating the plays where the phenomenon of continuous creation is best illustrated. The quality which makes the Guinean theatre an excellent means of social education, is also the way it makes use of the language resources. It is not rare to see a play successfully using French together with one or more national languages, which not only facilitates understanding and brings closer the end to be attained, but also constitutes a theatrical element in itself.

Aesthetically speaking, although a certain schematism is to be deplored in analysis and plot, great progress has been made in production and direction, even if the formal workmanship of the plays, although constantly improving, does not show, for the moment, a search for a renewal of the genre. But what is important is that the vocation and the social function of art find their full justification and that each artistic production is the result of a rediscovery and a national recasting. For in the case of the theatre as in other forms of art, the cultural upsurge in Guinea appears mainly as a profound movement of collective intellectual awakening destined to fuse together more closely the various social elements that constitute the people.

Dance, music and song also testify to the great cultural progress of Guinea, on a traditional as well as on a modern plane. The rediscovery and renewal of the

music of the past are the work of the Instrumental and Choral Ensemble of the National Broadcasting System, a group composed of musicians and singers whose task it is to revive the old airs, while illustrating and exalting in new creations the more permanent and immediate concerns of the Guinean Revolution. There has not been a foreign head of state visiting Guinea who has not been gratified by a beautiful song specially composed in his country's honor. The most interesting contribution of the Instrumental Ensemble, nevertheless, is still the rehabilitation of the African instruments which have been restored to their rightful place. There is even a plan to carry out a scientific study of these instruments in order to improve their technical qualities so as to make them become the modern partners of the musicians. And this would be no more than just, if one considers the infinite possibilities of the king of instruments, the **cora**, which is a kind of harp of 32 strings strung on a sounding box made of a large pumpkin.

But the richest flowering is that contributed by the development of modern dance music. Right after independence, the Democratic Party of Guinea banned the playing of non-Guinean music on the radio or in dance halls, with the aim of creating the necessary conditions for artistic creation in this field.

Under the driving force of the Youth of the Democratic African Revolution, orchestras were organized even in the remotest villages, and thus dance music underwent a boom the end of which is not in sight, as annual artistic competitions maintain its spirit. The main characteristic of this music is that it is based on African rhythms taken from villages or from Afro-Cuban traditions, according to the fad of the moment, and, also, on a certain reminiscence of the links that bind the African and Afro-American cultures. Its second trait is that the song, far from being the auxiliary of orchestral music, is rather its frame. What is primarily important in this music, rather than the air and the melody, are the lyrics, all having a political, economic or social significance, exalting the virtues or the historical stages of the permanent revolutionary struggle. The singers have created a style of their own, at the beginning subject to foreign influences, which little by little have been eliminated, thus rediscovering the original authenticity of the ancestral song. Some of the singers have even recaptured the epic form of the African bards, and this seems to me to be a major success.

After ballet and music, we must now consider literature. The outside world hardly knows the extent of its development, which is, however, true. There are in fact, a not insignificant number of unpublished works whose production has been greatly encouraged by the policy of the Party. But these works have not yet been published because of



more urgent tasks concerning the promotion of mass culture. It must be considered that far from revealing neglect, this measure must be understood as the desire to avoid granting privileges to a literature written in the borrowed language, French, which only reaches the "happy few." The drama of neo-African literature, is that it concerns the whole of Africa while at the same time it is alien to it. The only public and audience having the possibility of knowing and understanding it are, in fact, not the African people, but the readers of foreign countries. This does not mean that it is necessary to confine art within national boundaries, but its first intent and function must aim to reach and move the readers for whom it is meant. The satisfaction of this need requires that the African masses be taught to read and write in their national languages. From now on, and having this objective in mind, we are gathering, collecting and transcribing all the treasures of oral literature in Guinea: stories, proverbs, **tarrikhs** and epics. A permanent national campaign has been launched to this effect, with prizes awarded for the best works. This action is useful since it will permit the making of an inventory of all the literary creations of the Guinean and African spirit. And it will serve as a better definition of the canons and aesthetics of the new national culture, since its aim is to honor the forms best suited to express those very talents. If neo-African literature in the borrowed languages is pass-

ing at present through a crisis as regards canons and aesthetics, it is precisely because it has not known how to graft itself on to its original roots and how to empty itself into the molds that will best serve to express it. Fodéba Keita, Ray Autra, Saidou Conte, Emile Cisse, Tamsir Djibril Niane and Condetto Nenekhaly-Camara are undertaking this task, and we are only mentioning the Guinean writers who are already known for having written and published in French. One type of literature, political literature, has not been neglected, however, as it is more directly concerned with the need to instruct ideologically and educate the masses. The works of President Sékou Touré belong to this category. They not only serve for the diffusion of scientific progressive thought, but also offer new points of view on the problems of the evolution of formerly colonized countries, and at the same time aim to enrich universal political thought with theses which have matured in contact with new and present-day realities.

As to handicrafts, if, on the one hand, they attest to a technically diverse production and answers, as refers to indigo tincture, the demands of progress, on the other hand, certain forms still remain lamentably traditional in their expression. This is the case of sculpture in wood or ivory. Guinean craftsmen are capable artists, but their imagination is far from experiencing new trends away from the touristic style of colonial production of a poor and frozen inspiration. A revolution remains to be made in handicrafts in order to open them up to the ample currents of present Guinean thought. It is necessary to make sculpture and craftsmanship leave the beaten path and face the great problems posed by the evolution of the contemporary world. A current is being formed, a promising one, through the first steps of the young School of Fine Arts of Conakry, where the pupils are not only initiated in the modern techniques of decoration, basket-making, painting or modelling, but are engaged also in translating, through art, the achievements of revolutionary thought.

The task of cultural discovery and deciphering must not be limited only to the recording of facts of the collective memory. It must invade science by thoroughly studying and delving into the remote past, thanks to the utilization of archeology and prehistory. Material culture supports, completes and prolongs the creations of the imagination. The excavations of Niani, the capital of medieval Mali, which have just been started, will give within a short time, we are sure, new titles of nobility to African civilization. Prehistorical investigation should also be undertaken, for there are many indications of the existence of the pebble stone culture which poses problems of the origin of man.

Thus, the development of culture in Guinea is far from being limited. The truth is that such a revolution would not have been

possible without the present political structures. Such high quality has been attained in such a short span of time, only because the youth was urged to carry out this task, and consequently organized its resources.

Each of the 8 000 D P G committees has organized an artistic and cultural group which gathers the young men and women of a neighborhood or village. There, they study music, singing, dance, acting, or learn to play a musical instrument. The best members of these cultural groups become members of the artistic group of the section in the various activities, namely theatre, ballet, orchestra, folklore and chorus. In every city, the more gifted artists are also grouped to constitute the federal group in the above mentioned activities. And every year, before the celebration of the national holiday of October 2, the cultural groups of the 30 Federations are invited to Conakry to participate in the "Artistic Fortnight." Cups and prizes are awarded at the close of these competitions, which are presided by a National Jury composed of outstanding personalities, with a wide knowledge of, and interest in, the arts, and headed by the President of the Republic himself.

Thus, every year, a prize is awarded to the best play, the best ballet, the best orchestra, the best chorus and the best folkloric number.

The songs and dances meant to renew the repertoire of the two great National Ballets, namely

the African Ballet and the Djoliba Ballet, are selected from these wonderful artistic manifestations. This fact explains the high quality of the artistic production of Guinea. The continuous and progressive ascent of the cultural level of the Guinean people is fulfilled by encouraging and preserving artistic creations and through a criteria of selectivity applied to this abundant production. Far from being the privilege of a so-called elite, this culture accomplishes its harmony and balance within the general development of the nation. Not only do girls and boys mingle free of complexes, but also the intellectual is the partner of the worker and the peasant. There is no better proof of the moral health of a country. This guarantees and assures the forward march of the people of Guinea.

A cultural revolution of such importance deserves to be publicized and signalled out as an example which truly rehabilitates Africa, restoring to it a personality only comparable to that of peoples that are extremely proud of their civilization and culture. The Government acted on this understanding when it decided to organize the International Festival of African Art and Culture. It wished to give proof that the wealth and diffusion of a culture cannot be measured by the dimension of its material and technical means, but by the cohesion, the unity and the strength of its social organization, especially the high quality of its consciousness for fully assuming its destiny. It happened that at the same time, Senegal also tried to sponsor and organize a World Festival of Negritude. Therefore, negotiations were conducted between the two governments with the object of harmonizing, and even merging both projects into one.

Unfortunately, there were differences of interests and after Guinea had agreed to postpone the date of the celebration of its Festival, pledging itself to foster the success of the Senegal project, contacts were broken due to the compromising of Guinea's participation in the Dakar Festival. It would be an error to think that only personal considerations were the cause for this failure. The rift between the intentions of the two States is even more profound and rather reveals the irreconcilable discordance of two philosophies of culture: that of Senegal, artificial and erroneous, and that of Guinea, up-to-date and committed. We know that the concept of Negritude, historically limited, could not give rise to a political ethic, as required by the irruption of our young States and of our young nations into the industrial civilizations, a tendency denying Negritude, which clings to the past and is idealistic **par excellence**. The new African States have no use for a harmful racial ideology such as Negritude, which to be sure constituted a privileged moment in the arrival at consciousness of an African intellectual class, but which has remained foreign to our peoples, offending them. For Africanity

cannot be opposed to the personality of other peoples, cannot belittle, question or deny the essential qualities which make all men equal in their common nature, their aspirations and their future. Negritude is the apology of the regressive mentality, that very same mentality that it set out to oppose at the outset of its history.

The Guinean project for a festival has nevertheless not been abandoned. A gigantic framework, unique in Africa, is ready to welcome it. All the African and progressive nations of the world will be invited to it, to give evidence of the permanence and the vitality of revolutionary art and to illustrate the thought of the Head of State of Guinea, according to which "independence is an open door towards the world." Contrary to the Dakar Festival, that of Conakry will be placed under the moral sponsorship of revolutionary consciousness, not under the auspices of foreign protectors from international capitalist High Finance. It will rather be a Festival of African dignity and honor.

The prospects for the development of revolutionary culture in Guinea are still unsuspected. Every day, new initiatives arise to guide it towards new heights which inevitably lead to the universal. The dynamism which characterizes this evolution is worthy of respect, and the people that inspires it, being truly free, will be able to preserve the social, collective and human sense that characterizes it.



JAPAN: THE CULTURAL AGGRESSION OF IMPERIALISM

by Kenjuro Yanagida

Hundreds of islands make up a vast country: Japan. A thousand-year-old culture upon which, without doubt, China has been influential —particularly during the Tang dynasty of the 7th and 8th centuries— but which keeps the autochthonous characteristics of a settled national culture.

Kenjuro Yanagida, 74, first son of a peasant family in the prefecture of Kanagawa, and a philosopher who figures in the panorama of contemporary Japanese literature, in activity which combines creative work, teaching and political commitment, analyses the consequences which his country is now facing in the field of culture after the American intervention, the "MacArthur-style agrarian reform" and the mantle of "westernization." A theme as controversial in his country as the Fundamental Reform of Education is discussed by Yanagida, and he does so with the accumulated knowledge of his professional career. He is a graduate of the faculty of philosophy in the Imperial University of Kyoto (1925), and was professor of the Imperial University of Taipei (1929) and of the University of Otani (1942). In 1953 he organized the Workers' Educational Association and started to publish the magazine *Gerushy no somo* (Friends of Learning). In the same year he created the Central Academy of Workers. He is now president of the Workers' Educational Association and a leading member of the Association for Progressive Metropolitan Policy of Tokyo.

Kenjuro Yanagida's article, which *Tricontinental* publishes exclusively, includes little-known data on United States ideological colonization. The author of *Journey of my Thought, Philosophy of Freedom* and *Ten Years of Materialism* has taken up this research, using figures and data extensively, in order to record the complete picture of United States ideological penetration. The dominion which US consortia exercise over Japan's communication media, as an example, may be illustrated by just two figures: control of 81.1 percent of the total imports of books and 62 percent of magazines.

1. CULTURAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD JAPAN AFTER THE WAR

Though one of the highly developed capitalist countries, Japan is subordinate to U.S imperialism and is suffering not only from its military, political and economic domination, but from its violent ideological and cultural

aggression.

After the defeat of Japan in the war in August 1945, in the very beginning of its occupation, the U S Armed Forces did not land in our country as a friend of the Japanese people for their liberation, but came to rule the Japanese people arbitrarily, as troops of U S imperialism. Japan was occupied by the U S Forces, but never "liberated." An American journalist, John Gancer, writes that MacArthur told him "Japan is a big concentration camp of 80 million people." **(Mystery of MacArthur)**

2. COLONIZATION OF EDUCATION

The first and fundamental step to deprive the Japanese people of their independent and indomitable spirit and to create a people dependent on U S imperialism is to make them act according to its wishes in popular education. Therefore, in January 1946, right after the landing on our territory of the U.S occupation forces, the basic policy for education was fixed by publishing the "Note on the Fundamental Reform of Education." Since then, the U.S occupation forces have ever so often stressed that the "ideological reform" of the Japanese people through education was an important aim of the occupation policy.

Upon the conclusion of the San Francisco "Peace" Treaty after the period of victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and U.S imperialist aggressive war in Korea in 1950, cultural aggression of the United States in Japan has been gradually carried out through the policy of the Japanese Government.

At that time, an American scholar, Owen Latimore, states as follows concerning the U S policy toward Japan in his work **The Situation in Asia:** "First, like Britain, Japan is able to utilize its whole territory as an unsinkable aircraftcarrier. Second, like Germany, with a higher developed industry than any other neighboring country, Japan can be put in the center to lead such neighboring countries in an anti-Russian direction. Third, Japan can be forced to fulfil the same duty for the United States as Nepal, which supplies India and Britain with ferocious Gurkha mercenaries. It is expected that with the lapse of time, Japan will become a country which will provide new colonial troops faithful to the United States, because the disciplined Japanese, by nature, are traditionally anti-Soviet."

It can be said that afterward the United States has been assuming this attitude basically and incessantly in execution of imperialist policy in Asia. In the United States, from 1948 to 1949, the necessity of anti-communist and military education was proclaimed and a considerable num-

ber of professors were purged from universities, during the "Red Purge." Such a policy was immediately applied to the educational world of Japan and from 1949 to 1950, under the leadership of the military and administrative department of every prefecture in the country, the "Red Purge" was implemented among the teachers of primary, secondary and high schools, expelling 6.700 teachers from their schools. Faced with these events, such organizations as the Federation of University Professors, the Japan Teachers' Union and the All-Japan Federation of Student Autonomies (Zengakuren) immediately rose in resistance.

After that, the Ikeda-Robertson talks were the most important and significant event in the history of U S colonizing policy for education and culture in Japan. The Ikeda-Robertson talks were held in October 1953, since the United States had had a bitter experience in the Korean War. Ikeda was then the Minister of Finance and Robertson was the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Far Eastern Affairs.

Their joint communiqué states as follows: Up to now, during the eight years of occupation, the Japanese youth to be engaged in the task of defence have been educated in the idea that the "Japanese should never take a weapon in any event." The persons concerned in the talks agreed it is most important for the Japanese people to assume increased responsibility for defence. The Japanese Government has the biggest responsibility for the promotion of an atmosphere to develop a spontaneous spirit of self-defence and patriotism in Japan by means of education and public propaganda (**Asahi Shinbun**, October 28, 1953). This joint communiqué played an important role in limiting perfectly the Japanese administration and culture thereafter.

It can also be said that the transformation of the public election of members to the Board of Education into election by the authorities was an important step in implementing their policy. There is no doubt that the policy was persistently penetrated down to its roots by the enforcement of teachers' efficiency ratings since 1957 (the plan of repression of the peace and democratic movement, including discriminating treatment of clerical and teaching personnel through unilateral investigation of their ideology and belief by reactionary government). For there is no other effective measure than the efficiency rating as a means to deprive teachers of their spirit of democratic liberty and the power of resistance based on it. It is a matter of course that an unprecedented resistance movement then arose among teachers' unions in various pre-

fectures of the country.

Moreover, with aims at serving the common interests of the Japanese Government and US imperialism, the policy of reactionary education was plotted: promotion of pupils' achievement tests; plot for the revival of Kigensetsu which was once the spiritual mainstay of militarism, by setting February 11, accession day of the first legendary emperor, as the anniversary day of the founding of the country; plot to revive militaristic state textbooks by gradual and reactionary intensification of authorization of the textbook; plan to propagandize again the administration of the emperor, depriving science of the education of history by bringing a myth into it; policy to bring up an obedient youth in the interest of the revival of militarism through creating the idea of "superior man" by the Central Education Council.

Besides, as clearly shown in the recent trips of Prime Minister Sato to "South Korea," Taiwan, South Viet-Nam and other countries in Southeast Asia, such tendency has become concrete and quite dangerous, more openly connected with U S aggressive policy in Asia.

3. ROLE PLAYED OVER MASS COMMUNICATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES AND CRISIS OF JAPANESE CULTURE

Japan has also developed mass propaganda akin to the United States, as it is a highly developed capitalist country. It is hardly possible that the U S should not keep an eye on it, because of its intention to rule the ideology and culture of the Japanese people. The United States has intervened in the education of Japan and at the same time has made great efforts to intensify its rule over Japanese mass communications.

The ex-ambassador of the United State to Japan, Edwin Reischower, points out these principles as "principles of strategy" in his book **Asian Policy Standing at a Turning Point** written in 1954. He states as follows: The first, the "military weapon," is the most ineffective one though it is the most expensive. The second, the "economic weapon," also needs much money but has little effect. On the contrary, the third, "ideological weapon," is the cheapest but most effective one. In particular, he considered that if "American democracy" wins the victory in Japan, the developed capitalist country, it might be a good example for the other Asian countries and become a great factor to guarantee success of U S policy in Asia. In this battle of ideology, mass communication becomes the most powerful tool. Therefore, the Conlogn Report (in 1959, Conlogn Associate Professor Scalappinos'

report to the Diplomatic Committee of the U.S Senate concerning the attitude to be taken by the U S toward the Asian situation) also paid special attention to it, stating that Japanese mass communications were developed to such a degree as to be able to quickly and completely popularize the new idea. It is strongly claimed in the Conlogn Report that in order to create a conscious and cultural base necessary for the maintenance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the ideology of trust in the United States should be directly implanted deeply among the people, as it is not sufficient with only diplomatic and other organizations. From such viewpoints, the report makes the following proposals:

—1— To describe correctly the American society which has won the biggest victory in the 20th century.

—2— To propagandize not only the material, scientific and military prosperity of the United States, but also its creative tasks being carried out in art, music and social science.

—3— To offer the best treatment to Asian leaders who come to the United States.

—4— These works must be executed not only by the government, but by foundations, universities, the financial world and trade unions.

—5— The problem has to do with the improvement of cultural exchange between Japan and the U S at the mass level, and baseball and popular music are American exports to be considerably promoted. At present, the Japanese mass communication is regarded as occupying the second place in the world next to the United States, together with school education. With bourgeois newspapers (35 million daily circulation), radio sets (10 million) and television sets (11 million), each family has some mass media (90 per cent of the families have television); one billion and 370 million copies of magazines are published monthly.

According to ex-ambassador Reischower, a country with developed mass communication is a "modernized" country.

However, if we consider who controls the mass communication, it becomes clear that class and national domination is more intensified in the highly developed capitalist country subordinate to U S imperialism.

On October 5, 1965, on the day of the opening of the extraordinary session of the Diet of Japan for ratification of the "Japan-ROK Treaty," U S Ambassador E. Reischower made an address to the chamber, saying that the Japanese press did not publish the balanced news on the Vietnamese situation. In referring to the reports from Hanoi of Mr. Minoru Omori in the bourgeois news-

paper **Mainichi Shinbun,** and Mr. Shoryu Hata in **Asahi Shinbun,** he charged that they were not qualified as journalists. Especially, concerning the report of Mr. Omori on continuous bombing by U S planes against a leper colony in North Viet-Nam, he dared to say that this report was false and based on propaganda of the communist side, and U S forces had not done such an act. Soon after, Mr. Omori was dismissed from the **Mainichi.**

The characteristic of the attacks by reactionary forces appearing in the field of present day Japanese ideology and culture could be summarized as follows: the first is flooded with the American mode of living and American culture, together with the devastation of Japan's national culture. Now more than a half of the golden hours of Japanese television are occupied by programs made in USA. Sixty-five percent of imported films are American films. American culture has been brought into our country on a large scale through newspapers, magazines, books, records, etc. Spiritual and cultural subordination to the United States has been strengthened in the wide range from the twist to modern jazz, gun boom and professional wrestling to every mode of food, clothing and housing.

In the field of export and import of publications, 81.8 percent of our book imports and 62.5 percent of the magazines come from the United States.

Such phenomena of subordination have naturally crushed the traditional culture of the Japanese people and prevented its development. There are a considerable number of folk songs and dances which are doomed to extinction due to a lack of followers, though they have been passed on from peasant generation to generation. Such national traditional arts as Kabuki and Bunraku have also been distorted by commercialism and given up. There are many cases of releasing for sale old objects of art and of the Nara or Kyoto culture, not only at home, but abroad, together with harming their original form and destroying them.

The second is the increasing tendency toward the cult of war and violence. There has been a considerable increase in the films and literature agreeing with, and glorifying the former aggressive war. The war songs admiring former aggressive wars have been widely spread by records. In various cities of the country, American war and gangster films are being put on the screen. This admiration of militarism under the subordination to the United States is clearly reflected in juvenile magazines and comic books. Also, in the field of "toy" manufacture have appeared as great success jet planes of the nicest style or airplanes and warships

of the Empire of Japan, which played an active part in the Second World War.

A so-called boom of the Imperial House has been consciously produced in order to propagandize "the beloved Imperial Family" among Japanese people.

There is a tendency that we cannot afford to overlook in the propaganda of militarism by taking advantage of sports and the Olympic Games. For the Olympic Games, "Self-Defence Forces" of Japan situated under military command of the U S Forces went to all troubles to revive the law of S D F and prepared "cooperating troops with the Olympic Games" with about five thousand and several hundred soldiers, so that they might gain popularity among the people as their hero.

The third feature is the mobilizing of culture in order to divert people's eyes from contradictions of the real life and turn the outlet of dissatisfaction aside, by singing the praises of undisturbed peaceful mood. The television and films are flooded with programs for the salaried class; home-dramas, popular songs and jazz are playing quite the same role. Though existentialism and pragmatism or logical positivism in philosophy make a display of their "depth" using a truly hard expression, they aim at separating our life from social and political reality. So-called vanguard literature and vanguard pictures give way to pursue only their internal affairs apart from real life and struggles.

As the fourth feature, it must be pointed out that anti-communism has commonly penetrated at the base of the above-mentioned tendencies.

Organizations of culture themselves have been made more reactionary by leading circles of Japan and the United States. The most important moves are malrevision of the broadcasting law and the law of controlling electric wave. In brief, it can be said that a part of the plan is to adjust the network of electric wave of Japan to be suitable for U.S aggression by nuclear blackmail and revive Japanese militarism under subordination to the United States, adapting the policy for mass communication itself to it. The idea of an Asian News Center (ANC) is nothing but a plot of extension of the Japanese news agency, instead of U S agencies which have lost popularity, for the purpose of Asian domination by U.S and Japanese reactionary forces.

4. U S POLICY TO SCHOLARS AND INTELLECTUALS

Scholars and intellectuals are relatively small in number, but they have social influence not to be ignored. U S imperialism is making various efforts in order to attract Japanese scholars and intellectuals in a pro-American and anti-communist direction.

In June 1961, the then Prime Minister Ikeda, made a visit to the United States and had secret talks with President Kennedy, publishing a Joint Communiqué. According to the Communiqué, it is said that the U S Government places its great hope on the human resources, science, technique, learning and education of Japan and that therefore the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee on Education, Culture and Science should be established together with the Joint Committee on Trade and Economy. Besides, it is scheduled that for the expense of these two Committees, 25 million dollars might be appropriated out of the repayment fund to the American GARIOA (Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Areas) and AROA (Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas). After the war, the Japanese people were forced to purchase surplus agricultural products from the United States.

On that occasion they did not get such products free, but bought them. But this repayment fund means double payment by tax plundered from people.

Thus, at the end of January 1962, the First Meeting of the Educational and Cultural Committee was held, in which the Nakaya and Shwantes Report was presented. In the Report were beautifully displayed such plausible problems as personnel exchanges, exchange of books and materials, mutual study between Japan and U S and language study. But its true aims are, in brief, to make Japanese education and culture pro-U.S and anti-communist, and finally to include them in a part of the U S strategy in the Far East.

In general, the scholars of universities in Japan receive quite a poor amount of money for their study. The annual study expenses of science which are appropriated in the budget by the Ministry of Education are only 7 200 000 dollars altogether. Moreover as these figures are distributed for the scholars and investigators of the whole country, each scholar receives quite a small amount of money.

25 million dollars — it is evident that if such a great amount of money is distributed among the scholars for the purpose of pro-U.S and anti-communism it would play a very important role.

At present, a large amount of funds is presented for Japan-U S joint study and scores of different kinds of studies are carried on by the hand of the Japan-U S Scientific Committee. Still more, the United States has control of foundation funds (for example, the Asian Fund, the Foundation Fund, etc.).

America is using this fund, openly declaring it is "for anti-communism." Making capital out of "the aid without strings attached," America is mobilizing the scholars

who do not yet understand the essence of American imperialism in the study of China or Southeast Asia, while deceiving them and spreading money. The China Study Center of **Toyobunko** (Oriental Library) in Tokyo and the Study Center for Soviet-East Asia in Kyoto University are only a part of such action. But the violent resistance movement is becoming stronger with the voice of "we must not receive such dirty money," among young conscientious scholars. Of late, it has been exposed that the Physical Society of Japan had been receiving financial aid from U.S. Forces. But as the result of the resistance movement of conscientious scientists, the Physical Society of Japan decided to decline the receipt of financial aid from U S Armed Forces in the future.

On the other hand, in 1950, the CIA founded an international propagandizing organization by the name of Free Cultural Conference in conspiracy with the Rockefeller Foundation or the Ford Foundation. Eighteen kinds of magazines which have connection with this Conference have been published in England, Uganda, Nigeria, Germany, France, Italy, Australia, Lebanon, Brazil, India, Austria, Philippines, South Korea and Japan in each language. The anti-communist monthly magazine **Jiyu** (Free) has been published by the fund of the destructive activities of the CIA.

There are Japanese who are members of such international anti-communist organizations, as Ketaro Hayashi, Taiko Hirabayashi, Masamichi Inoki, Rinmei Kawarita, Kenko Kimura, Kunio Odaka, Zengo Ohira, Yoshihiki Seki, Michi Takeyama, Kenzo Takayanagi and so on.

Though they call themselves "Free Conference," they have neither defended the liberty of the American Black people, nor taken an interest in American culture itself.

Further, in concert with other organizations, this group of "liberty" has organized the Cultural Forum of Japan which has three main tasks:

A) To attract young scholars of Japan, so that they may have a conception of the world in an American way. To organize presents, scholarships and invitation trips to the United States, as a means to do this.

B) To supply three papers in English which are now being published in Tokyo: **Japan Times, The Mainichi** and **The Yomiuri,** with "important news."

These three papers have regularly put articles from the magazine **Liberty** in the column "The World of Criticism."

In short, they are going to regard "the modern truth" appearing in the magazine **Liberty** as the "truth."

C) U S Congress and Govern-

ment officers concerned are taking advantage of the articles of this magazine as data for judgment of the Japanese situation.

Thus, Cultural Forum of Japan is regarded as a convenient world of criticism where the "constructive views" of Japan can be found and various seminaries and conferences are organized based on it.

JAPANESE PEOPLE FOR NATIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE

As mentioned above, we have surveyed only the outline of the U S cultural invasion of Japan. The U S cultural invasion of Japan seems to have achieved considerable success, but its success is a temporary one. Various resistance movements against the U S cultural invasion have started to rise in every strata of Japanese society. Now I point out several facts which symbolically show these movements.

The organ of the Communist Party of Japan, **Akahata**, and various magazines of the Party (**Akahata** has become the biggest organ of the Communist Party in the capitalist countries, with a circulation of one million and hundreds of thousands including the daily and Sunday **Akahata**) and its increasing influence has great significance for the future development of the history of Japan.

In every field of science, ideology, literature, films, theatre, music, national accomplishments and others, strong power against cultural aggression of American imperialism, to safeguard the independence and liberty of the Fatherland and for creative development of the tradition of national culture has grown with great force among the Japanese progressive people.

This movement is not limited only to the struggle against cultural aggression of U S imperialism. At the same time, it is the struggle against the cultural policy of reaction and militarism of Japanese ruling circles subordinated to U S imperialism, and the struggle for the construction of a new national and democratic culture of the people.

We are proud of the fact that under the present situation of Japan, connected with the struggle for genuine independence, peace and democracy of the Fatherland, the movement to attain, develop and create a national and democratic culture based on the real life of Japanese people has been expanded and intensified.

In the movement, especially the Movement Singing Voice, and activities of the Music Council for Workers, Film Council for Workers, and the Theatrical Council for Workers, are playing a big role in the development of progressive and total popular direction of song, music, film and theatre. The Musical Council of

Workers has increased its members to 500.000 and is now striving for one million in membership. The Theatrical Council for Workers, and the Association for Promotion of Independent Performance of films have established their organization on a nation-wide scale toward another development.

The Japan Festival of Singing Voice has also extended its scale year by year and now the Singing Voice movement is marching toward 10 million people. Together with the extension in quantity, the effort for development in quality has also been made. The Musical Council for Workers hoists the slogan: "Let's develop national and democratic music!" In the Singing Voice movement, a workers' movement to compose more than 1 000 musical works in a year, based on worshops, and people's music and dance which have national tradition have been dug up and developed.

On the other hand, concerning the problem of maintenance of cultural inheritance, about a few years ago, many intellectuals rose up to maintain the ruins of Heijo Kyu (in the Nara prefecture) which were exposed to the danger of destruction due to the construction of factories. The National Musical Council for Workers played the role of host in organizing a Study Meeting of Traditional Music and the Japan Council of Music and Dance also organized a Study Meeting on Traditional Music with aims to develop its study in the future. It must be said that in this point the **Zenshinza** Theatre and a national song and dance ensemble, **Warabiza,** have rendered distinguished service. The founding of the Association for the Maintenance of National Attainments is worth paying attention to in order to maintain and protect such national attainments as **Rakugo, Manzai, Kodan** and **Bungaku.**

In the field of works of literature and arts, works of those who are organized in the Union of Democratic Literature or the Poets Conference reflect well the reality of Japan. Outstanding works of music have been created like the grand cantata Come Back Human Being! composed by Sakae Araki and others. We are strongly impressed with these songs. Also, we can find many works depicting various phases of life and struggles of the Japanese people in the works of the Japan Independent Exhibition sponsored by the Japan Art Association. As seen in various public performances by newly founded troupes and films named **Dawn of Japan** and others by the Independent Production — works which have aroused our big impression — have been produced. In the field of literature, since **Democratic Literature,** the organ magazine of the Union of the De-

mocratic Literature, was published, new creative works have been released one after another. In the field of photographs, the Group Realistic Photography was also organized, and is growing up to become one of the forces organizing amateurs all over Japan. Further, in the field of physical training and sports, since several years ago, the New Physical Training League of Japan and the Working Committee for All-Japan Sports Festival of Youth were organized and are rapidly developing year by year. The New Physical Training League of Japan includes every kind of sports in Japan, and is introducing a fresh and healthy atmosphere of working youth into sport fields, opposing bourgeois and corrupted organizations or Olympic Games. The All-Japan Sports Festival of Youth has been held once a year since 1962, and in November this year the fifth Festival is to be held in Kyoto.

Besides these, the nation-wide activities of systematic learning being carried out by the Educational Association of Workers, which is being developed around their organ magazine **Friend of Learning,** could also be said to have been playing an important role in a series of resistance movements against U S ideological rule. Such a systematic and nation-wide development of workers' learning movements as the above, could be evaluated as a proof of progress of the struggles of independent ideas and culture. Also, in the field of science, the Congress of Japanese Scientists, newly established in December, the year before last, and gathering several thousand democratic scientists from all over Japan, is developing wide-range movements aiming at the independent and democratic development of Japanese science.

Thus, the struggle against U S imperialist cultural invasion into the ideological and cultural field in Japan, against the anti-national and militaristic culture made by Japanese reactionary forces subordinated to the U S and for the national and democratic development of Japanese culture, is being expanded.

The fact that wide and various cultural popular demands in every field of culture are being achieved and promoted in the struggle, that new forces of people are springing up and that their struggle is being steadily consolidated shows that whatever brutal power the U S cultural invasion in Japan may exercise, or rather the more brutal it is, the more our resistance against this will be strengthened.

It shows in the end that U S imperialism will have no other way but to suffer a defeat. This can be said, upon comparison with the law of development of history, a destiny which they can never avoid.

NUDE SHOW
NIGHTLY
CLUB
NO COVER
MINIMUM
CHARGE

華商品が当る抽戯ハ

FROM SAMNEUA TO HAVANA

On October 7, Havana was honored by the arrival of a delegation from the Neo Lao Haksat headed by Saly Vongkhamsao, member of the Central Committee of that organization, and composed of Khamphay Boupha, member of the Central Committee; Khamsoubinh Thonveunth, General Staff officer of the People's Army of Laos; high ranking army officer Koua Keu; Khamphat Saykeo, representing the Federation of Laotian Women; and Soulivong Phrasithideth, Sithonh Sibounhuong, Phengkhoune Voraphet and Bounbieng Sysourath.

The Neo Lao Haksat delegation was here in response to an invitation extended by an OSPAAAL delegation headed by its Secretary General Osmany Cienfuegos during a visit to the liberated zones of Laos. At that time the OSPAAAL delegates reaffirmed in Samneua that the struggle of the Laotian people is a valuable and direct contribution to the militant spirit of all the peoples of the world who struggle against imperialism, especially against U S imperialism. During its stay in Cuba, the Neo Lao Haksat delegation attended several meetings and had contact with the various departments of OSPAAAL. The delegates exchanged points of view with the members of the Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL and expressed their high esteem for the tasks of solidarity undertaken by that organization and especially in relation to the struggle of the people of Laos.

Their visit to Cuba coincided with the celebration of the

A MANEUVER

On September 29, 1967 the Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL issued a statement under the slogan Belgian-US imperialists, puppets and mercenaries, get out of the Congo! condemning the Mobutu puppet regime and the imperialist aggression against the people of the Congo (K).

The statement pointed out that "the Yankee imperialists and their NATO allies have just had another confrontation in Stanleyville, using as usual their lackeys Mobutu and Tshombé." Having pointed the finger of guilt at those assassins, OSPAAAL stresses that "they are the same mercenaries who, recruited by Mobutu and Tshombé, intended to suppress the armed struggle of the Congolese people, led by the National Liberation Council, but who have now turned against Mobutu himself." The statement goes on to say that "this attempted mercenary aggression against the Mobutu Government is not due to the fact that this is a progressive regime, but on the contrary, to inter-imperialist rivalries." The OSPAAAL document adds that Mobutu, Tshombé and their ilk "are imperialist puppets and are all authors or accomplices of the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba." Referring to Mobutu's demagogic policy, the statement explains that "this is nothing but a maneuver intended to strengthen his position in power, isolate the liberation movement from the people and divide the progressive forces of Africa."

Following denunciation of Mobutu's maneuver, aimed at scoring new successes during the OAU meeting, the Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL stresses that while this meeting was being held, "the activities of the People's Army were increasing, fully demonstrating that armed struggle in the Congo has not been quelled."

In conclusion, the Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL vigorously "calls on all progressive mankind, all progressive governments and the socialist camp, and national liberation movements that are struggling against colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism on the continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as all lovers of justice and liberty throughout the world, to support the heroic struggle that the Congolese people are waging for their complete liberation."

THE VANGUARD

The Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL issued a statement calling for the holding of the International Day of Solidarity with the People of Venezuela on November 21. It urged "all revolutionary and progressive organizations to show their active and militant solidarity with the courageous Venezuelan people."

In continuing, the statement explained that this date had been selected in commemoration of the "great day of revolutionary struggle by Venezuelan youth against the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship," pointing out that "today, as yesterday, the Venezuelan people constitute an important vanguard in the struggle being waged in Latin America against imperialism, headed by the aggressive U S imperialist government."

After stressing the degree of economic dependence suffered by the Venezuelan nation, the document lashed out against "the weak and opportunistic position of those who, calling themselves revolutionaries, abandon the armed struggle and play the political game of reaction and imperialism."

The Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL states in conclusion its firm support of the United Committee of the FLN-FALN (CUFF), headed by Major Douglas Bravo, and of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), headed by Moisés Moleiro, its Secretary General, and points out that both revolutionary organizations are heroically carrying on a struggle to the death against imperialism and its stooges."

BEN BARKA

On commemorating the second anniversary of the death of revolutionary leader El Mehdi Ben Barka, the Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL issued a statement honoring "the memory of this assassinated leader, who will be ever-present in the work of our organization and in the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America."

"Ben Barka," the document goes on to say, "dedicated his life to the revolutionary struggle, remained consistently faithful to the peoples' cause, and by so doing became one of the most respected and admired leaders of his people and of the entire African continent."

The OSPAAAL statement recalls Ben Barka's exemplary attitude during the preparation of the Tricontinental Conference and his spectacular kidnapping in broad daylight from a Paris street. It stresses that "the feudal and reactionary Moroccan Government, in collusion with international imperialist forces, assassinated him in a futile attempt to prevent the holding of the Tricontinental Conference."

In conclusion, the Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL pointed out that the "Tricontinental Conference was a success and the revolutionary spirit of Ben Barka will never be forgotten."

news behind the news

¶ *Situation in Kalimantan.* As a result of the increasing guerrilla activity in Kalimantan and, above all, after the spectacular guerrilla surprise attack on the air base of Sigkawany, the Military High Command of Indonesia has adopted a series of measures which clearly demonstrate the state of uneasiness of the reactionary Nasution-Suharto regime:

1. Convening a meeting of the military authorities of so-called *Malaysia* and Indonesia in the capital of Sarawak where an agreement was reached to intensify the joint anti-guerrilla operations all along the frontier.
2. Sending a battalion of the *Siliwangui* Division to the Sigkawany sector.
3. Creating a para-military force from among the reactionary students of the KAMI under the name of the Regiment of the Grandchildren for the purpose of carrying out anti-guerrilla activities.
4. Transferring the 6th Unit of the Bandjarmasin Army, until now stationed to the south of Kalimantan, to the same Sigkawany sector.
5. Closing down maritime traffic in the territorial waters of Kalimantan after the discovery of arms and ammunition on a beach of the island.
6. Increasing the number of reactionary troops from 1,500 to more than 4,000 men.

On the other hand, rumours persist that the guerrillas are being led by the former chief of the 9th Military District of Kalimantan, Colonel Suhardjo, who is very popular in the eastern region of Kalimantan where he took part in the development of worker, farmer and leftist organizations. The reactionary coup caught him by surprise while he was studying in Moscow. When the Indonesian Embassy requested his return it was informed that he had

left for Viet-Nam to join the fight of the people of that country. He was later seen in Hanoi and in Peking. By way of confirmation, the reactionary regime recently put a price on his head.

¶ Great Britain promised publicly to continue "aiding" the South Arabian Federation with 15 million pounds sterling for a period of three years after conceding independence. What it failed to say was that this "aid" would be made effective on condition that the Aden Government maintained *a friendly attitude toward Great Britain.* This clause, established in July, foresees the crumbling of the Federal Government, for otherwise there would be no purpose in such a clause with their most faithful allies.



¶ Art. 4 of the Ethiopian Constitution says: "... by virtue of his Imperial blood, the person of the Emperor is sacred; his authority is indisputable." Aspects of putting into practice the Divine Law: Haile Selassie, the *Lion of Judea* and *God's Chosen One,* personally decides on the execution of all death penalties. There have been cases of those sentenced to death waiting five and even eight anguished years for the Emperor to deign to confirm the sentence. There is no known case of a revocation of sentence.

—The slightest show of protest is punished by sentences which vary from five to seven years.

—The minimum sentence meted out to the discontented is 40 lashes to be administered in the public square.

—Torture is an integral part of the sacred justice: the prisoner is submerged in water until drowned, or hanged by a rope tied to the thumbs with a bottle of water tied to the genital organs.

—In addition to the security apparatus which exists in the country under the orders of the Emperor, there exists what is known as the Kidnapping Squad designed to crush all political opposition.

—Part of the so-called penal population is to be found in the *Alem Bekagne* prison situated in the capital itself with 7,500 political and other prisoners in seriously overcrowded conditions. One out of eight has been condemned to the death penalty, a fate which almost always befalls those countrymen who object to the geophagist family of the Emperor, the feudalists and the Coptic Church which controls a third of all the lands of the country. *Alem Bekagne* means *End of Life.*

—The prisoners of *Alem Bekagne* work at handicrafts, turning out $450,000 worth per month, receiving no remuneration whatsoever.

—Another 20,000 prisoners from other jails work in the Imperial gold mines of Adola.

Other facts which round out the social panorama of Ethiopia are:

—Infant population: 5 million.

—Education budget: 17 million Ethiopian dollars.

—Illiterates comprise 90% of the population.

—Per capita income is $30.00 per year.

—The famine of 1959 killed 250,000.

¶ The Special Air War Center located in the US Air Force Base at Englin, Florida, is carrying out a series of tests with a view to adapting the F-51D Mustang pursuit plane for use in the counterinsurgency plans. The project is in the hands of the Cavalier Aircraft Corporation of Sarasota, Florida, under the auspices of the US Program of Counterinsurgency Military Aid for the purpose of equipping Latin American armies with that apparatus. The adaptation contemplated: seat for an observer, installation of six 50 mm machine guns, facilities to carry bombs of high explosive power, napalm, and air-surface 5 in. missiles. It will be able to remain five hours over the same objective.

¶ The Federal Army, which has become, by grace of the British, the "saviour" of the so-called South Arabian Federation, is headed by a Britisher, Brigadier General Jack Dye, who visited London during the crucial events of September and October. The officers are in large part members of the feudal aristocracy.

¶ Some observers of the situation in Chile have speculated on the possibility that the "left" of the Christian Democratic Party may break away from the Party because its economic proposals are not being adopted by the Frei Government. However, the course of events makes this possibility doubtful. There are clearer indications that the "rebel" group may adopt a line, advocated by the president of the Young Christian Democrats, Rodrigo Ambrosio, of internal struggle for changes in the government's domestic foreign policy.

They hope that the PDC, before the downfall of President Frei, may produce new figures who will publicly wash their hands of the unfulfilled official promises in an attempt to guarantee the election of another Christian Democratic candidate in the elections of 1970.

—Recognition of the existence of the class struggle in Guinea. Up to now the analysis of the Party has been based on the strengthening of the State as a national democracy, which would include all classes supporting national development.

—The necessity gradually to abolish polygamy in order to promote several objectives including the emancipation of women.

—Orientation toward the priority development of agriculture and the cooperative movement in the face of the fact that 80% of the population depend on the land. Continuation of a number of industrial projects, especially those connected with mining and the production of electrical energy.

—The growth of a petty bourgeoisie (bureaucratic bourgeoisie) in Guinea was noted together with the dangers which its growth engenders.

—Emphasis on the fact that the armed forces must be "revolutionary in their conduct and have a popular base," and must organize the participation of its members in more intensive political activity.

—Condemnation of the present terms under which commerce is carried on between the underdeveloped countries and the capitalist powers, pointing out that the socialist countries of Europe sometimes take part in such terms of commercial exchange.

—With regard to peace and peaceful coexistence, Sékou Touré affirmed: ". . .The conception of peace prevailing at the international level is that of avoiding a confrontation between East and West; in other words, between the capitalist world and the socialist world. This conception is wrong and we denounce it."

—The UN was characterized as an impotent organization ". . .incapable of assuring the freedom and progress of the peoples."

—Confirmed Guinea's aid to the national liberation movements of the African colonies and of Viet-Nam, and expressed greetings to the peoples of Latin America.

After discussion and approval of the various subjects and documents of interest to the Congress (ideological and political reorganization of the leadership of the Party; economic and cultural development; mass political participation; foreign policy), Sékou Touré delivered the closing address, emphasizing the following points:

—Announcement of an amnesty for the prisoners implicated in the conspiracy of 1961.

—Return of the Senegal River to the Interstate Committee which is composed also of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal.

—Improvement of relations with Senegal, and the desire to renew collaboration with France on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

—Emphasized the historic ties with both these nations and said that the policy of the DPG is that of maintaining relations with all African States.

—Asserted that Guinea will continue to help all revolutionary movements, especially those of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Zimbabwe and South Africa, and stated that Latin Americans should know that Guinea is on their side in the struggle against neocolonialism.

Finally, he pointed out the unconditional support of the struggle of the Arab peoples and warned that while Israel occupies the territories of those nations, Guinea too considers itself occupied.

¶ Three current developments have occupied the spotlight of the Dominican political scene:

I) Repercussions to the thesis "dictatorship by popular acclaim" as the sole way out for the peoples of Latin America. These pronouncements, made by ex-president Juan Bosch, brought, as a consequence, the adoption of different positions by the leaders of the Dominican Revolutionary Party. One may see two streams: one defending the thesis in its entirety, headed by Deputy Jottin Cury and supported by Peña Gómez, now president of the PRD; and the other, in opposition, directed by Senator Pablo Rafael Casimiro Castro, who is Propaganda Secretary of that Party.

II) There are indications that this situation must reach a definitive stage sometime in the immediate future, and two results are possible: either a breakup of the PRD with the development of a new party organized by the proponents of the Boschist thesis, or a radical redevelopment on organizational lines in the event that Bosch supporters are expelled from the party by their opponents.

III) Another important aspect is the rumour of a coup d'etat to be instigated by circles allied with General Wessin y Wessin, a situation that was tacitly admitted as certain by President Joaquín Balaguer in a speech delivered on November 21 in which he appealed to the armed forces for order.

¶ King Hussein continues importing great quantities of merchandise, handicrafts, fruit, olive oil and wheat from the so-called west bank in spite of its being occupied by Israel. The trucks which transport the goods travel without difficulty between Amman and Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nablus and other regions.

CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

by Jacques Vignes

A kind of specialized encyclopedia: that is the project on Africa that editors such as Feltrinelli suddenly found in their hands. Eight volumes (with four of the titles still in the provisional stage) will be published in Europe early in 1968. The first two volumes cover more than two-thirds of the African continent. Before writing the third, the author decided to spend a year (1967-68) studying in Egypt to get a firsthand view of such particular problems as Nilotic Africa (Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia-Somaliland) and Austral Africa (from the Congo to the Cape). While the dates of publication will not allow complete coverage, every new volume will contain an appendix with a brief study of the events which have occurred in the countries dealt with.

Jacques Vignes, the author of this gigantic study, is forty-six, has three children and leads a many-sided life in which travel, journalistic assignments and writing play alternating roles. His last novel was *The Gates to the Sea.* He was born in Bordeaux, completed his secondary studies and then received a bachelor's degree in philosophy and a diploma in higher studies. But the war postponed what promised to be the beginning of a literary career. He joined the underground, became a guerrilla fighter, and later a non-commissioned officer in the First French Army. He received the Croix de Guerre in October, 1944.

In 1948 the premature death of his father forced him to return to Bordeaux where for nine years he managed a company specializing in the manufacture of concrete and bricks. His business activities led him to make a trip to the French colonies of West Africa. In 1957 he left his brother to manage the firm and settled in Paris as a journalist. The war in Algeria was reaching its climax and Vignes, having taken a stand, was prosecuted in February 1960 for "threatening the security of the state." He made his way to Tunis and the Algerian-Moroccan frontier.

His report, *Algerians at War,* was published. He stayed for a time in Guinea and Mali and moved to Algeria after the victorious Revolution. There, he established an African Documentation Center and became one of the main contributors to the newspaper *Révolution Africaine.* From 1963 to 1965 he travelled constantly through Africa, visiting almost the whole of the continent and began work on the outline of *Contemporary Africa.*

Before returning to France to continue his journalistic and literary activities, Vignes had been named head of the Algerian Finance Ministry.

This issue of *Tricontinental*'s section "Books of Today" is wholly devoted, because of its great interest, to the exclusive advance publication of extensive extracts from the first volume, *Dependence and Economic Exploitation,* which allows an appreciation of one of many aspects explored by the author. The political viewpoints such as those he expresses in the chapter *Functions of the Political Parties in Africa,* for instance, will surely stimulate considerable polemics, because Jacques Vignes has such a complete grasp of African problems — the role of the single party, socialism, the diversity of classes, about which there still exist very dissimilar criteria.

MONETARY DECOLONIZATION

(. . .) It is not out of the question for different economic and political evolution to impose sooner or later some modifications of the rules of a "sterling club" which would appear, after all, as much more homogeneous than the franc system and closer in any case, to the CFA formula than to that of the "advance accounts." The unfortunate attempt made by Dr. Nkrumah to obtain this type of modification was the first manifestation of this trend. But only the creation of an African continental monetary zone — at least one with continental aims — which would have from the start a large enough territorial base, would be able to solve both the problems of dependence and those arising from the rivalries between the frequently divergent interests of the different zones. Can such a creation be envisaged in the near future? It would entail that significant economic as well as political changes be carried out. In particular, it entails that African monetary union be strong and firm enough to force the industrialized world to adopt forms of aid and trade no longer closely bound to the present monetary zones. Because in the post-colonial period currency has become one of the most efficacious tools of imperial policy, it is correct to think that Africa will be able to achieve monetary decolonization only at the price of a long and hard battle and that, with few exceptions, waging this struggle is beyond the possibilities of each of the micro-nations divided up at present among twenty-five (25) currency systems and four zones of influence or direct domination.

It is evident that in the face of this scattering, a number of nations find immediate advantages

through direct ties with one or another pole of world power. Most of these nations would find themselves seriously handicapped if they were seized with the desire to break those ties without first building a new system. But will the time come when it will become apparent that the way to development passes necessarily through this new form of liberation and where the countries that still exert indirect power in Africa will themselves agree — or will find themselves forced to agree — that truly facilitating this development constitutes the only worthwhile enterprise? It is doubtless unnecessary to point out that we are still not at that point.

The most direct threats against the supremacy of the old colonial powers do not come in most cases from African leaders but from the only Western power that did not share in the dividing up of Africa: the United States.

FRENCH BASTIONS AND AMERICAN INFILTRATION

Through the operation of its monetary zone, France has, on the whole, retained strong economic and political influence in its former colonies. Only Guinea has changed orbit. However, there are numerous regions where the United States has staked out claims. Contrary to a widely held opinion, such infiltration did not begin with independence but with the end of World War II and even during the war. The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia drove the Allies, and in the first place the United States, to seek in Africa what they could no longer obtain for themselves in the Pacific. It was during this period that Firestone developed its rubber plantations in Liberia and the Union-Minière du Haut-Katanga was delivering to the Pentagon the uranium that was to be used in the making of the first atomic bombs.

Later, U S capital was invested in formerly French Africa in association with European capital. There are many reasons why this is so. The mines that have been exploited in West Africa for the past twenty years are frequently huge. The massive entry into a country's market of the production of even one such mine (for example, of iron or bauxite) would pose absorption and reconversion problems. Moreover, investors try to divide up the risks: four iron mines exploited by four associated groups in four different countries offer greater over-all security than the exploitation of just one mine by each isolated group. Finally, the possibility of outlets in the U.S. market are not negligible. If such outlets are secured, it is possible to conceive

larger production units, thus cutting selling prices.

The bauxite mining and aluminum manufacturing complex built in Guinea by the FRIA corporation, the technical direction of which is guaranteed by Péchiney, belongs in reality to a Franco-U S consortium with British (10%), Swiss (10%) and German (5%) participation. Olin-Mathieson (USA) owns 48.5% of the firm's capital as compared with Péchiney's 26.5%. Each shareholder is committed to take a share of the aluminum production corresponding to the proportion of stock it owns.

This rule of dividing the production according to the stock held is in general applied in associations of this kind. This is the case, for example, in Gabon, where the U S Bethlehem Steel group has an important position in the Ogoué Mining Company (Comilog) which exploits manganese reserves in the Franceville region. We find the same group, Bethlehem Steel, once again in Gabon in the Mekambo Iron Mining Company whose aim is the exploitation of a deposit which undoubtedly contains over 500 million tons of ore with an average mineral content of 65%. Bethlehem owns 49% of the shares of Comilog, the bulk of the remainder being controlled by the Mokta Company. Bethlehem owns half the Mekambo Company's capital. The balance is held by French (34%) and European (16%) steel interests.

In Senegal, the U S trust International Mineral and Chemical Corporation (IMC) owns 12% of the Taiba Phosphate Company. Newmont Mining (Morgan-Lazard) is closely related to Zellidja-Pennaroya (Rothschild in the mining of Algerian-Moroccan non-ferrous metal. Finally, it is necessary to take into account the important U S interests in petroleum research and in soft-drink factories (Coca-Cola, Pepsi Cola, etc.).

But it is mainly through the financial apparatus (banks and development societies) that U S penetration in formerly French Africa appears most clearly, as well as the close ties binding "Atlantic" capitals across all political conjunctures. It is an interesting point to examine: it reveals one of the most efficacious instruments for the dependence of the African countries in regard to the groups of international interests.

THE NEW "AFRICAN" BANKS

From 1962 on, all of French-speaking Africa has been undergoing profound changes in the structures of the banking apparatus. It would undoubtedly be a long and tiresome process to enumerate all of the mergers, all of the social changes and all the new

divisions of capital that have taken place, inasmuch as the trend is the same in all cases. It has been a matter of creating "national" or "regional" banks as a cover for fanning out participation by offering a respectable place to U S., Swiss, Italian, Dutch and Belgian banks. At the same time the private savings or public investments of the new independent states are offered more or less symbolic participation. Without doubt French interests have retained the majority shares in the new companies, but the newcomers' share is far from negligible.

In Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Cameroun and the Congo-Brazzaville, the Société Générale has transformed its former affiliates, keeping 51% of the shares and associating itself with three other French banks (9% of the total), an Italian bank, a German bank and Crédit Suisse (20%) plus the important Bankers Trust of the Morgan group (10%).

For its part the BNCI has set up a banking syndicate, the Société Financière, for the overseas countries, crowning a whole series of African banks in Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Cameroun, the Congo-Leopoldville (Kinshasa), Ruanda and Burundi. This syndicate is made up of the Bank of America (considered the world's largest bank), its Italian affiliate, the Banco d'America e d'Italia, the Cie. d'Outremer pour la Finance et l'Industrie (Lamsels) and the Berliner Handelgesellshaft. The Société Financière for the overseas countries has a Geneva affiliate, the United Overseas Bank.

Another international syndicate, the UFIDA (International Financial Union for the Development of Africa), the Crédit Lyonnais, the Morgan Guaranty Trust, the Banco Commerciale Italiano and the Dresdner Bank are associated as well as a certain number of specialized commercial companies: CFAO (Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale), SCOA (Société Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain), Cie. Optorg, which transferred its Indochinese interests to Africa, Société du Niger Français, a subsidiary of Unilever. We once again find the Morgan Guaranty Trust in the Gabon Banking Union and the Bank of America in the Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank.

It is nevertheless evident that U S interests remain, in the former French Union, a minority. It is thus a matter of infiltration rather than a takeover. However, the movement does exist and must not be ignored.

THE U S IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING AFRICA AND IN THE CONGO?

In the English-speaking countries and in the ex-Belgian Congo there is also an infiltration of U S interests, but here it has a broader scope. We will leave out Liberia which evolved as a satellite of the U S economy. Apart from that small country, it is mainly in Nigeria, the Congo, South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Libya that the United States has chosen footholds and bases for investment, both directly and through Federal German banks and industrial firms. Since 1962, for example, U S imports to the Congo have been higher than those from Belgium. In Libya, the ESSO group controls practically all the oil production.

One of the most spectacular, although little-known, actions carried out by U S financial groups in Africa since 1945 concerns diamonds. African mines provide close to 98.5% of world diamond production. The stones are mined in principally three regions: the south, from the Cape to the Congo; the center, Tanganyika and Central Africa; and the west, Ghana, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast and Guinea. In all, close to 30 million carats are removed from African soil each year, of which 25 million are for industrial uses and the remaining five million for jewelry. The Congo is the leading producer of industrial diamonds with 16 million carats, followed by the west African countries with 6 300 000 carats. For stones used in jewelry-making, the leaders are South Africa and South-West Africa, with 2 200 000 carats, followed by the west African countries with 1 600 000 carats. Until recently the world diamond market, excepting the socialist countries, was controlled by the Anglo-Dutch group, de Beers-Oppenheimer. After 1945 a U S concern, CAST (Consolidated Selection Trust), a subsidiary of the group Selection Trust American Metal Climax, has been attempting to take away the de Beers monopoly. It has not hesitated to encourage the clandestine diamond trade in the west African countries. Liberia was used as a base to carry out this operation. In the "free buying offices" opened in Monrovia, the clandestine prospectors of Guinea, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast and even from Ghana were invited starting in 1950 to trade their stones for dollars. Result: seven years later, Liberia was exporting 757 000 carats. In 1959, these exports reached 877 000 carats and became stabilized later at around one million. At the same time CAST obtained a concession in Sierra Leone and created the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, leaving to de Beers the control of the production of the small

African prospectors, the same who supplied the Monrovia free buying offices, while the Sierra Leone Selection Trust set up a subsidiary in Guinea, the Soguinex. In 1960 another CAST subsidiary, the West African Selection Trust, obtained a concession in the Ivory Coast in partnership with another U S firm, Harry Winston, Inc. Upon the advice of this new concessionaire, the Ivory Coast Government decided to open its own free buying office to drain off the clandestine production of Ghana and Guinea. Ivory Coast exports suddenly soared from 200 000 to 500 000 carats a year. CAST finally obtained the technical direction of the Ghana field known as the Akin Concession.

Things became even more disquieting for de Beers since another U S group, Guggenheim (Kennecott Copper and American Smelting and Refining Co.), specializing in non-ferrous metals, succeeded in acquiring 25% of the stock of the Forminière, one of the Congo's principal diamond producers, owning interests in Diamang (Angola Diamond). Rather than pursue a struggle contrary to its interests, de Beers preferred to compromise, leaving CASE a share of the market. This understanding was made concrete by the entry of a de Beers representative into the CAST board of directors and in 1964, by the association of the two groups for prospecting in Bechuanaland. To end our examination of this affair, let us note that American Metal Climax, parent company of CASE, is one of the big copper producers in Zambia, where it is associated with the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa.

Regardless of the concessions it has made, it can be said of Great Britain, just as we have said of France, that its economic interests in its former African Colonies are still the predominant ones and are well-defended by the political cohesion evidenced by the Commonwealth. In addition, Britain, in contrast to France, whose influence has never gone beyond the framework of its former colonies, despite the efforts made since 1960 to regroup French-speaking Africa, has always benefitted from considerably important establishments outside of the territories it dominated. Let us mention only the case of the Sudan: this Anglo-Egyptian condominion was in fact a Crown colony, so great was Egypt's domination by Britain. Ethiopia, for its part, before being conquered by Italy, was not without vassal relations with London. However, it is mainly in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique that England, favored by the influence that it

had long exerted over Portugal itself, extended a more or less disguised domination, as well as in the Congolese province of Katanga through the British corporation, Tanganyika Concession.

But there too, and more clearly than in the Commonwealth countries, British influence is being defeated by that of the U S. By purchasing an important packet of stock in the Tanganyika Concession, the U S Rockefeller interests have introduced themselves into the very heart of the Copper Belt system of exploitation. In Angola the Americans are not alien to the takeover by the German Krupp interests of the Moçamedes region with the Cassinga iron mines and the Serpo Pinto railroad which is to be extended to Lusaka, thus offering a new outlet to Zambian minerals; Moçamedes, with its Tiger Bay, although tigers have never been seen in Africa, possesses one of the most beautiful natural ports of the west coast.

Finally, it is necessary to say a word about Italian penetration in Africa as a whole. In oil, the ENI which, after the death of Enrico Mattei, has formed close ties with the international cartel, is installing throughout the continent a vast network for refining and distribution. Under the sign of Agip and the eight-legged dog, the automatic pumps are beginning to be complemented by motels and cafeterias. In another domain, public works, the Impregato firm, in which Fiat has important interests, is securing for itself little by little a quasi-monopoly of the construction of high dams such as those on the Zambesi in Rhodesia and Mozambique, on the Niger in Nigeria and on the Volta in Ghana.

AN EFFECTIVE MEANS FOR PENETRATING DEPENDENCE

These changes and interferences of interests, not by any means as contradictory as might be believed, do not greatly modify the dependent character of the economy of the different African countries. Using the rivalries among the powers to attempt to broaden the margin of maneuver can confer some tactical advantages, but political subtleties, no matter how refined they may be, cannot suffice to create the conditions for development and economic independence. These two aspects of the problem are not necessarily overlapping. A certain form of development can occur in a situation of dependence, and even at the cost of reinforcing dependence. In order to arrive at this unfortunate result there is an almost infallible process: grant exclusive attention to the creation of units of industrial or mining production to the detri-

ment of the transformation of social structures, the development of agricultural production and —something that does not always go along with the former— the living standard in the countryside. What does indeed take place in this case? In the absence of national capital, technicians and markets, the units created are always conceived "from without," that is, in function of the needs of foreign markets and therefore aimed at producing either raw materials, or slightly processed goods.

The massive incorporation of labor, which represents the only real source of enrichment, will take place where there are domestic markets to complement the foreign markets, of which the African country that provides raw materials generally forms part.

In brief, it is the slave-trade economy perpetuated in a modern disguise, with the conscious or unconscious complicity of the privileged few who at the same time hold power and benefit from the meager riches that the system distributes day after day. How could it be any different? The cake is too small to be widely distributed. Or rather it is distributed as crumbs. In any case it cannot be a matter of keeping a piece as provisions. The share of profits that returns to the country is in the form of a tax that barely suffices to allow the State to live. The rest of the profits are remitted as soon as they are amassed.

And there is not much that can be done about this fact: investors have their main sphere of interest outside the country. They refuse to accumulate assets in places that they do not completely control and where they have no use for them. The wages paid to generally unskilled African labor are too low to produce a training effect; or rather, this effect is so weak that it becomes imperceptible. What must be done? Private returns are on the whole too small to allow any hope to be conceived to the effect that important resources could be drawn from them as direct taxation, which is still difficult to enact. Foreign aid often serves to improve local infra-structure; this is not negligible but it only creates temporary employment and offers possibilities from which the people of the country only profit to a limited extent, or in any case, in a secondary way- the main result will be to facilitate the exploitation of new deposits. Meanwhile, the rural world stagnates, the exodus to the cities becomes more pronounced and economic and social maladjustment goes on.